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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
Case No. CV -2006-7097
Plaintiff,
vs.
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho
corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation,
and Sill,TNYSISDE INDUSTRIAL AND
PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability corporation,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND
ORDER

Defendants.

I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 18,2006, Printcraft Press, Inc. ("Printcraft") commenced this
action against Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. ("Sunnyside Utilities"), Sunnyside Park
Owners Association, Inc. ("SPOA"), and Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park,
LLC ("SIPP") (collectively "Defendants"). On July 19, 2007, Printcraft filed a first
amended complaint seeking damages from the defendants for breach of a third party
utility agreement, failure to disclose and/or misrepresentation, constructive fraud for
failure to disclose the size of a sewer system and its limitations, and constructive fraud
for failure to disclose the existence of a third party beneficiary utility agreement.
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d '-

,-i

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

On July 19, 2007, each defendant filed an answer and motion for summary
judgment. Sunnyside Utilities supported its motion with excerpts of a deposition from
Travis Waters ("Waters"). SPOA and SIPP supported their motions with discovery
responses and the Affidavit of Kirk Woolf ("Woolf'). On August 2, 2007, Printcraft
filed a memorandum in opposition with the affidavits of Lane V. Erickson and Waters.
On August, 102007, the Court heard oral argument on the defendants' motions
for summary judgment. The COUli also heard oral argument on motions for continuance
and to strike by Printcraft. The Court granted the motion to strike in part, and denied it in
part. The Court denied the motion for continuance. The Court took the motions for
summary judgment under advisement. Having considered the record, legal memoranda
and oral argument, the Court makes its decision.

II.

STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION

A motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), I.R.C.P.; Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 597,
600,944 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1997). Upon considering a motion for summary judgment, all
controverted facts are liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. Friel v. Boise

City Housing Authority, 126 Idaho 484, 485,887 P.2d 29 (1994). Where a jury will
decide the facts at trial, the cOUli must draw all reasonable factual inferences and
conclusions in favor of the non-moving party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126
Idaho 527, 529, 887 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1994). In ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the district court is not permitted to weigh the evidence or to resolve
r~
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controverted factual issues. Bybee v. Clark, 118 Idaho 254, 257, 796 P.2d 131, 134
(1990).
The pariy moving for summary judgment always bears the burden of proving that
no genuine issue of material fact exists on an element of the non-moving party's case. If
the moving party fails to challenge an element or fails to present evidence establishing
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on that element, the burden does not shift
to the non-moving pariy, and the non-moving party is not required to respond with
supporting evidence. Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., at 600,944 P.2d at 1363.
If the moving party has met its burden by either an affirmative showing of the
moving party's evidence or by a review of the non-moving party's evidence, the burden
shifts to the non-moving party to establish that a genuine issue for trial does exist. ld;
Navarrette v. City of Caldwell, 130 Idaho 849, 851,949 P.2d 597, 599 (1997). To
withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's case must be
anchored in something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough
to create a genuine issue. Nelson, A.1.A. v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 410, 797 P.2d 117, 118
(1990); Zimmerman v. Volkswagen ofAmerica, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 70
(1996).
Rule 56(e), LR.C.P., requires that both supporting and opposing affidavits be
made on personal knowledge, set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Moreover, inadmissible opinions or conclusions do not satisfy the requirements for proof
of material facts. Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Co., 122 Idaho 778, 783-786, 839
P.2d 1192,1197-1200 (1992). The question of admissibility of affidavit and deposition
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testimony is a threshold question to be answered by the trial court before applying the
required liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule in favor of the party opposing
a motion for summary judgment. No objection or motion to strike is required before a
trial court may exclude or not consider evidence offered by a party, Hecla ~Mining Co.,
122 Idaho at 784, 839 P.2d at 1198; Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 45, 844 P.2d 24,27
(et. App. 1992).

III.
A.

MATERIAL FACTS

UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

Waters is the owner and president of Printcraft, which is an Idaho corporation.
Sunnyside Utilities, SPOA and SIPP are Idaho corporations with Woolf and Doyle Beck
("Beck") as the officers and/or members.
In 1996, SIPP obtained a permit from District Seven Health Department ("District
Seven") for a septic system and tank. The system currently serves SPOA, which is the
owners association for SIPP. Sunnyside Utilities is responsible for providing the septic
services to SPOA and its members pursuant to an agreement entered into on April 16,
2002 entitled "Third Pmiy Beneficiary Utility Agreement" ("Agreement"). The
Agreement provides that Sunnyside Utilities would provide the following service for
SPOA and its members:
[T]he present and future owners of or occupants of all and each of the
properties, buildings, and other improvements which are now or may
hereafter be served by the water supply systems and/or sewage systems of
the Company as well as the holders of any mortgage or mortgages
covering any such buildings, and other properties and improvements.
(Agreement, Sec. l(a)) See also Agreement, Sec. 10(b).
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On September 12,2005, CTR Development, LLC ("CTR") paid Sunnyside
Utilities a sewer connection fee for a new building that would be served by the system.
Either Printcraft or CTR provided Sunnyside Utilities with the blueprints of the new
building. On January 23, 2006, CTR transferred its property to J&LB Propeliies. On the
same day, J&LB Properties entered into a written lease agreement with CTR
Management, LLC ("CTR Management"). Also on the same day, CTR Management
entered into an oralmonth-to-month sublease agreement with Printcraft. Printcraft
subsequently began occupying the premises for its printing business.
Printcraft discharged water softener brine, hazardous wastes, processed water and
excessive flows of wastewater into the system in violation ofIDAPA 58.01.03.004.03.
On June 9, 2006, the sewer system overflowed. On December 15, 2006, Sunnyside
Utilities severed the sewer connection to Printcraft.

B.

DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

The pm1ies strongly dispute the cause of the system's failure and the events that
occurred subsequent to the system's failure. However, construing the facts liberally in
favor of Printcraft, the non-moving party, the Court assumes the following facts for
purposes ofthis motion only.
The system failed as a result of Sunnyside Utilities' lack of care and compliance
with District Seven regulations. Waters and Woolf met on September, 25 2006 to discuss
issues relating to the system's failure. During the meeting, Printcratl: showed Woolf the
premises, specifically indicating the substances it discharged into the system and the
sources of the discharges. Woolf and Beck knew the nature of Printcraft's business and
the types of substances it would discharge into the system as a result of the blueprints
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Sunnyside Utilities had received previously. Despite its prior acceptance of Printcraft' s
discharges, Sunnyside Utilities asked Printcraft to either eliminate various discharges or
change the points of discharge. Printcraft complied with the requests and Sunnyside
Utilities, through Wolf, approved of the alterations in early October 2006.

IV.

ANALYSIS

A.

SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1.

Breach of Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement

Sunnyside Utilities argues that it was justified in disconnecting the septic system
to Printcraft because Printcraft discharged various substances into the system in violation
of state and federal law and Sunnyside Utilities' Rules and Regulations. Sunnyside
Utilities cites Bantz v. Bongard, 124 Idaho 780, 785, 864 P.2d 618,623 (1993) and Tolley
v. THI Co., 140 Idaho 253, 262, 92 P.3d 503, 512 (2004). SU11l1yside Utilities

additionally argues that the Court granted SU11l1yside Utilities' summary judgment on
July 5, 2007 holding that Printcraft violated state and federal law and Sunnyside Utilities'
Rules and Regulations. Finally, Sunnyside Utilities argues that Printcraft is not entitled
to enforce the Agreement because Printcraft is an incidental beneficiary. SmIDyside
primarily cites I.C. § 29-102; Shmp v. WH Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 305, 796 P.2d
506,514 (1990); and Stewart v. Arrington ConstT'. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 446 P.2d 895
(1968).
In response, Printcraft argues that when the Court granted summary judgment to
Sunnyside Utilities, it also allowed Printcraft to file an amended complaint so no finding
was made as to Printcraft violating the law or Sunnyside Utilities' regulations. Printcraft
also argues that it cannot be charged with breaching the Agreement before September

r:
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2006 because it was unaware of the Agreement until that time. Printcraft further argues
that there were no violations subsequent to September 2006 because it entered into and
complied with a separate agreement that it made with the defendants in October 2006.
Printcraft cites several cases setting forth general contract law, but does not cite any legal
authority specifically supporting the foregoing arguments. In response to Sunnyside
Utilities' argument regarding incidental beneficiaries, Printcraft argues that no one in the
Sunnyside Professional and Industrial Park could be an intended beneficiary under the
Defendants' logic and "[t]he title of the Agreement makes it clear that there has to be a
third party somewhere [and] Printcraft is an 'occupant' as defined by the strict language
of the Agreement itself and is therefore an intended beneficiary."
In reply, Sunnyside Utilities argues that the Court's decision to grant the motion
to amend has no bearing on whether the Court should grant the current motion for
summary judgment. Sunnyside Utilities supports this argument with Thomas v. A1edical
Or. Physicians, 138 Idaho 200, 61 P.3d 557 (2002). Sunnyside Utilities disputes that an

agreement was reached in October 2006, but argues that even if the parties entered into
an agreement, it is illegal and unenforceable because Printcraft continued to violate state
and federal law. Sunnyside Utilities cites Barry v. Pac. West Canst., 140 Idaho 827, 832,
103 P.3d 440, 445 (2004). Finally, Sunnyside Utilities argues that there is no
requirement that an agreement entitled "Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement" must
have an intended third party beneficiary. Moreover, Sunnyside Utilities argues that there
are intended third party beneficiaries under the Agreement, but that Printcraft is not part
of the class.
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First, the Court will address Printcraft's argument regarding the Court's Order.
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated:
The dual purposes of Rule 15(a) are to allow claims to be
determined on the merits rather than technicalities and to make pleadings
serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of the claim and the
facts that are at issue. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho
866, 871, 993 P.2d 1197, 1202 (1999) (citation omitted). A court may
consider whether the allegations sought to be added to the complaint state
a valid claim in determining whether to grant leave to amend the
complaint. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc., v. Idaho First Nat'!
Bank NA., 119 Idaho 171, 175,804 P.2d 900, 904 (1991). A court,
however, may not consider the sufficiency of evidence supporting the
claim sought to be added in determining leave to amend because that is
more properly determined at the summary judgment stage. Christensen
Family Trust, 133 Idaho at 872, 993 P.2d at 1203.
Thomas at 210,61 P.3d at 567.
The Court agrees with Sunnyside Utilities that the Court's Order granting the
motion to amend has no bearing on the current motion for summary judgment. Under
I.R.C.P. 15(a), the Court could not consider the sufficiency of the evidence relating to
Printcraft's motion to amend. As stated by the Thomas Court, summary judgment is the
proper stage to consider the sufficiency of the evidence. Therefore, the fact that the
Court granted Printcraft's motion to amend does not mean that the Court cannot grant
Sunnyside Utilities' motion for summary judgment if Sunnyside Utilities meets its
burden of proof and Printcraft fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact.
Next, the Court will address Printcraft's arguments regarding its ignorance of the
Agreement until September 2006 and its compliance with the alleged October 2006
agreement. The Court agrees with Printcraft that lack of knowledge of a contract may
prevent the contract from having binding effect on a party without knowledge. See
Pitner v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 94 Idaho 496, 498, 491 P.2d 1268, 1270 (1971) ("A
1-
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necessary element in the formation of a valid bilateral contract of cancellation is mutual
assent.") (citing Fox v. Bankers L{fe & Casualty Co., 61 Wash.2d 636, 379 P.2d 724
(1963) and 45 c.J.S. Insurance s 444 (1946)). Furthermore, a party's compliance with an
agreement typically precludes judgment against the complying party. However,
Printcraft has not offered any evidence rebutting Sunnyside Utilities' evidence that
Printcraft violated IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03 by discharging water softener brine,
hazardous wastes, processed water and excessive flows of wastewater into the system. 1
Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no issue of material fact that Printcraft
discharged substances into the sewer system in violation of state law? Sunnyside
Utilities was justified in severing Printcraft's sewer connection in light of this illegality.
The fact that Printcraft may not have been aware ofIDAPA 58.01.03.004.03 does not
excuse Printcraft's illegal disposal because "[i]gnorance of the law is not a defense."
State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993) (citing Hale v. Morgan, 22
Ca1.3d 388, 149 Cal.Rptr. 375, 380, 584 P.2d 512, 517 (1978)). Finally, the alleged
October 2006 agreement does not change this result. The Idaho Supreme Court has
stated:
The Court will not enforce an illegal contract. Quiring, 130 Idaho
at 568, 944 P.2d at 703. Illegal contracts are void, and generally the Court
will "leave the parties where it finds them." Id.; Trees, 138 Idaho at 9,56
P.3d at 771; Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 611, 990 P.2d 1219,
1222 (Ct. App. 1999). This Court has stated that, "the rationale for
leaving the parties where the law finds them is premised on the notion that
I IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03 provides that "Cooling water, backwash or backflush water, hot tub or spa water,
air condition water, water softener brine, groundwater, oil, or roof drainage cannot be discharged into any
system unless that discharge is approved by the Director."

2 As noted previously, Sunnyside Utilities also alleges that Printcraft violated federal law. Printcraft has
failed to refute this allegation as well. However, the Court was unable to locate any references to federal
law by Sunnyside Utilities regarding this issue other than saying Printcraft violated "applicable federal
laws" or "EPA regulations." Accordingly, the COUli will not discuss the federal law that Printcraft
allegedly violated.
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both parties are equally at fault." Trees, 138 Idaho at 9,56 P.3d at 771.
When the Court "leaves the parties where it finds them," it denies
recovery to either party. Morrison v. Young, 136 Idaho 316, 319, 32 P.3d
1116,1119 (2001); Kunz, 133 Idaho at 612,990 P.2d at 1223.
Jd. Any agreement between the parties that allowed Printcraft to continue to violate
IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03 is illegal and unenforceable. Therefore, Sunnyside Utilities'
termination of septic service to Printcraft because of state law violations is not an
enforceable breach.
Finally, the Court will address Sunnyside Utilities' argument that Printcraft
cannot enforce the Agreement because Printcraft is an incidental beneficiary. The Idaho
COUli of Appeals has stated:
In order for a third paIiy beneficiary to recover on a breach of contract
claim, the third party must show that the contract was made for his or her
direct benefit and that he or she is more than a mere incidental beneficiary.
Dawson v. Eldredge) 84 Idaho 331, 337, 372 P.2d 414, 418 (1962). The
contract itself must express an intent to benefit the third party. Stewart v.
Arrington Constr. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 532,446 P.2d 895, 901 (1968).

Nelson v. Anderson lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 708,99 P.3d 1092, 1098 (Cl. App.
2004). The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that not only must a third-party be a
direct beneficiary to recover, but the third party must be a member of a limited class to
recover. The Court stated:
In order to recover as a third party beneficiary, it is not necessary
that the individual be named and identified as an individual although that
is usually sufficient; a third party may enforce a contract if he can show he
is a member of a limited class for whose benefit it was made. Johnson v.
Holmes Tuttle Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 160 Cal.App.2d 290, 325 P.2d 193
(1958). The class may be limited either by a narrow description of the
injuries to be guarded against and the damages to be paid, Anderson v.
Rexroad, 175 Kan. 676, 266 P.2d 320 (1954), or by a similar description
of the class to be protected. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co. v.
Delong Corp., 246 Or. 369,425 P.2d 498 (1967); Shell v. Schmidt, 272
P.2d 82 (Cal. 1954). Where the group to be benefited is large and vaguely
defined, individual members are no more than incidental beneficiaries and
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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no rights are created by virtue of the contract between the public body and
the contractor. Davis v. Nelson-Deppe, supra; Sauve v. Title Gar. and
Sur. Co., 29 Idaho 146, 158 P. 112 (1916); Earl E. Roher Trans. & s. Co.
v. Hutchinson Water Co., 182 Kan. 546, 322 P.2d 810 (1958).
Stewart v. Arrington Canst. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 532,446 P.2d 895,901 (1968). It is
undisputed that the only class to which Printcraft might belong under the Agreement is
the class defined in Section l(a) or Section 10(b) of the Agreement. As stated previously,
Sections 1(a) and 1O(b) state in relevant part that Sunnyside Utilities will provide
ongoing service to the following customers
[T]he present and future owners of or occupants of all and each of the
properties, buildings, and other improvements which are now or may
hereafter be served by the water supply systems and/or sewage systems of
the Company [Sunnyside Utilities] as well as the holders of any mortgage
or mOligages covering any such buildings, and other properties and
improvements.
(Agreement, Sec. 1(a» See also Sec. 1O(b). Printcraft is an "occupant" of a
property "served by" the "sewage system" of Sunnyside Utilities. Therefore, Printcraft is
clearly an intended beneficiary of the Agreement.
2.

Constructive Fraud

Sunnyside Utilities argues that the Court should grant its motion for summary
judgment dismissing the failure to disclose and/or misrepresentation and constructive
fraud claims for four reasons. 3 First Sunnyside Utilities argues that it had no duty to
disclose information to Printcraft because there was no fiduciary or other similar
relationship between the pmiies that would give rise to a duty to disclose. Sunnyside
Utilities supports this argument primarily with Sowards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702, 707,
3 As indicated in the procedural history section of this decision, Printcraft's complaint included causes of
action for breach of the Agreement, failure to disclose and/or misrepresentation, and two claims for
constructive fraud. Each of these causes of action can be properly addressed under "constructive fraud."
Therefore, the Court is addressing and considering each of these causes of action when it uses the tenn
"constructive fraud."

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
11
~

A

~

J0J

8 P.3d 1245, 1250 (2000) and "Mitchell v. Barendregt, 120 Idaho 837, 844, 820 P.2d 707,
714 (Ct. App. 1991) (overruled on other grounds by Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 17
P.3d 247 (2000). Second, Sunnyside Utilities argues that the facts not disclosed were
immaterial to Printcraft's decision to enter into the sublease with CTR Management.
Sunnyside Utilities cites Aspiazu v. Mortimer, 139 Idaho 548, 82 P.3d 830 (2003) to
define materiality. Third, Sunnyside Utilities argues that Printcraft cam10t establish
reliance because it did not have a right to reliance and did not do anything in reliance of
the non-disclosures. Sunnyside Utilities cites Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 507, 112
P.3d 788, 795 (2005) as general background of the reliance element of fraud. Fourth,
Sunnyside Utilities argues that Printcraft did not suffer any damages as a direct and
proximate result of any alleged non-disclosure by Sunnyside Utilities. Sunnyside
Utilities does not cite any legal authority in support of its final argument.
Printcraft responds that Sunnyside Utilities had a duty to disclose: (1) under the
terms of the Agreement; (2) because the development was named "Sunnyside
Professional and Industrial Park" indicating that industrial activity was permitted; (3)
pursuant to a letter sent by District Seven to SIPP on April 15, 2002 indicating that
District Seven prohibited further sewer connections to SIPP; and (4) because Woolf
and/or Beck knew of the nature of Printer aft's business from the blueprints, but failed to
warn Waters of the septic system's limitations. Printcraft supports the argument that
there was a duty to disclose by citing Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616, 620, 962 P.2d 387,
391 (1998). Second, Printcraft argues that the failure to disclose was material because
Printcraft would not have occupied the premises if it had known of the limitations of the
sewer system. Printcraft cites Watts, supra and Restatement (Second) of Torts §538(2)
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(1977). Third, Printcraft argues that it had a right to rely on the non-disclosures and that
it justifiable relied on the non-disclosures. Printcraft argues its reliance is analogous to
the fact pattern in Watts, supra. Fourth, Printcraft argues that it suffered damages
because Sunnyside Utilities disconnected it from the sewer system after it had complied
with the October 2006 agreement.
In reply, Sunnyside Utilities argues that Watts does not apply to this case by
analogy because Watts involved a relationship of trust and confidence that is not present
in this case.
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated:
To successfully bring an action for fraud, a plaintiff must establish
the existence of the following elements: (1) a statement or a representation
offact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its
falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that there be reliance; (6) the hearer's
ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8)
justifiable reliance; and (9) resultant injury. Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3,
10, 56 P.3d 765, 772 (2002). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( c) governs
the grant of summary judgment on the issue of fraud. Lettunich v. Key
Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 368 fn. 1, 109 P.3d 1104, 1110 fn. 1
(2005).

Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166 (2007). The Court has additionally
stated:
Fraud may be established by silence where the defendant had a
duty to speak. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1108,
63 L.Ed.2d 348 (1980); see also Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37,
740 P.2d 1022 (1987) (failure to disclose may amount to a
misrepresentation); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55,415 P.2d 698
(1966) (failure to disclose may amount to a misrepresentation); Jones v.
Majestas, 108 Idaho 69, 696 P.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1985) (fraud may be
established by silence where information to be conveyed is not already in
possession of other party). A duty to speak arises in situations where the
pmiies do not deal on equal terms or where information to be conveyed is
not already in possession of the other party. Jones v. Maestas, 108 Idaho
69,696 P.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1985); see also Sorenson v. Adams, 98 Idaho
708, 571 P.2d 769 (1977) (silence in circumstances where a prospective
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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purchaser might be led to harmful conclusion is a form of
"representation").
G & A1 Farms v. Funk frr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991). "The

absence of any one of the elements is fatal to recovery." Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp.,
141 Idaho 233, 239, 108 P.3d 380,386 (2005).
Regarding constructive fraud, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated: "The gist of a
constructive fraud finding is to avoid the need to prove intent (i.e., knowledge of falsity
or intent to induce reliance), since it is inferred directly from the relationship and the
breach." Country Cove Dev., inc., v. Myron, 143 Idaho 595, 601, 150 P.3d 288,294

(2006) (citing 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 4 (1997)).
a.

Duty to Disclose

The Smvards Court stated the following regarding the duty to disclose:
A party may be under a duty to disclose: (1) if there is a fiduciary
or other similar relation of trust and confidence between the two parties;
(2) in order to prevent a partial statement of the facts from being
misleading; or (3) if a fact known by one party and not the other is so vital
that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be voidable, and the
patiy knowing the fact also knows that the other does not know it.
Bethlahmy, supra.

Sowards, supra.
Printcraft has not established the existence of any special relationship between it
and Sunnyside Utilities. Furthermore, there is no evidence that any of the Defendants
made any partial or ambiguous statement which would have been misleading to
Printcraft. However, there is a material question of fact regarding whether Sunnyside
Utilities had a duty to disclose under the third prong listed by the Sowards Court. By
affidavit, Waters testified that the Woolf and/or Beck understood the nature of the
business and its need for a septic connection, but failed to disclose several deficiencies
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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with the system. (Waters Aff. at 5-8,

,r, 18-27) Waters further testified that he did not

know the limitations of the septic system.
h.

Materiality

The Idaho Supreme Court has stated: "As to a claim of fraud, '[m]ateriality refers
to the importance of the misrepresentation in determining the plaintiff's course of
action.'" Aspiazu, supra (citing Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616, 619, 962 P.2d 387, 390
(1998)).
Idaho courts have not addressed whether materiality is a question of law or a
question of fact. However, the importance of the alleged non-disclosures on Printcraft's
course of action appears to the Court to be a question of fact. See White v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 368 Ill.App.3d 278,856 N.E.2d 542 (Ill. Ct. App. 2006)
(materiality in a common law fraud claim is a question of fact) and Powers v. United
Services Auto. Ass'n, 115 Nev. 38,979 P.2d 1286 (Nev. 1999) ("materiality is generally a
question of fact, and only where reasonable minds cannot differ may the issue be
resolved as a matter of law").
c.

Reliance

The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "the issue of justifiable reliance is
generally a question of fact .... " King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 42 P.3d 698 (2002)
(citing Perkins v. Thorpe, 106 Idaho 138, 142,676 P.2d 52, 56 (Ct. App. 1984)). The
question of whether Printcraft reasonably relied on Sunnyside Utilities' non-disclosures is
a question of fact for the fact finder, the jury in this case, to decide.
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d.

Damages

Although the Court could not find Idaho legal authority for the following
proposition, it appears to the Court that the issue of whether a party suffered damages as
a direct and proximate cause of an alleged failure to disclose is a question of fact for the
fact finder, the jury, to decide.
Therefore, the COUli must deny Sunnyside Utilities' motion for summary
judgment as to constructive fraud.
B.

SPOA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1.

Breach of Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement

SPOA reasserts the arguments made by Sunnyside Utilities in support of the
argument that it did not breach the Agreement. Printcraft also reasserts the arguments it
made opposing Sunnyside Utilities' motion for summary judgment on this cause of
action. For the same reasons the Court is granting Sunnyside Utilities' motion for
summary judgment on this cause of action, the Court grants SPOA's motion for summary
judgment. Further, the Agreement requires Sunnyside Utilities, not SPOA, to provide
septic services.

2.

Constructive Fraud

SPOA reasselis the arguments made by SUlmyside Utilities in support of the
argument that the COUli should grant the motion for summary judgment relating to the
failure to disclose and/or misrepresentation and constructive fraud claims. Printcraft also
reasserts the arguments it made opposing Sunnyside Utilities' motion for summary
judgment on this cause of action. There is no evidence that Woolf and/or Beck was
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acting on behalf of SPOA in dealing with Printcraft as to the septic system. Therefore,
the Court must grant SPOA's motion as to constructive fraud.
C.

SIPP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1.

Breach of Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement

SIPP argues that Printcraft's cause of action for breach of the Agreement must fail
against SIPP because SIPP is not a party to the Agreement. SIPP also reasserts the
arguments made by Sunnyside Utilities and SPOA. Printcraft also reasserts the previous
arguments. Printcraft does, however, acknowledge and assert the following:
Plaintiff acknowledges that the Defendant SIPP is not a party to
the written Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement and therefore has no
liability thereunder. However, as set out below, the Defendant SIPP was a
party to the oral agreement and is liable threon for breach of severing
Plaintiff s sewer connection.
(Response at 18, fn 1)
For the same reasons the Court is granting Sunnyside Utilities' motions for
summary judgment on this cause of action, the Court grants SIPP's motion for summary
judgment on this cause of action. FUlihermore, the Court grants SIPP's motion for
summary judgment as it relates to SIPP not being a party to the Agreement as conceded
by Printcraft.
2.

Constructive Fraud

SIPP reasserts the arguments made by the other defendants in support of the
argument that the Court should grant the motion for summary judgment relating to the
failure to disclose and/or misrepresentation and constructive fraud claims. Printcraft also
reasserts the arguments it made opposing the other defendants' motions for summary
judgment on these causes of action. For the same reasons the Court is denying Sunnyside
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Utilities' motion for summary judgment on this cause of action, the Court denies SIPP's
motion for summary judgment.

V.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court concludes, and
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that each of the Defendants' motions for summary
judgment ARE GRANTED with respect the Breach of Third Party Beneficiary Utility
Agreement count, and SPOA' s motion for summary judgment IS GRANTED with
respect to the constructive fraud claims. Sunnyside Utilities and SIPP's motions for

3f

summary judgment ARE DENIED with respect the constructive fraud claims.

DATED [his

day of August 2007.

/i~JMoe~~/
. L--R1CHARD T. ST. CLAIR
DISTRICT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

day of August 2007, I did send a true and correct copy
I hereby certify that on this
of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective cOUlihouse mailbox;
or by causing the same to be hand-delivered.
Mitchell W. Brown
Lane V. Erickson
Racine, Olson, Nye,
Budge & Bailey, Chtd.
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Mark R. Fuller
Fuller & Carr
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935
Attorneyfor Defendants

RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho

By

~

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO,

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an
Idaho corporation,
Plaintiff,
MINUTE ENTRY
Case No.
CV-06-7097

vs.
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES,
Idaho corporation,

INC., an

Defendant.
On the 17th day of October, 2007, Defendant Sunnyside Park
Owners Association's motion for attorney fees came before the
Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge,

in open court at Idaho

Falls, Idaho.
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick,
Deputy Court Clerk, were present.
Mr. John Avondat appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff.
Mr. Mark Fuller appeared on behalf of Defendant Sunnyside
Park Owners Association.
The Court advised that until all claims on all parties were
finalized he would hold his decision in abeyance regarding the
issue of attorney fees.
Mr. Fuller argued Defendant's motion for the record.

Mr.

Avondat objected to a determination being made at this time and
rested on his filed objection.
The Court will consider the matter submitted and make a

determination at a later date.
Court was thus adjourned.

H:cv067097.42mo
l01707AM5Tingey

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

~

day of October, 2007, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to
be delivered to the following:
RONALD LONGMORE

Deputy Court Clerk
Michael Gaffney
2105 Coronado
Idaho Falls, ID

83404

Mark R. Fuller
PO Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID

83405

[4]003

Fuller&Carr Law Office

10/2:6/200i 12: 18 FAX 208 524

MARK R. FULLER (ISB No. 2698)
DANIEL R. BECK (IS8 Ko. 7237)
FULLER & CARR
410 JvlEt·!ORIAL DRIVE, SUITE 201

7

P . 0 + Box 50 935
IDAHO FAL,I,S,
TELEPHONE:

10 83405-0935
(208) 524-5400

ATTORNE.YS FOR DEFENDANTS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
PRINTCRAFT
PRESS i
Idaho corporation,

INC. ,

an

Case No. CV-06-7097

plaintiff,
STIPULATION RE: PROTECTIVE
ORDER

v.
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an
Idaho corporation,
SUNNYSIDE
PARK OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
an
Idaho
corporation
and
SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRIAL
AND
PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC.,
an
Idaho
limited
liability
company,
Oefendants.

COMES NOW, the Defendants, by its counsel of record, Mark R.
Fuller of Fuller
record,

&

Carr,

and the Plaintj.ff

Michael Gaffney of Bea]":d St.

I

by

its counsel of

Clair and enter into the

following Stipulation regarding Plaintiff's Protective Order:
1.

It

is

hereby stipulated that

Plaintiff's counsel

and

Defendant's counsel has reviewed the Protective Order and agree to
the

provisions

set

forth

in

the

Protective

Order.

Defendant

agrees to provide a copy of each written observation, test report
or

photograph

to

allow

Plaintiff
r--

ry ""':

JLJ,. .. )

an

opportunity

to

designate

STIPULATION K1::; PROTEC'rrVE ORUl:;R - 1

!4i 004

Fuller&Carr Law Office

1l)/.2!?/2007 12:18 FAX 208524 '"

whether or not such documents are "confident:ial information" prior
to any disclosure outside the scope of para.

7 of the Protective

Order.

such

Plaintiff

shall

LlfoY':-nation" tvithin ten
su

(10)

designate

all

"confidential

days of the Plaintiff's receipt of

dOCLlmelit s ~

2.
cr other
inspection

Plaintiff shall
items
are

of

identify which conversations,

information provided to

"confidential

information"

samples,

Defendant during the
and

Defendant

shall

treat such designated disclosures as confidential.
DAi'ED this

2) ii..

day of

C%~ l

,

2007.

STU'[JLATION l:\E:

PROTECTIVE ORDER -

:.2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO

I

IN

A~D

FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an
Idaho corporation,
Plaintiff,
MINUTE ENTRY
Case No.
CV-06-7097

vs.
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an
Idaho corporation,
Defendant.

On the 30th day of October, 2007, Plaintiff's motion to
amend counterclaim came before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey,
District Judge, in open court at Idaho Falls,

Idaho.

Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick,
Deputy Court Clerk, were present.
Mr. Jeff Brunson appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff.
Mr. Mark Fuller and Mr. Dan Beck appeared on behalf of the
Defendant.
Mr. Beck presented Plaintiff's motion to amend counterclaim.
Mr. Brunson argued in opposition to the motion.

Mr. Beck

presented rebuttal argument.
The Court will take the matter under advisement and issue an
opinion as soon as possible.
Court was thus adjourned.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of October, 2007, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to
be delivered to the following:
RONALD LONGMORE

Deputy Court Clerk
Jeff Brunson
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Mark R. Fuller
Dan Beck
PO Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID

83405

eo
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, fN AND FOR THE COw\TTY OF BONNEVILLE
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho
corporaton,
Plaintiff, Counterdefendant,

)
)
)
)
)

vs.

Case No. CV -06-7097

)
)

SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho
corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company,

ORDER

)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants/Counterclaimants.

THIS MATTER came before the Court upon the motion of Sunnyside Parks
Utilities, Inc. to amend its counterclaim to include a claim for punitive damages. The
Court having reviewed the record, and heard oral argument, and finding that the moving
party has established at this time a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient
to support an award of punitive damages, and good cause appearing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of Defendant/Counterclaimant is
granted. The issue of whether punitive damages will ultimately be submitted to a jury
will be reserved for determination at the time of trial
Dated this

ORDER

- 1

')0

day of October, 2007.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the
day of October, 2007, I served a true and correct copy
ofthe foregoing document upon the following by U. S. mail postage prepaid, or by hand
delivery, or by depositing at recipients' courthouse box:
Jeffrey D. Brunson
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY
2105 Coronado Stret
Idaho Falls, ID
Mark Fuller
FULLER & CARR
605 N. Capital Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho

By

ORDER

-

2

t~. ~ .~

vv\J

~/
Deputy Clerk

MARK R. FULLER (ISB No. 2698)
FULLER & CARR
410
DRiVE, SUITS 201
P.O. Box 50935
IDAHO
, 10 83405-0935
TELEFHONE: (208) 524-5400
DEFENDANT /COUNTER CLAHIANT SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES r INC.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
PFUNTCRAFT
Idaho co

PRESS,
ion,

INC. ,

an

Case No. CV-06-7097

Plaintiff,

SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES'
ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT,
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIMS, PRAYER
FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES, AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

PARK
UTILITIES,
UNNYSIDE
NC.,
an Idaho corporation,
PARK
OWNERS
SUNNYSIDE
INC. ,
an Idaho
ASSOCHiTION,
corporation,
and
SUNNYSIDE
AND
PROFESSIONAL
NDUSTRIAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability
ion.
Defendant.

COjV1ES NOW the Defendant,
Idaho corporation

(hereafter

Sunnyside Park Utili ties,

"s

Inc.,

ide Park Utilities"),

response to the Amended Complaint filed

Plaintiff,

and

an
l

states and

a leges as follows:
1.

Defendant denies each and every al

ion set forth in

the Amended Complaint except as expressly admitted herein.
2.

Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cause of act on

SUNNYS DE PT-'cRK UTILIT ES' ANS1fJER TO
PRAYER FOR peNIT
'frl"

F"~

"J:

.i ~.) ..;.

upon which relief can be granted.
3.
is

an

se to paragraph 1,

In re
action

arising

failed to make.

out

of

defendant

certain

disclosures

es

this

the

defendant

Defendant asserts that this is an action arising

out of the disconnection of Printcraft Press's sewer connection to
Sunnyside

Park

Utilities.

The

defendant

admits

that

there

is

a

sewer system located in the Sunnyside Industrial and Professional
Park

subdivision

which

is

operated

and

maintained

ide

Park Utilities.
In

4.

answer

to

s

parag

2,

3,

4,

and

5,

defendant

admits the same.
5.

In

6.

In

answer

to

paragraphs

6

and

7

defendant

8,

defendant

a

the

s

same.
answer

to

parag

Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park, LLC

admits

that

(hereafter "8 pp H

completed and filed with District Seven Health Department a s

)

i

permit for the installation of a septic system that would serv ce
a minimum of one to two buildings. Defendant admi s tha
District

Seven Health

Department's

septic permit

is

a copy of

a tached as

Exhibit "A" to the Complaint.
7.

In anS'Ner to paragraph 9, defendant admits the same.

8.

In answer to paragraph 10, defendant admits the same.

9.

In

t
Devel
p

be

t11

,

answer

1999,

to

SIPP

Agreement.

paragraph
and

11,

Bonneville

de

admits
County

that

entered

on

into

a

The defendant denies that 8IPP promised to

all street improvements and utilities as were necessary to
completed.

The

COU:iTERCLAII1S,

agreement

specifically

states

that

SUNNYS
PARK UTILI
' ANSWER TO AMENDED
PRl-:l.YER FOR PUNITIVE D}\1'1AGES AND DEl'lAND FO}" Jl,W{
F~ ")
Ju
,,__

t

will

"owner(s)"

construct

said

needed

The agreement does not obli

s.

utility

or

street

e the "Devel

r" to

construct needed utility or street improvements.
10.

In answer to paragraph 12, defendant admits the saIne.

II.

In answer to paragraph 13, defendant denies the same.

12.

In answer to paragraph 14, defendant admits the same.

13.

In

ans\ver

meeting was held.

paragraph

to

However,

15,

defendant

admits

that

a

defendant denies the rema nder of the

allegations contained in paragraph 15.
14.

In answer to paragraph 16, defendant admits the same.

15.

In

answer

to

paragraph

17,

defendant

letter sent by District Seven Health
meeting held on March 29,
attached as
correct

Exhibit

copy

of

to

"FII

the

2002.

that

the

rtment memorialized the

Defendant admits that the let e

Plaintiff's

letter

denies

sent

complaint

by

is

strict

a

true

Seven

and

Health

t.

16.

In

answer

to

paragraph

18,

defendant

denies

that

t

entered into an agreement with the Defendant Sunnyside Park Owners
Association,

Inc.

(hereafter

"SPON/ )

for

the provi

ng of

water

and sewer services to the subdivision identified in the p at
Defendant asserts that it entered into an agreement with SPOA
sewer

services

to

occupants of any subdivis

past,

s whi

present,

and

future

I

ovmers

were being or

one

0

and
be

served by Sunnyside Utilities' sewer facilities.

Third

17.

In answer to paragraph 19, defendant admits the same.

18.

In

answer

to

paragraph

Party Beneficiary }\greement

l,,]\lE:NDED COUNTERCLAIMS,

20,

defendant

states:

admits

that

"This Agreement

SUNNYSIDE PARK
ILITIES' ANS\!JER TO AlvlENDED
PRAYER FOR PUNITIVE DJlJvlAGES AND DE[vIANi:) FOR CTR":r"

the

sha 1

upon and shall inure to the benefit of ... al

also be bi

present

and future owners or occupants." Defendant denies the remainder

0

paragraph 20.
19.

In

20.

In

Agreement

answer

is

recorded.

to

only

c

paragraph

binding

on

ts tr1e

Defendant

Plaintiff

if

denies

several

language

Third Party Beneficiary

Defendant

22,

specifically

Defendant

contains speci

21,

to pa

allS\i\ler

denies

the

that

aces

saITte .

that

t-

reement
the

was

reement

indica t

that the

reement would be recorded "so as

put

0

all persons on notice that any properties receiving sewer serv ces
reement." Defendant admits

would be subject to the terms of the
that

a

true

Utility

and

correct

Agreement

is

copy

of

the

Third

attached

as

Exhibit

Party

"G"

Beneficia

to

plain

~

f"f"' :::>
~

-LLJ....

Compla
L.

In answer to paragraph 23, defendant adrni s the same.

22.

In answer to parag

23.

In answer to paragraph 25,

'")

about September 12,
property at
Utilities
fee.
to

for

sewer

defendant

2005 CTR Development,

time,

ts the same.

LLC,

ts

and

paid

the

0

the o",mer of the

entered into an agreement

services

hat on

th

$1,800.00

side
connection

Sunnyside Utilities thereafter allowed the sewer connection
be

made

to

the

building

currently

admits that a true

De

eTR

made
Exh

that

24, defendant

t
24.

Development

to

occupied

Plaintiff.

correct copy of Check No.
Sunnyside

Utilities

is

5896

attached

as

"I" to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint.
In

answer

to

paragraph

26,

defendant

upon

information

provided by the plaintiff, admits the same.

JlJvlENDED COUl\iTERCLAIl\1S,

SUNNYS
PARK UTILI
'P<JJSlriER TO AI"JENDED (::Clr~PLp<Il;:':',
PR.:'IJr·ER FOR PUl\iTTIVE DAt"l.7"iGES AND DEfvlANI::' ~'()F JURY TRIP<.L

25.

In

answer

Sunnyside

Utilities

copies

drawings

of

to

specifically
or

27,

paragraph

requested

proposed drawings

from

CTR

concerning

vvhich would be built and located on the premises.
not have suf

Therefore,

not

Plaintiff

dr

ngs to

Deve~

the

Iding

Defendant does

(as

Defendant
opposed

cannot

to

CTR

ded

ded the reques ed

admit

or

deny whether

Development)

ide Utilities and its officers and/or directors.

In answer to paragraph 28, defendant denies the same.

27.

In answer to paragraph 29, defendant denies the same.

8.

In answer to paragraph 30,

iff

or

CTR
to

"K"

l

or
the

p

26.

PIa
Exh

that

cient information to determine if Plaintiff

the requested documents or CTR Development p
docurnents.

rl
"
a'.Aml"LS

defendant

Devel

nt

defendant.

Defendant admits that either

provided

Defendant

the

denies

document
that

attached

it

as

received

a

fourth page showing the floor plan or layout of the second floor.
Defendant was

verbally informed that

the

second floor was

to be

used solely for storage.

were

29.

In answer to paragraph 31, defendant admits the same.

30.

In anS\ver to paragraph 32,

10

or

11

connections

defendant in June of 2006.

to

defendant admits that

the

sewer

system

here

operated

Defendant admits that one of the sewer

connections was to the property owned by J&LB Properties and that
Plaintiff

was

occupying

J&LP

Properties'

Iding.

Defendant

denies the remainder of the allegations in paragraph 32.
31.
June

In

2006,

overload.

answer

to

defendant's
Defendant

Ai'AEiJDED COUNTERCLAIJV1S,

paragraph
sewer

admits

33,

system

that

it

defendant

admits

experienced
immediately

a

:,.,;'vJ

in

temporary

reported

SUNNYSl8i P}\;"\K GT
lES' ANSvJER TO Al'1ENDEil
PRAYER FOR PUNl lVE DAl"l}'IGES AND DEJVlAND FOR

r- .- ,....

that

the

temporary overload to District Seven Health Department and that an
onsite

investigation

District

conducted

In

answer

to

paragraph

Health

attached

Department

to

SIPP

Exhibit

as

to

defendant

34,

true and correct copy of the June 28,
Seven

Seven

Health

Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 33.

r~ment.

32.

was

that

a

letter f::.:-om District

2006

and

admits

Sunnyside

Plaintiff's

Utilities

Amended

is
into

Defendant denies the remainder of the allegations in paragraph 34.
In answer to

33.

ragraph

Defendant

ts that a true

and correct copy of the July 6, 2006 letter is attached as Exhib
to

"]V]"

Plaintiff's

Amended

Complaint.

Defendant

denies

the

r of the allegations in paragraph 35.

rema
34.

In

addi tional

answer

to

paragraph

ic permit

s

for

36,

Defendant

admits

that

an

installation of additional capacit

\;laS obtained. Defendant admits that a true and correct copy of the
s

t

ic pe

is attached as

Defendant

denies

Exhibit

the

to

"Nil

remainder of

Plaintiff's AInended
the

aIle

ions

in

paragraph 36.
35.

:Jist

ct

In

answer

Seven

to

of

the

\vhich

conducted

37,

t

Health

installat ion
were

paragraph

expansion
and

and

defendant

physically
repairs

completed

of

the

Sunnys

admits that a true and correct copy of t

De

admits

t

inspected
s

lC

the

system

LJtilit es.
Septic System

Inspection Report is attached to Plaintiff's A.mended Complaint as
Exhibit "0." Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 37.
36.

In answer to paragraph 38, defendant admits the same.

37.

In answer to paragraph 39,
SUNNYSIDE PARK

CCUlJTEc~RCLAIi"lS

,

defendant admits that a copy
LITIES'

PRAYER FOR PUNITIVE

r,:-

vvJ

A~SWER TO
AND DElvJAl;D

of

t

the

23,

2006

letter

from

Doyle

Beck

is

attached

as

Exhibit "Q" to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Defendant denies the
remainder of the allegations in paragraph 39.
38.

In answer to paragraph 40,

defendant admits that a copy

ember 13, 2006 letter from Greg Crockett is attached as

of the S

it "R" to Plaintiff's A.'ll.ended Complaint. Defendant denies the
remainder of the allegations in paragraph 40.
39.
of

the

In answer to paragraph 41,
September

6,

2006

letter

defendant admits that a copy

from

Do

e

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as Exhibit "S".

Beck

is

attached

to

Defendant denies the

remainder of paragraph 41.
In

40.

answer

to

paragr

defendant

Plaintiff

requested

from

documents,

contracts,

agreements,

Utili ies'

sewer utility services.

Third

Utilities

In

Party

answer

to

paragraph

Beneficiary

copy

of

or the like governing S

all
s

denies the rema nde

De

43,

Utility
to

at ons were p

defe

nt

ement

and

Printcraft.

as

Exhibit

to

" T"

t

ts
the

the

Rules

and

Defendant admits that a

true and correct copy of Doyle Beck's September
attached

a

that

ions in paragraph 42.

of the all

41.

Sunnyside

admits

Plaintiff's

0,

2006 let er

A.uended

~

1.a

Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 43.

42.
side
ses

In

answer

Utilities
to

scuss

to

paragraph

and

the

the

issues

44,

plaintiff
of

the

its
met

at

that

the

plaintiff's

plaintiff's

discharges.

Defendant admits that plaintiff agreed to collect and di

se of

all substances Sunnyside Utilities classified as "processed waste"

A[VIENDED COUNr::'ERCLAItvIS,

80i'J1'1YSI
P8AYER FOR

PARI< UTILITIES' Ai'JSlrJER TO AMEN~)ED
TIVE DAlVlAGES AND DEi'1AND FOR JURY

.- r- ' .....
0~.

which

Sunnyside

Defendant
in a

is

asserts

letter and that

a tached

is

Plaintiff's

that

ts

agreement
letter

Utilities

a

non-human

counsel

true

Exhib

as

any

wastes.

memorialized

and correct copy

"U"

to

the

of such

plaintiff's

Amended

laint.
In answer

43.

to paragraph

Woolf met with the Plaintiff.

defendant

45,

admits

that

Kirk

Defendant admits that the Plaintiff

asserted to Mr. Woolf that the Flexo ink was aqueous in nature and
not harmful.

Defendant denies the remainder of the allegations in

paragraph 45.
In answer to paragraph 46,

44.

and

correct

Department
A.'1lended
all

of

letter

the

is

October

attached

2,

District

2006

as

Defendant

Complaint.

Exhibit

denies

the

"V"

Seven

to

Health

plaintiff's

remainder

the

of

ions in paragraph 46.
45.

and

copy

defendant admits that a true

In answer to paragraph 47,

correct

Department

copy

of

the

attached as

letter

Defendant

Complaint.

l\mended

October

defendant admi s that a true

5,

District

2006

"W" to the

Exhibit
denies

Seven

the

Health

Plaintiff's

remainder

the

of

allegations in paragraph 47.

di

46.

In

e

arose
s.

dispute

answer

to

between

48,

pa
strict

Seven

defendant
Health

ts

that

Department

and

a
the

Defendant asserts that the only issue related to the

between

District

Seven

Health

rtment

and

the

defendants is the temporary overload caused by Plaintiff in June
of

2006.

Corrected

Defendant
Notice

admits

of

that

Intent
S~lNNYSIDE

COT

PRAYER FOR

to

a

true

and

Re- impose

correct

Sanitary

, ANS 'iJER TO
Dlij\il\GES AND DEIVlAND
r~Y/

vv...)

copy

of

the

Restrictions,

8

dated NO"\Ternber 21,

2006,

is attached as Exhibit "X.1f

4 .

In answer to paragr

48.

In

side

Utilities

Plaintiff's

answer

to

therein

paragraph

sent

the

50,

letter

Complaint.

Amended

statements

49, defendant

speak

for

ts tl1e same.

defendant

attached

Defendant

as

s

Exhibit

that
\'ZI!

asserts

themselves.

to
the

Defendant

denies

the

remainder of paragraph 50.
49.

In

answer

to

paragraph

51,

defendant

admits

that

side Utilities received a letter dated December 12, 2006 from
Printcraft

and

that

such

letter

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.

is

attached

as

Exh

it

"AA"

to

Defendant asserts that such letter

speaks for itself. Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 51.
50.

In

answer

ide Utilities
he

Plaintiff's

statements

to

paragraph

sent the

Amended

therein

52,

letter attached as

Complaint.

speak

defendant

for

Defendant

themselves.

s

Exhibit

asserts

Defendant

that

"BB"

to

that

the

denies

the

remainder of paragraph 52.

51.

In

answer

to

paragraph

53,

defendant

severed the sewer connection on December 15,
not

have

sufficient

information

to

admits

2006.

either

admit

that

Defendant
or

deny

remainder of the allegations in paragraph 53, and therefore

t

s
the
es

the same.
52.

In

Sunnyside
establ shing

answer

Utilities
that

to

paragraph

has

Sunnyside

54,

provided
Utilities'

defendant
docurnents
sewer

admits
to

that

plaintiff

system's

capacity

from 1996 when it was first constructed and installed th

June

of 2006 was in the amount of 500 gallons per

Afv1ENDED CUmJTF:RCLAI:'V1S,

Defendant also

SUNNYSI
PARI< I.jTILITI
' ANSvE.R TO l'it"'lENDEIJ
FRAYER tOR PUNITIVE OAI'1AGES lmo OElvlANO FOR
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a

ide Utilities'

ts that

sewer system capacity after June

2006 was in the total capacity of 2,000 gallons per day.

ts

evidence

that

capaci ties

are

Sunnyside

of

attached

as

Exhibit

Utilities'

"CC"

to

PIa

55,

defendant

Defendant

sevver

systen,

iff! s

Amended

laint.

In

53.

answer

to

paragraph

Sunnyside

Utilities

provided

Sunnyside

Utilities

measured

Utilities'

sewer

system

that

the

and

2007,

approximately

370

and

copy

correct

from

average

gallons

documentation
sewer

amount

6,

2007

of

such

Defendant

Sunnyside

of

discharge

February

per day.

aint.
54.

that

Plaintiff

that

into

Sunnyside

through

May

scharges

admits

Utilities'

measurements are attached as Exhibit "DO" to
C

to

admits

that

16,

were

a

true

calculations

and

Plaintiff's Ame!lded

Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 55.
In answer to paragraph 56,

defendant admits that it has

sufficient capacity to receive all sewer discharges in acco
with the

terms

of

the

contract.

Defendant

admits

that

p aintiff

has demanded reconnect ion and that Defendant has refused to a low
such

a

discharge

reconnect ion
substances

because
and

of

the

quantities

plaintiff's
prohibited

intention
by

to

Defendant's

Rules and Regulations and applicable state and federal law.
55.

In answer to paragraph 57, defendant denies the same.

56.

In

res ates

all

answer
the

to

factual

paragraph

58,

allegations

through 58 and incorporates the same

defendant
set

forth

re-alleges
In

paragr

reference.

57.

In answer to paragraph 59, defendant admits the same.

58.

In answer to paragraph 60, defendant denies the same.
SUNNYS
PRP"YER FOR

f

i1:JS~'\iER TO
,L\ND DEtll\ND

and
s

59.

In answer to paragraph 61, defendant denies trle same.

60.

In answer to pa

61.

In answer to paragraph 63, defendant denies the same.

62.

In answer to paragraph 64,

62,

fendant den es the same.

defendant admits that

; +-

did

~'-

not record the Third Party Beneficiary Agreement. Defendant denies
sewer services to the

it

that

was

Plaintiff

occupant

an

of

the

Plaintiff merely because

Sunnyside

Industrial

and

Professional Park Subdivision.
63.

In answer to parag

64.

In answer to paragraph 66, defendant denies the same.

65.

In

severed the

answer
sewer

to

65, defendant denies the same.

67,

paragraph

connection.

defendant

Defendant

denies

admits
the

that

it

remainder of

the a legations in paragraph 67.
66.

In answer to paragraph 68, defendant denies the same.

67.

In answer to paragraph 69, defendant denies the same.

68.

In answer to paragraph 70, defendant admits the same.

69.

In answer to paragraph 71, defendant admits the sanle .

70.

In answer to paragraph 72, defendant denies the same.
In answer to paragraph 73, defendant denies the same.

7) .

In answer to paragraph 74,

~

and

re-states

all

the

admissions

defendant he

and

denials

through 73 and incorporates the same herein

in

re-al eges
paragraphs

1

reference as if set

ly.
3.
Seven

In

Health

buildings"
asserts

to

that

answer

to

Department
be

75,

provided a

connected

such permit

AHENDED COUNTERCLl-l.H1S f

paragraph

to

permit

defendants

provided for

SUL\NYSIOPRAYER FOR PUNI

defendant
for

den ies
only

"one

building.

a minimum of

District
to

two

Defendant

"one to two

buildings." Defendant admits that District Seven Health
l

cated in

be

made

to

il of 2002 that no new sewer connect ons were to
the

existing

system.

Defendant

ies

that

such

"indication" had any legally binding effect on defendant's sewer
system or defendant's ability to connect additional buildings to
defendant's sewer system.
74.

In answer to paragraph 76, defendan

7

In answer to paragraph 77, defendant denies the same.

76.

In answer to paragraph 78, defendant denies the same.

7"
, ! •

In answer to paragraph 79, defendant denies the same.

78.

In answer to paragraph 80, defendant denies the same.

9.

In answer to paragraph 81, defendant denies the same.

80.

In answer

to

paragraph

82,

denies the same.

defendant

denies

es each and every subpart of pa

De endant

ame.

82.

81.

In answer to paragraph 83, defendant denies

8 .

In answer to paragraph 84,

and re-s ates

the

same.

defendant he

its admissions and denials to parag

re-al eges

s

83 as set forth herein.
83.

In answer to paragraph 85, defendant denies the same.

84.

In answer

to

paragraph

86,

defendant

denies

the

same.

Defendant denies each and every subpart of paragraph 86.
85.

In answer to paragraph 87, defendant denies the same.

86.

In answer to paragraph 88, defendant

87.

In answer to paragraph 89, defendant denies the same.

88.

In anS\ver to paragraph 90, defendant denies the same.

89.

In answer to paragraph 91, defendant denies the same.

90.

In answer to paragraph 92, defendant denies the same.

j:ljvlENDEC

CO~lNTERCLAIJ'vlS,

es the same.
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91.

In answer to paragraph

and re-states

93,

defendant hereby re-alleges

its admissions and denials to paragraphs 1 through

92 as set forth herein.
011

defendant denies the same.

92.

In answer to paragraph

93.

In answer to paragraph 95, defendant denies the same.

94.

In answer to paragraph 96, defendant denies the same.

95.

In answer to paragraph 97, defendant denies the same.

96.

In answer to paragraph 98, defendant denies the same.

0j

In

answer

to

J'r

99,

paragraph

defendant

ad111i t s

that

Plaintiff requested any and all documents that would be as so iated
Wl

the

Ut lities.
2006,
Th rd

property
Defendant

Sunnyside
Party

and

sewer

admits

Utilities

Beneficiary

services

that,

provided

in

response,

reement

Sunnyside

on

Plaintiff with

Utility

Utilities Rules and Regulations.

provided

and

Sept
a

r

20,

of

the

the

ide

Defendant denies the remainde

0

99.

pa
98.

In answer to paragraph 100, defendant denies the same.

99.

In answer to paragraph 101,

defendant

s

the same.

Defendant denies each and every subpart of paragraph 101.
100.

In answer to paragraph 102, defendant denies the same.

10l.

In answer to paragraph 103, defendant denies the same.

102.

In answer to paragraph 104, defendant denies the same.

103.

In answer to paragraph 105,

and re-states

its

defendant he

ssions and denials to paragraphs

re-alle
1 th

104 as set forth herein.
104.

In answer to paragraph 106, defendant denies the same.

COUNTERCLAHiS,

SlJNNYS
PAPK
TIES' llJ\lS\iJER TO A[vlE1,JDED
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s

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
105. To

the

extent

y with all terms,

Plaintiff

has

failed

to

satis

lor per

sions,

conditions and p

and/or
rm

all of its obligations under the Third Party Beneficiary Utility
reement

ide

and

Plaintiff's claims

Utilities'

Sewer

Rules

and

lations,

is excused from any

are barred and de
Plaintiff.

duty or performance cla

106. Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff lacks s

LO

pursue its claims.
107.
la k

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's cla
ty

of

t

and

Plaintiff

is

at

are barred

most

an

incidental

bene iciary of any agreement.
asserts that it has no fiduciary relat ons

108. De
th the Plaintiff.
109.

iff's claims are barred by Plaintiff's breach of

Pla

the contract.
110.

Plaintiff's

claims

are

barred

as

resu t

a

of

Plaintiff's own illegal acts.
111.

To

the

extent

Plaintiff

failed

to

min

ze

some or all of the damage alleged in the Complaint,

or

a-void

any reco-very

inst this defendant must be reduced in whole or in

the

amount attributable to such failures.
112. Defendant
enti tled

to

any

asserts

award

of

that

damages

if

Plaintiff

against

is

deemed

defendant,

to

be

such aVJard

must be offset by amounts owed to Defendant by Plaintiff as set
forth in Defendant's Counterclaims hereafter.
113.

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint,

COUNTERCLAHlS,

SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES'
PRAYER FOR
'I:.JV..,E DA]\1AGES

.... vl:

and each claim therein,
ANSWER TO
DEtJf}\ND

1

the doctrines of waiver and/or estoppel.

is barred
114.
lS

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint,

rine of independent intervening cause.

the

barred

and each claim therein,

aint and each claim therein,

115. The Amended

is ba red

the doctrine of laches.
116. The

.~ended

Complaint,

17. Plaintiff has
parties to this

each

claim

therein,

failed to join one or more indispensable

ion.

iti

the doctrine

118. The claims in the Complaint are barred
of illegality.
an

i legal

act

Defendant cannot contract with Plaintiff to
and

enforcement

of

any

such

contract

or back flush water,

air conditioning water,

rtment.

from

the

the system.

ba kwash

water softener brine

of

and excessive

Department

Seven

0

Health

see

to

s

the

flows

of process

\vater

into

Plaintiff has not obtained approval from the Director

discharge

exceed the

Director
scharged

Plaintiff

i ted substances

of

such

substances

or

dis

and therefore

system desi

rge

of

any such

flows

which

scharges

nto

em would be and are illegal.

the s

1 9.

sufficient

Plaintiff

has

particularity

iate defenses,
to

barred.

flows which exceed the design flow of the system, without pr

authorization

for

t

s

IDAPA 58.01.03.004 prohibits discharge of cooling water,

o

lS

ean hands.

the doctrine of

barred

and

seek
luding

leave

of

to

to

permit

and therefore,
court

affirmative

CUJNTERCLI\H1S,

failed

to

amend

defenses,

PRAYER FOR PUNI

to

set

forth

Defendant

its
to

cIa

with

raise

all

Defendant reserves the ri
or

supplement

specify

further

its

Answer,

grounds

J\NSitJER
}\NiJ DEMAND FOR JLiRY

for

the claims and causes of action that are the subj ect of
t

s action.
reason

120.

of

the

filing

of

Plaintiff's

Compla

Sunnyside Utilities has been required to retain the serv ces

0

attorney to defend this action and has incurred attorney

sand

costs

in

In accordance \vi th

such defense.

§12-120,

Idaho Code §12-121,

and

Sewer

the

Rules

Sunnyside Utilities
expenses,

fees,

and

IRCP 54,

Idaho Code §12-123,

Regulations,

Article

Idaho Code

IRCP
IV,

an

11 (a) (1),

Section

entitled is reimbursement of all attorney

1S

losses

and

incurred

herein

in

defense

of

Plaintiff's claim and as a result of Plaintiff's actions.
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM

ide Park Utilities,

Inc.,

hereby alleges the follmv

Amended Counterclaims against Printcraft Press,

Inc.,

pursuant to

IRCP 13:
FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTERCLAIMS

ide

1.

Utilities")

is

an

Utili ties,

Inc.,

(hereafter

Idaho corporation with its principle place of

Utilities

Sunnyside

engages

1n

the

ding water and sewer service to the owners and
certain

buildings,

properties,

a

"Sunnyside

lIe County, Idaho.

business in
2.

Park

h

Thi

and

siness

s of

0

other

Party Beneficia

s

Utility

of

in

reement and

Sunnyside Utilities' Rules and Regulations.
3.

Print craft Press,

Inc.,

(hereafter "Printcraft

ff
)

is an

daho corporation with its principle place of business located at
3834

T,j\jENDED

South

Professional

C:OlnJ'~ERCLAI[v],S,

Way,

Idaho

Falls,

Bonneville

SUNNYSIDE PARK OT LI ~ES' ANSWER TO
PRAYER FOR
DllliAGES AND DElvil,\ND
..) v

J

County,

Idaho.
4.

LLC.,
p

That

jurisdiction

and

venue

lIe County,

State of Idaho.

That

to

pursuant

an

agreement

(hereafter "CTR Development")
de water

and

sewer

South Professional 1iJay,
Provision

6.

of

this

action

with

CTR

arise

Devel

to

Sunnyside Utilities

service to

the building located at

Regulations,

of

arId applicable
copy of

the

VIa ter

Third

state

and

such Agreement

sewer

and

Party

services

Beneficiary

federal

and

rules

applicable

"A"

Exhibits

as

attached

3834

(hereafter "the property")

"B"

and

arId
Rules
to

Utility

CTR

to

Deve opment was to be regulated by the Sunnyside Utilities'
and

in

Rules

Agreement,

regulatio11s..

That

and Regulations
Plaintiff's

a

are

Original

laint.
In

'7I .

January

2006,

CTR

Development

s to use Sunnyside Utilities'

and any rl
rties,

Management fI)

for

Properties,

The

Inc. ,

lease agreement

CTR IVlana

all

thereafter

lS

LLC.

specifically

and that

J&LB

y

illtO

attached

as

Exhibit

"J"

a

(hereafter"
ded that the

Properties had no

utilities to the building.

furni

entered

was responsible for furnishing and pa

utilities

reement

prope

sewer services to J&

written lease agreement with CTR Management,

lessee,

sold the

Inc.

J&LB

Q
v.

of

ng

obligation to

a copy of such Lease
to

Plaintiff's

Amended

Complaint.
9.
pursuant

Printcraft
to

an

oral,

COUNTE8CLAItv.1S,

is

a

sub-tenant

month-to-month

P8AYE8 FOE PUN I

in

the

sub-lease

subj ect
agreement

TO AlvlE:WED
AND DE[\1AND FOF

property
between

Pr

craft and eTR Management.
Printcraft

10.

began

discha

ng

wastes

Utilities sewer system on or after January 23,
4

1

water softener brine,
alcohol,

is
ha

s

s

Printcraft's

1.J...

included

and mul t

Ie

2006.
ca s,

hazardous

reverse osmosis water,

ink,

into

fountain concentrate,

other

discharges

that

were

to Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system.
12.

In addition,

Print craft discha

ty of Sunnyside Utilities'

the ca
13.
types or

sewer system.

i ties

the

of sewer discharges

ide Utilities'
Nei ther

specifically

Printcraft,

excluded

nor

it

intended to

ever

eTR

and
rights

informed

with J&LB Properties

eTR

rties'

J&LB

that

sewer stem.

Sunnyside Utilities that the lease

using

in excess of

Printcraft never informed Sunnyside Utilities about the

o
14.

wastes

to

the

Printcraft
sewer

Press

from

connection

with

ide Utilities.
5.

Pr

craft

Press

either

negligently

did

not

read,

0

intentionally did not obey the multiple warnings and prohibitions
contained in the Material Safety Data Sheets for the n
hazardous

chemicals

Utilities'

sewer system.

16.

On

or

about

caused Sunnyside
sewage

to

Printcraft

June

Ut il i ties'
on

the

discharged

9,

2006,

seVJer

the

Printcraft's

system to

near

into

over load

Sunnyside

ous and
side

discharges
and caused

Utilities'

drain

field.
17.

Defendant observed significant quantities of ink in the
SUNNYS DE

AIvlEl';DED COUNTERCL["H1S,

U~ILI

'ANSWER TO
OAl\1AGES ["NO

r· ,.

r)

dv.J

sewage on the ground as a result of the June 9,
On or about July 2,

8.

a

temporary

expansion

permit

2006,
and

2006 overload.

Sunnyside Utilities obta

increased

the

capacity

of

::'he

sewer system in order to avoid future overloads of the system. At
that time Sunnyside Utilities was still unaware of all the var ous
ities of discharges coming from Printcraft into

types and

he

seVJer system.

19.

st

In

Printcraft

had

2006,

Sunnyside

scharging

been

Utilities

reverse

discovered

osmosis

water,

that
ink,

cals and other harmful substances into the sewer system.
On

20.

or

about

informed

specifical

September

Printcraft

6,

2006

that

the

Sunnys
sewer

Utilities

system was

onl

designed to accomrnodate human waste and that Printcraft needed to
ities and cease discharging chemica s,

control its discharge
processed water,
or

and ink into the sewer system.

21.

On

about

ded

Print craft

September

with

a

On September 26,
was

copy of

2006,
the

Sunnyside

Third

Party

Utilities

Beneficiary

reement and Sunnyside Utilities' Rules and Regulat ons.

Utility

l

20,

2006,

Printcraft Press acknowledged

aware of the system limita

ons

and of the

the Department of Environmental Quality and

sputes

and

classified

dispose
as

of

all

substances

"processed wastes,"

that

including

th

strict Seven Hea th

Department as a result of the June, 2006 overload, and
collect

hat

ide
all

sed to
Utili ties

reverse

osmosis

water.
23.
that

In

December

Printcraft

of

continued

2006,

Sunnyside

discharging

Utilities

substances

that

discovered
Sunnys de
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Utilities classified as "processed wastes."
24.

On December 11,

to Printcraft,

25.

ll

that

Sunnyside

2006,

Printcraft

cease

all

wastes" and informed Print craft that
its discharges

i

Utilities

discharges

of

again

"processed

it must allow monitoring of

Printcraft desired to continue receiving sewer

Printcraft

services.

cease all discharges of

immediately.

December

On

requested

Sunnyside Utilities sent a letter

demanding that Printcra

ssed wastes

"

2006,

refused

to

allow

its

discharges

to

be

monitored only because Printcraft was knowingly and intentiona ly
scharging "processed wastes" and had no intention of ceas

to

scharge "processed wastes" despite the agreement reached betwe
Printcraft and Sunnyside Utilities on or about September 26,
26.

On

December

1

2006,

1

Sunnyside
Printcraft

sewer connection to the buil
On

2 'I .
installed
gallons
Pr

December

alternative

to overload,

craft's

2006,

19,
sewer

Utilities
1S

with

severed

occupying.

Print craft

system,

006.

caused

a

its

newly

of

1,000

capacity

allowing sewage to pond on the ground near

e

Mult

bui

additional

overloads

occurred.
28.

On

December

20,

2006

the

1

Department

of

Environmental

Qual ty conducted an investigation of the sewage on the
determined

that

"Odor

wastewater

was

a

dark

of

wastewater
blue

to

smelled

black

investigation letter dated January 5,

like

color."

A

and

k.

Color

copy

of

2007 is attached as

of
the
it

"1."

29.

The

investigation

.I\[/IENDED COONTEPCLAII'1S I

SUNNYSIDE PAPK
PRI\ YEP FOP PUNI

the

Department

of

TO
AND DEMAND

Environmental

(1

Quality,
sewer

only

five

days

after

+=c'
conLlrms

connect

Sunnyside

that

Utilities

Printcraft

severed

was

the

discharg ng

"processed wastes."

COUNT I: BREACH OF CONTRACT
30.

Defendant

re-alleges

Defendant

and

paragraphs

through

1

reference.
31.

hat

On

entered

into

a

as follows:

contractual relati
a.

Plaintiff

September

Defendant's

6,

sewer

2006,

Defendant

informed

Plaint £ f

system had capacity only to

co lect

and dispose of "human waste" and that no other wastes would
be allowed into the system.
b. On September 19,

2006,

Plain iff requested a copy of

any contracts, agreements, documents, or the like, which were
applicable to parties receiving sewer services from Sunnyside
Utilities.
c.
wi h

ember 20,

On

Defendant's

Third

2006,
Party

Defendant

ded Plain iff

Beneficiary

Uti ity

reement

and Defendant's Rules and Regulations for sewer service. Such
Rules

Regulations

and

blackwaste or blackwater
specifically excludes

a

specifically

"sewage"

as

(also known as "human was es")

and

1i s t

le

define

0

f

\\ pro c e sse d

\va s e s

/I

from being discharged into the sewer system.
d.

On or about September 26,

2006,

Plainti ff agreed to

abide by Defendant's Rules and Regulations for sewer service
stating
Defendant

that

it

agreed

classified

AMENDED COUNTERCLAIMS,

SUNNYSI
FOE

as

not

to

discharge

"processed

rVE

waste"

any

substance

into

side

'ANSWER
AMENDE
AND DEi'lAN[\ FOR ~U?Y

DA~JIAGES

Utilities' sewer system.
e.

Defendant

exchange for PIa

accepted

Plaintiff' ,s

iff's pa

of

sewer

discharges

monthly sewer se

In
ce

fee.
32.

Defendant substantially performed its obli

the contract from September 26,

ions under

2006 until December 15,

2006 arld

did not materially breach the contract.
Plaintiff

33.

breached

softener brine,

hazardous

to

sewer

Defendant's

the

contract

chemicals,

facilities,

by

discha

ng

water

substances that are

inks,

and

excessive

1

f ow

of

discharges.

was

34.

As a

re

red

disconnect

15,

2006.

December

rect result of the acts of PIa
Plaintiff

The

costs

from

of

such

the

tif
sewer

and $1,420.00 for inspection and supervision by t
As

contract

by

a

direct

and

Plaintiff,

proximate

Defendant

result
is

system

disconnection

$1,228.64 for a backhoe and operator to perform the

35.

Defendant
on

included

sconnection
Defendant.

of

the

breaches

of

to

damages

of

entitled

$2,648.64 or such other amount as may be proven at trial.
36.
12 123,
Art icle

In accordance with IRCP 54,
IRCP
IV,

11 (a) (1)
Section

r

2,

and

the

Sewer

ide

Park

reimbursement of all attorney fees,
herein in prosecution of

Idaho Code §12-120,
Rules

and

Utilities

expenses,

12 121,
lations,

is

entitled to

and losses incurred

ide Park Utilities' counterclaims.

COUNT II. COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
37.

Sunnyside

Park

Utilities

re-alleges

32 by reference.

T'J1ENDED COUNTERCLAIMS,

SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES'
PRAYER FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES

r- !-"',1li'
J,,,,,,

ANSVJER TO
DE1vlJ\ND

F~ND

paragraphs

1

38.

The

contract

between

these

parties

includes

material

lied covenants.
ied

39.

parties will act

in

every

contract

in good faith

is

and fair

a

covenant

deal

that

wi th each other

with respect to the terms of the contract.
40.

Printcraft

has

failed

to

deal

fairly

with

and

act

in

faith towards Sunnyside Park Utilities and has breached the
lied covenant of good faith and fair deal
Printcraft's

4

fai th

and

Utili ies'

breach

the

ied

unfairly

covenant

fair

dealing

ri

to receive the benefits of the contract.

Printcraft's

42.

has

of

breach

of

frustrated

the

ied

of

Sunnyside

covenant

of

faith and fair dealing is a material breach of the contract
the

direct

and proximate

cause

ide

hereafter

suffer

suffered

a~d

is

Sunnyside

s are continuing.

Park Utilities, whi
43.

of damages

Park

Park Utilities has

damages

in

an

amount

suffered damages

and will

to

tria

be

proven

at

In

excess of the jurisdictional amount of this Court.

COUNT III. NEGLIGENCE
44.

Sunnyside

Park

Utilities

re-alleges

parag

s

1

Printcraft has a duty not to allow its sewer discha

s

reference.

45.

to cause unreas
46.

Printcraft
e

reas
!Vlaterial

le,

care

and

in

foreseeable risks of
breached

following

Safety

Data

its

duty

by

the warnings

Sheets

provided

rm to third
failing

to

ies.
exercise

and directions
to

Printcraft

on the
he

manufacturers.

COUNTERCLAItJ;S,

,
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ANS\iJER TO
AND

1\1'"

i\

FOR

.L ,

Printcraft

47.

case

exercise

reas

,vere

harmful

not

facilities

further

and

to

that

breached

to

ensure

Sunnyside
cra

Pr

hat

Park
I

s

illegal

Printcraft
substances

further
and

duty

discharges

discharges

sewer

did

o

system and

not

exceed

sewer system.

breached

hazardous

failing

Printcraft's

Utilities'

capacity of Sunnyside Park Utilities'
48.

its

its

duty

chemicals

by

discharging

im:o

ide

Park

Utilities sewer facilities.
Printcraft's breaches were the direct and
of

the

temporary

overload

ln

Sunnyside

Park

te cause

Utili ies'

sewer

system during June of 2006.
50. Printcraft's breaches were the direct and proximate cause
s arising out of the temporary overload,

of a
expansion
sewage,

of

all

the

sewer

costs

and

system,

fees

treatment

related to

District Seven Health Department,
to

the

ongoing

ity.
t

The

dispute

costs

of

with
such

the

of

the

on the

ongoing di

and all costs and fees

the

Department

expansion,

of

treatment,

e

\vi th

related

Environmental
and

di

es

December, 2006 are as follows:
Construction Permit:
Purchase of Additional Septic Tanks:
Valves from Falls Plumbing Supply:
Cost of Excavation, Drain Field
Supplies, Meter Reading and Supervision:
Attorney Fees through December, 2006:
Cost for Eme
Excavator and
and Operator to Excavate and Install
Tanks and Piping:
Cost for lime to neutralize overflow:
TOTAL

In

including an

$

200.00

$ 1,7
.00
$
1 4.2"7

:;; 9, 58.81
$26,818.97
$ 2,430.00
$ 1,202.82
$42,2.59.87

t on, if this Defendant is required to construct a large

]\iVIENDED COUNTERCLAILvlS,

COIVIFL;:~
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SUNNYS
PARK
PRAYER FOR PUNITIVE DALvlAGES AND DEIV;J\.ND FOR ,}CI!=\':{ TRIJ\.:L< -

L~L±

soil absorption system, and/or to abandon its current system, as a
resu t of the acts of Plaintiff,

Defendant will also seek as

s the cost of such construction, a / o r
amount to be proven at trial.

III

an

Defendant's attorney fees and costs

related to the District Seven Health Department and

rLment of

ronmental Quality litigation continue to increase.
51.
in

the

Defendant
amount

of

amount as wil

is entitled to be compensated for its damages
$42,259.87,

and

its

continuing

in

s

an

be proven at trial.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES
side Park Utilities re-alleges paragraphs 1-51

52.
reference.

53. Printcraft's actions were wanton, malicious and in
reckless

sregard of the Sunnyside Park Utilities ri

property.
54. Sunnyside Park Utilities has suffered damages to i
ri

s
55.

s

rty.
Printcraft's wanton, malicious,

and reckless actions

continue.
55. Sunnyside Park Utilities is entitled to an award of
punitive damages,

in an amount to be determined

the jury, to

deter Printcraft from continuing in its wanton, malicious, and
rec

ess behavior.

PRAYER
liJHEREFORE f

Sunnyside

Park

Utilities,

Inc.

respectful y

requests the following relief against Printcraft Press,
1.

That

Printcraft

DtD COUNTERCL2\!!vlS,

recover

nothing

SUNNYS
PARK OT LITIES'
PRAYER FOR PUNITIVrE
.

o

j.)

by

ANSWER

Inc.

reason

of

its

Amended Complaint and that all such claims be dismissed.
That
for

Sunnyside

Park

Utili ties

Printcraft's breach of contract

be

awarded

in the amount

its

s

of $2,643.64,

together with continuing damages as may be proven at trial.
3.

That

Sunnyside

Printcraft's

caused
$42,259.8 ,

Park

Utili ties

negligent

be

awarded

discharges

in

its

the

damages

amount

of

together with continuing damages as may be proven at

trial.
4.

That

Sunnyside

Park

Utilities

s, in an amount to be determined
5.

That

6.

For

be

the

awarded

tive

ury.

ide be awarded all of its costs and attorney

fees.
such

other

relief,

legal

or

equitable,

to

which

ght or entitlement.

ide has any

day of November, 2007.

DATED this

Mark R. Fuller
Attorney for Defendant

DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL

Sunnyside Park Utilities hereby demands a trial
(12) person j

a Uvel ve

on a 1 issues of fact.
,/'

OlWED this

~

--'---

day of November, 2007.

~;(JJL

IvJark R. Fuller - ' - - - - - Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that

served a true and correct copy of t

following described pleading or document on the attorneys 1 s ed
below on this

day of November, 2007:
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES' ANSWER
TO AMENDED COMPLAIN7,
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIJ:vlS, PRAYER FOR
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL

Document Served:

Attorneys Served:
Jef
D. Brunson, Esq.
Lance J. Schuster, Esq.
John M. Avondet, Esq.
Michael D. Gaf
,Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, 10 83404

U.S. Mail

Facs
Ie
Hand Delivery

Mark R. Ful er
FULLER & CARR

TO
COiJt,;rEF.CL1UMS,

PR.l\YER FOR PUNI

ANi:) DEtJ)AND

80

7

20 P 4 :15

Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
Lance J. Schuster, ISB No. 5404
Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Attorney for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC. an Idaho
corporation, an Idaho corporation,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

Case No.: CV-06-7097

vs.
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho
corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company,

ORDER TO SHORTEN TIME

Defendants/Counterclaimants.

This matter having come before this Court by and through the Motion to ShOlien
Time, and good cause having been shown:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing on the Plaintiff's Motion to Allow
Disclosure, Illentification and Use

ofRebup.aJ}~.~pert

J.-...J

Witnesses shall be heen. on
Order to Shorten Time Page 1

Tuesday, November 27,2007 at 9:00 a.m.
DATED: NovemberZG, 2007.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On November

iLL, 2007, I served a true and correct copy of the NOTICE OF

SERVICE upon the following by the method of delivery desigpated:
Mark Fuller
Fuller & Carr
PO Box 50935
Idaho Falls, 1D 83405-0935
Fax: (208) 524-7167
Michael D. Gaffney
Lance J. Schuster
Beard st. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, 1D 83404
Fax: (208) 529-9732

0

U.S. Mail

o U.S. Mail

7

G Courthouse Box 0

lcoUltnom;e Box

Facsimile

o Facsimile

Clerk

Order to Shorten Time Page 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an
Idaho corporation,
Plaintiff,
MINUTE ENTRY
Case No.
CV-06-7097

vs.
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an
Idaho corporation,
Defendant.

On the 27th day of November, 2007, Plaintiff's motion to
allow discovery came before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey,
District Judge, in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho.
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick,
Deputy Court Clerk, were present.
Mr. Lance Schuster and Mr. Jeff Brunson appeared on behalf
of the Plaintiff.
Mr. Mark Fuller and Mr. Dan Beck appeared on behalf of the
Defendant.
Mr. Schuster presented an oral motion to continue the jury
trial setting.

Mr. Fuller stipulated to a continuance.

The Court granted the motion for continuance.
Jury trial was reset for July 22, 2008.
two weeks.

Trial may go for

If so, trial may continue the week of July 29 th .

Pretrial conference was scheduled for July 9, 2007 at 8:30 a.m.
The pending motion was considered moot.

Court was thus adjourned.

L
TINGEY
District Judge
J

H:cv067097.48mo

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

~

day of November, 2007, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to
be delivered to the following:
RONALD LONGMORE

Deputy Court Clerk
Lance Schuster
Jeff Brunson
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Mark R. Fuller
Dan Beck
PO Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID

83405

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO,

7

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an
Idaho corporation,
AMENDED
ORDER AND NOTICE
RESETTING JURY TRIAL
Case No.
CV-06 7097

Plaintiff,
vs.
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES,
Idaho corporation,

INC., an

Defendant.
Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
the following pre trial schedule shall govern all proceedings in
this case:
I.
1.

2.
3.
4.

5.
6.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
A Pre-trial Conference is rescheduled for July 9, 2008
at 8:30 a.m.
Jury trial is rescheduled for 10:00 a.m. (or 1:30 p.m.)
on July 22, 2008.
Trial lS expected to continue the
week of July 29.
Dispositive motions must be filed at least 60 days
prior to trial.
Plaintiff(s) expert witness disclosure and Defendant's
expert witness disclosure on its counterclaim,
including opinions and conclusions must be filed at
least 100 days before trial. All rebuttal expert
witnesses, including opinions and conclusions must be
disclosed and filed at least 75 days before trial.
All discovery shall be completed 45 days prior to
trial.
The parties and their attorneys shall attend a
mediation session before a qualified attorney mediator
or district judge selected by the parties.
Mediation
should be completed at least 90 days prior to trial.

II.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each attorney shall, no
later than three (3) days prior to the pre-trial conference:

1.

ORDER

File a list of names of persons who may be called to

2.
3.
4.

testify.
File a descriptive list of all exhibits proposed to be
offered into evidence
File a brief citing legal authorities upon which the
party relies as to each issue of law to be litigated.
File proposed jury instructions.
The parties need not
submit IDJI2 instruction numbers 1.01 through 1.43.
All instructions shall be prepared in accordance with
I.R.C.P. 51(a).

III. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each attorney shall no later
than seven (7) days before trial:

1.
2.

IV.

1.

2.

3.
4.

File any objections to the jury instructions requested
by an opponent specifying the instruction and the
grounds for the objection.
Deposit with the clerk of the court all exhibits to be
introduced.
Plaintiff shall mark exhibits in numerical
sequence as outlined in Plaintiff's exhibit list and
Defendant's exhibits shall be marked in alphabetical
sequence as outlined in Defendant's exhibit list.
Pages of exhibits shall be stapled, with a sticker
placed on the first page of the actual exhibit.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
Any exhibits or witnesses discovered after the last
required disclosure shall immediately be disclosed to
the court and opposing counsel by filing and service
stating the date upon which the same was discovered.
No witnesses shall testify and no exhibits shall be
admitted into evidence at trial other than those
disclosed, listed and submitted to the clerk of the
court in accordance with this order ..
This order shall control the course of this action
unless modified for good cause shown to prevent
manifest injustice.
The Court may impose appropriate sanctions for
violation of this order.

DATED this ~ day of November, 2007.

ORDER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

~

day of November, 2007,

I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to
be delivered to the following:
RONALD LONGMORE

Deputy Court Clerk
Lance Schuster
Jeff Brunson
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Mark R. Fuller
Dan Beck
PO Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID

ORDER
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
-vs.SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES INC. ET AL.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2006-7097
MINUTE ENTRY

December 20,2007, a Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavit and Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment on Amended Complaint came on for hearing before the Honorable Joel E.
Tingey, District Judge, sitting in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho.
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Ms. Rhonda Quintana, Deputy Court Clerk, were
present.
Mr. Lance Schuster and Jeffrey Brunson appeared on behalf of plaintiff.
Mr. Mark Fuller and Mr. Daniel Beck appeared on behalf of the defendant's.
Mr. Schuster offered the motion as argument for the Motion to Strike Affidavit.
Mr. Beck had previously submitted his response and submitted on such.
The Court denied the Motion to Strike Affidavit.
Mr. Beck addressed the Court in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court inquired of counsel regarding the argument.
Mr. Beck responded and then continued his argument in support.
MINUTE ENTRY - 1

Mr. Schuster offered argument in opposition.
The Court inquired of counsel.
Mr. Schuster responded and continued argument in opposition.
Mr. Beck offered rebuttal argument in support and requested the motion be granted.
The Court took this matter under advisement and will issue its opinion and decision in
due course.
Court was thus adjourned.

c: Mark Fuller
Michael Gaffney
122007AMTingey5

MINUTE ENTRY - 2
f'~

" t"1

....Iv.

B
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL D~,SlRtCTr.1n2
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY
BO'NNEVILLE'0 ~

ot

PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
Case No. CV-06-7097
Plaintiff,

ORDER

v.
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL
& PROFESSIONAL PARK, L.L.C., an Idaho
limited liability company
Defendants,

ANALYSIS
This matter has come before the Court upon Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment RE: Constructive Fraud. The procedural background, disputed and undisputed
facts, and standard of adjudication applicable to this matter were previously set out in the
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order entered on August 31, 2007.

In that Decision, the Court considered Defendants' prior motions for sunU11ary
judgment and granted said motions in part, and denied said motions in part. As to
Plaintiffs claims for failure to disclose and for constructive fraud, the Court granted
summary judgment as to Defendant SUlU1yside Park Owners Association, Inc., but denied
summary judgment on those claims as against Sunnyside Utilities, Inc., and SUlU1yside

ORDER 1

Industrial and Professional Park, LLC, on the grounds that there were disputed issues of
fact.
Defendants have again moved for summary judgment on those claims on the
grounds that Plaintiff did not rely on any alleged non-disclosure, and further had no right
to rely upon any alleged non-disclosure. For purposes of the present motion, the facts
indicate the following.
On December 23, 1999, Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park, LLC (SIPP)
transferred the property now know as Block 1, Lot 5 at Sunnyside Industrial Professional
Park to Miskin Scraper Works, Inc. Miskin Scraper Works, Inc. transferred the propeliy
to Waters Land and Cattle, LLC on March 26,2004. On August 18,2005, Waters Land
and Cattle, LLC transferred the property to CTR Development, LLC. CTR Development,
LLC constructed the physical building located on the propeliy, and while the current
owner, paid $1800.00 to Defendant Sunnyside Park Utilities (Sunnyside Utilities) to
establish a sewer connection to Block 1, Lot 5. Shortly thereafter, a connection was
established to the property allowing access to the septic system installed by SIPP. On
January 23,2006, CTR Development, LLC transferred the property to J&LB Properties,
Inc., who is the current owner of the property.
J&LB Properties, Inc. entered into a written lease agreement with CTR
Management, LLC on January 23, 2006 to rent the premises located on Block 1, Lot 5.
On that same day, CTR Management, LLC entered into an oral lease with Printcraft
Press, Inc. (Printcraft) where Printcraft would rent the premises on a month-to-month
basis. Shortly thereafter Printcraft began occupying the premises and operating a full
color printing service which employs approximately 40 employees. The Bonneville

ORDER 2

COlmty Planning and Zoning Department issued a Temporary Certificate of Occupancy
for the premises on March 16, 2006. The temporary certificate expired 180 days later on
September 12,2006. A Certificate of Occupancy was issued by the BOlmeville County
Planning and Zoning Department on February 1,2007.

In June of 2006, the septic system operated by Sunnyside Utilities and installed by
SIPP began to fail and sewage leaked onto the ground. The Defendants claim that
Printcraft caused the failure because of the large amount of processed waste iqjected into
the septic system. On December 15, 2006, the Defendants severed the sewer connection
to the premises being rented by Printcraft because Defendants believed that Printcraft was
discharging prohibited material into the septic system.
Defendants argue that since Plaintiff was occupying the property in the absence of
an occupancy permit, it can not claim justifiable reliance on alleged misrepresentations or
non-disclosures i.e., there can be no justifiable reliance when performing an unlawful act.
The Court however does not believe that occupying the property without a permit is
dispositive of this issue. Instead, it is the Court's opinion that the occupation of the
property without an occupancy permit is simply evidence which may have an affect on
whether reliance was justified (as determined by a jury), proximate cause, and/or
damages.
FUlihermore, the alleged detrimental reliance is not just the occupancy of the
building, but also the closing down of Plaintiff's business at the prior location. There was
nothing illegal about making a decision to cease doing business at one location in
anticipation of doing business at another location. In granting inferences in favor of the
non-moving party, at least some of the alleged detrimental reliance and corresponding
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damages arose from the decision to relocate to the property in question, not just the
decision to occupy the building at a particular time.
Defendants further argue that there could be no justifiable reliance because no
"promises" had been made to Plaintiff regarding sewer service and that the Plaintiff s
rental agreement also did not provide for sewer service. However, it is the Court's
opinion that this goes to the heart of the factual issues relating to a claim of constructive
fraud. The evidence indicates that Plaintiff assumed and believed that the "industrial
park" would have adequate facilities for sewage and waste water. There is also a
disputed issue of whether Defendants were aware of Plaintiffs sewage and waste water
requirements. Accordingly, the issue of whether express promises or agreements had
been made regarding sewer service is necessarily related to whether there was a prior
failure to make a required disclosure regarding the limitations of the septic facility.
Accordingly, consistent with the Court's decision of August 31, 2007, there are
disputed issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on these claims. Those
factual issues include the nature of the statements made between the Parties'
representatives, the respective knowledge of the Parties as to the infrastructure of the
property and the requirements of Plaintiffs business, and whether Defendants reasonably
should have disclosed the limitations of the septic system. Derivative factual issues from
the foregoing include whether Plaintiff relied upon the alleged non-disclosures and
whether such reliance was justified.
Based on the foregoing, Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment Re:
Constructive Fraud is DENIED.
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Dated this :::t;day of December, 2007.

DIstrict Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this~ day of December, 2007, I did send a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox;
or by causing the same to be hand-delivered.
Michael Gaffney
Lance Schuster
Beard St. Clair Gaffney, McNamara Calder
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Mark R. Fuller
Daniel R. Beck
Fuller & Carr
P.O. Box 50935
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
Bonlleville County, Idaho

BYKs
I

Deputy Clerk
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
Lance J. Schuster, ISB No. 5404
Jeffrey D. Bmnson, ISB No. 6996
Jolm M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
lance@beardstclair.com
j eff@beardstclair.com
javondet@beardstclair.com
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Attorneys for the Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho
corporation.
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

Case No.: CV-06-7097

vs.
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho
corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK
O\VNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company

ORDER RE: STIPULATION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER

Defendants/Counterclaimants.

The Comt having considered the parties' signed StipUlation for Protective Order,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
The pmties shall not release, disclose, or otherwise cause to be released or

r:'"''J
J..." .J
Order Re: Stipulation for Protective Order Page 1

disclosed Plaintiff, Printcraft Press, Inc. 's financial infonnation, to any person not a party
to the pending action between Plaintiff and the Defendants or to any person not an expert
witness in the above action, and shall use such information solely for the purposes of this
litigation.

IT IS SO ORDERED
DATED: February

2008.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on February L02008, I served a true and correct copy of the
ORDER RE: STIPULATION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER on the following by the
method of delivery designated below:
Mark Fuller
Fuller & Carr
PO Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935
Fax: (208) 524-7167
Lance Schuster
leffBrunson
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Fax: (208) 529-9732

lli.s. Mail
/

[gU.S. Mail

0

Comihouse Box

0

Facsimile

0

Comihouse Box

0

Facsimile

Clerk of the Court
By:

')}NY
Deputy Clerk
Order Re: Stipulation for Protecti ve Order Page 2
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MARK R. FULLER (ISB No. 2698)
DANIEL R. BECK (ISB No. 7237)
FULLER & CARR
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE, SUITE 201
P.O. Box 50935
IDAHO FALLS, iDAHO 83405-0935
TELEPHONE: (208) 524-5400
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ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho )
corporation,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)

v.

)
)

Case No. CV-06-7097

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES' BREACH
OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION

SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho )
SUNNYSIDE
PARK)
corporation,
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an)
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE)
INDUSTRIAL AND
PROFESSIONAL)
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability )
company,
)

)
Defendants.

)
)

COMES NOW, the Defendants, Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. ("Sunnyside
Utilities") through its counsel of record, Daniel R. Beck of Fuller & Carr, and moves the
Court pursuant to IRep 56(b) for Partial Summary Judgment on Sunnyside Utilities
Cause of Action for Breach of Contract.
Sunnyside Utilities is entitled to Summary Judgment on its Cause of Action for

MOTION FOR SUtvltvl}\,RY JUDGMENT RE: SUNNYSIDE
ES'
BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION -

Breach of Contract because, there is no dispute that a contract was formed, the contract
is unambiguous, and Printcraft violated the contract.
The Motion is based upon this Motion, the Notice of Hearing, the Brief in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment RE: Sunnyside Utilities' Breach of Contract Cause of
Action, the Affidavit of Doyle Beck, dated March 10, 2008, and the Affidavit of Daniel R.
Beck, dated March 14, 2008.
y~""

DATED this \ '\
\

day of March, 2008.

Daniel R. Beck
Fuller & Carr

JV10TION FOR SUJVlf\lARY JUDGI\1ENT RE: SUNNYSIDE UTILI
ES'
BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION
~'''"\t"'\

!J~ .~;

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the following
described pleading or document on the attorney listed below on this

---L-'--

day of March,

2008:
Document Served:

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: SUNNYSIDE UTILTilES' BREACH
OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION

Attorney Served:

Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, 10 83404

)(

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

Daniel R. Beck
FULLER & CARR

['10TION FOR SUJVIMARY JUDGMENT RE: SUNNYSIDE
LI :LES'
BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE Of ACTION - 3
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MARK R. FULLER (IS8 No. 2698)
DANIEL R. BECK (ISB No. 7237)
FULLER & CARR
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE, SUITE 201
P.O. Box 50935
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405-0935
TELEPHONE: (208) 524-5400
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ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho)
corporation,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)

v.

)
)

Case No. CV-06-7097

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE:
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES' BREACH
OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION

SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho )
corporation,
SUNNYSIDE
PARK)
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an)
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE)
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL)
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability )
company,
)
)
Defendants.
)

COMES NOW, the Defendant, Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., ("Sunnyside Utilities")
through its counsel of record, Daniel R. Beck of Fuller & Carr, and submits this Brief in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment RE: Sunnyside Utilities' Breach of Contract
Cause of Action.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On September 12, 2005, CTR Development, LLC and Sunnyside Utilities entered

SUt~NYSI

BRSIF IN SUPPORT Of MOTION FOR SDt1Mlmy ,JUDGMENT
UTILITIES' BREl\.CH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF l\CTION

into an agreement for Sunnyside Utilities to provide sewer services to the building
located at Lot 1, Block 5, Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park Subdivision.
See Amended Complaint, para. 25.
2.

On January 23, 2006, CTR Development sold the building and its right to use the
sewer system to J&LB Properties. See Amended Complaint, para. 24(0).

3.

Sunnyside Utilities never promised Printcraft Press, Inc. (hereafter "Printcraft") any
sewer services prior to Printcraft's occupancy of the building. See Deposition of
Travis Waters, pg. 109, In. 25 through pg. 110, In. 2.

4.

J&LB Properties never promised Printcraft any sewer services. See Amended
Complaint, para. 26 and Lease Agreement, para. 6, attached as Exhibit J to the
Amended Complaint. .

5.

Printcraft moved into the building in January of 2006 and began discharging water
softener brine, hazardous wastes, processed water and excessive flows of
wastewater into the system in violation of IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03. See
Memorandum Decision and Order, dated August 31,2007.

6.

In June of 2006, Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system experienced a temporary
overload.

7.

Printcraft admitted that prior to September 26, 2006 it discharged illegal processed
wastes into Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system. See Response to Request for
Admission, No. 21.

8.

On September 20, 2006 Sunnyside Utilities offered to provide Printcraft with sewer
services upon certain terms and conditions, however, Sunnyside Utilities refused

RE:
RREIF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMM..F"RY
SUNNYS DE UTILITIES' BREACH OF CONTRACT Cz\USE 0;:;" l'.CTION -

to accept any "processed wastes". See Letter of Mark Fuller, dated September
20, 2006, attached as Plaintiff's Response to Request for Admission, No.6.
9.

On September 26, 2006, Printcraft accepted Sunnyside Utilities' offer and
specifically promised to cease all discharges of "processed waste" into the sewer
system. See Letter of Lane Erickson, dated September 26, 2006, attached as
Plaintiff's Response to Request for Admission, No.7.

10.

Despite the agreement, Printcraft continued discharging water softener brine into
the sewer system after September 26, 2006 through December 15, 2006. See
Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 200, In. 21 through pg. 201, In. 5.

11.

Printcraft continued discharging inks into the sewer system after September 26,
2006 through December 15, 2006. See Luzier Deposition, pg. 69, In. 25 through
pg. pg. 71, In. 6.

12.

Printcraft continued discharging processed waste from its air conditioner units into
the sewer system after September 26, 2006 through December 15, 2006. See
Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 190-191.

13.

Printcraft continued discharging processed wastes from its prepress area and its
flexographic printing area from September 26, 2006 through December 15, 2006.
See Deposition of Terry Luzier, pg. 39, In. 25 through pg. 40, In. 22.

14.

Printcraft was specifically warned by a Sunnyside Utilities' representative, in
October of 2006, that the sink where Printcraft was discharging its ink was a
serious concern. See Travis Waters Deposition, pg. 192, In. 23-24.

15.

On December 10, 2006, Doyle Beck, a Sunnyside Utilities' representative,

BREIF IN SUPPORT OF t,;JOTION FOR Sm'lt,;JARY cTUDG1,;JENT RE:
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personally observed "processed waste" being discharged from the building
occupied by Printcraft. See Affidavit of Doyle Beck, para. 3, dated March 10,
2008.
16.

On December 13, 2006, Sunnyside Utilities' attorney demanded that Printcraft
cease all discharges of water softener brine. See Deposition of Travis Waters,
pg. 199, In. 5 through pg. 201, In. 5 and Exhibit 18.

17.

Despite the warnings and demands, Printcraft continued discharging ink, water
softener brine, and other "processed wastes" into the sewer system. See
Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 200, In. 21 through pg. 201, In. 5. These facts
have been established as a matter of law by this court. See Memorandum
Decision and Order dated August 31,2007.

18.

On December 15, 2006, Sunnyside Utilities severed the sewer connection to the
building occupied by Printcraft. See First Amended Complaint, para. 53.

19.

Sunnyside Utilities incurred damages in the amount of $2,648.64 in order to
disconnect the building occupied by Printcraft from Sunnyside Utilities sewer
system. See Affidavit of Doyle Beck, para. 5 and 6, dated March 10, 2008.
LEGAL STANDARD

This Court's standard in considering Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment was addressed in G & M Farms v. Funck Irr. Co., 119 Id. 514, 808 P.2d 851
(1991):
It is well established that "[A] motion for summary judgment shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
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any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." IRCP 56(c); Olson v. Freeman, 117 Idaho 706,791 P.2d
1285 (1990); Rawson v. United Steelworkers of Am., 111 Idaho 630,726
P.2d 742 (1986); Boise Car & Truck v. Waco, 108 Idaho 780,702 P.2d 818
(1985); Schaefer v. Elswood Trailer Sales, 95 Idaho 654,516 P.2d 1168
(1973). Upon a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are
liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. Tusch Enters. v. Coffin,
113 Idaho 37,740 P.2d 1022 (1987); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,716
P.2d 1238 (1986); Kline v. Clinton, 103 Idaho 116, 645 P.2d 350 (1982).
Likewise, all reasonable inferences which can be made from the record
shall be made in favor of the party resisting the motion. Tusch Enters. v.
Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987); Doe V. Durtschi, 110 Idaho
466,716 P.2d 1238 (1986); Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v. Meridian
Athlete Ass'n, Inc., 105 Idaho 509,670 P.2d 1294 (1983); Anderson v.
Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923 (1982); Kline v. Clinton, 103 Idaho
116,645 P.2d 350 (1982). The burden at all times is upon the moving party
to prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Petricevich v.
Salmon River Canal Company, 92 Idaho 865, 452 P.2d 362 (1969).
However, the plaintiff's case must be anchored in something more than
speculation and a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a
genuine issue. kL See also Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409,797 P.2d 117
(1990). If the record contains conflicting inferences or reasonable minds
might reach different conclusions, a summary judgment must be denied.
Kline v. Clinton, 103 Idaho 116, 645 P.2d 350 (1982); Farmer's Ins. Co. of
Idaho v. Brown, 97 Idaho 380, 544 P.2d 1150 (1976). All doubts are to be
resolved against the moving party, and the motion must be denied if the
evidence is such that conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom, and if
reasonable people might reach different conclusions. Doe v. Durtschi, 110
Idaho 466,716 P.2d 1238 (1986); Ashby v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67,593
P.2d 402 (1979).
119 Id. at 516-7. If any genuine issue of material fact remains, after all reasonable
inferences have been made in favor of the non-moving party, the Motion for Summary
Judgment must be denied.
Under Rule 56(a), the moving party has the initial burden of showing that it is
entitled to judgment. In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 US 317,106 S. Ct. 2458 (1986) the
Supreme Court held that a party moving for Summary Judgment, and not bearing the
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burden of proof at trial, need not negate the opposing party's case. Rather, the moving
party could discharge its initial burden by demonstrating the absence of an essential
element of the case of the opponent, who bears the burden of proof at trial. The
Supreme Court in Celotex, supra, stated:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial. In such a situation, there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact',
since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving
party is 'entitled to a judgment as a matter of law' because the non-moving party
has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with
respect to which she has the burden of proof.
477 US at 321, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. "The language and reasoning of Celotex has been
adopted by the Appellate Courts of Idaho." Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Id. 308, 312, 882 P.2d
475 (Ct.App. 1994).
ARGUMENT
I.

EXISTENCE OF A CONTRACT

The parties entered into a binding agreement on September 26, 2006. "Formation
of a valid contract requires that there be a meeting of the minds as evidenced by a
manifestation of mutual intent to contract." Heritage Excavation, Inc. v. Briscoe, 141 Idaho
40,43, 105 P.3d 700 (Ida. App. 2005). "This manifestation takes the form of an offer and
acceptance." Id.
On September 20,2006, through its attorney, Sunnyside Utilities offered to accept
Printcraft's human waste into Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system, only if Printcraft agreed

BREIF
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not to discharge any "process wastewater" into Sunnyside Utilities sewer system. See
Letter of Mark Fuller, dated September 20, 2006, attached to Printcraft's Response to
Request for Admission NO.6. The letter specifically advised Printcraft that "the sewer
system is only designed to accommodate human waste and is not designed to handle
'processed waste.'" Id. The letter also states that "Printcraft Press must cease any flows
of process water into the system." Id. Finally, the letter states: "These issues are not
negotiable." Id. (Emphasis Added).

On September 26, 2006, through its attorney, Printcraft unconditionally accepted
Sunnyside Utilities' offer. Specifically, Printcraft "agreed to make arrangements to collect
and dispose of what you [Sunnyside Utilities in Fuller's September 20, 2006 letter] classify
as 'processed waste. '" See Letter of Lane Erickson, dated September 26, 2006, attached
to Printcraft's Response to Request for Admission NO.7.
In this case there is a clear manifestation in the form of an offer and acceptance.
There is no material issue of fact that a contract between the parties existed after
September 26, 2006.

II.

INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT
The contract is unambiguous and only subject to one interpretation: Printcraft was

only entitled to discharge human waste into the sewer system and any discharge of
"processed waste" violated the terms of the contract.
"Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law; and if the contract is not
ambiguous its meaning is also a question of law." Shacocass Inc. v. Arrington Canst. Co.,
1161daho 460,462,776 P.2d 469 (lda.App. 1989). The Idaho Supreme Court has set
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SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES' BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION
7

forth the following rules for construction of a contract:
When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and
legal effect are questions of law. An unambiguous contract will be given its plain
meaning. The purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the
contracting parties at the time the contract was entered. In determining the intent
of the parties, this Court must view the contract as a whole. If a contract is found
ambiguous, its interpretation is a question of fact. Whether a contract is ambiguous
is a question of law. A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to conflicting
interpretations.
Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 190, 108 P.3d 332 (2005).

The September 20, 2006 letter, containing the terms of the contract, is not reasonably
subject to conflicting interpretations. The letter clearly states: "the sewer system is only
designed to accommodate human waste and is not designed to handle 'processed
waste.'" See Letter of Mark Fuller, dated September 20, 2006, Attached to Plaintiff's
Responses to Requests for Admission, No. 6.The letter also indentifies any "chemicals"
and "large amounts of water" specifically as substances Sunnyside Utilities considered to
be "processed wastes." Id. Reading the letter as a whole it is clear that only human waste
would be allowed to be discharged by Printcraft under the terms of the letter. Id.
Furthermore, the letter specifically includes the statement that "[t]hese issues are not
negotiable." Id.
Finally, in Printcraft's acceptance letter, Printcraft's attorney acknowledges that he
was been unable to find a definition of "processed waste" in IDAPA, so instead Printcraft
agreed to abide by the definition of "processed waste" contained in the September 20,
2006 letter. See Letter of Lane Erickson, dated September 26, 2006, attached to
Printcraft's Responses to Request for Admission NO.7. Regardless of any other possible

BREIF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMIJll\W{ JUDGMENT
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES' BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF }I.CTION A,... ....,

r-'*

L '--' 'J

8

definition of "processed waste," it is clear that the mutual intent of the parties was to follow
the definition of "processed waste" contained in the September 20, 2006 letter. Id.
The agreement between the parties was not ambiguous because it is only subject
to one reasonable interpretation. Printcraft was only entitled to discharge human waste
into the sewer system and was not entitled to discharge any "processed wastes".

III.

BREACH OF THE CONTRACT
Because Printcraft was only entitled to discharge human waste into the sewer

system, and was specifically prohibited from discharging "processed waste" under the
agreement, the discharge of any quantity of "processed waste" constituted a breach of
the agreement. "A breach of contract may occur through affirmative noncompliance with
the terms of the contract (i.e. 'misfeasance'), as well as by a failure to perform at all (i.e.
'nonfeasance')." Wickstrom v. North Idaho College, 111 Idaho 450,452,725 P.2d 155
(1986).
The Court has already determined that "Printcraft discharged water softener brine,
hazardous wastes, processed water and excessive flows of wastewater into the system in
violation of IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03." See Memorandum Decision and Order, pg. 5,
entered August 31, 2007. There is no dispute that Printcraft continued discharging water
softener brine into the sewer system until the disconnection occurred. See Deposition of
Travis Waters, pg. 200, In. 21 through pg. 201, In. 5. Mr. Waters testified that Printcraft
did not divert air compressor water out of the sewer system. See Deposition of Travis
Waters, pg. 190-191. Printcraft's general manager testified that on December 15

th

,

2006,

Printcraft was discharging diluted chemicals from Printcraft's prepress area, and
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discharges from Printcraft's flexo department. See Deposition of Terry Luzier, pg. 39, In.
25 through pg. 40, In. 22. Luzier also testified that ink being washed off of trays continued
to be discharged into Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system until December 15

th

,

2006. See

Luzier Deposition, pg. 69, In. 25 through pg. pg. 71, In. 6. Luzier testified that in response
to the agreement reached in September of 2006, Printcraft took steps to minimize the
amount of ink flowing into the system, however, the ink continued to be washed down the
sink and into the system on a daily basis until the disconnection. See Luzier Depostion,
pg. 74, In. 16-24. Mr. Waters acknowledged that in October, Kirk Woolf inspected the
property and informed Printcraft that the ink "sink is going to be a concern." See Travis
Waters Deposition, pg. 192, In. 23-24. Mr. Waters also acknowledged that despite the
warnings from Mr. Woolf about the sink and the necessity to comply with the agreement "I
kind of blew it off. I didn't take it too serious." See Travis Waters Deposition, pg. 193, In.
4-6.
On December 10, 2006, Doyle Beck observed significant quantities of "processed
waste" being discharged from the building occupied by Printcraft. See Affidavit of Doyle
Beck, para. 3, dated March 10, 2008. Mr. Beck removed the clean out cover in front of the
Printcraft Press building and observed that significant amounts of "processed waste" were
flowing through the sewer system. Id. Para. 4. Mr. Beck then checked the upstream
manhole and discovered that no "processed waste" was flowing through the sewer
system at that location. Id. 5. Mr. Waters acknowledged that on December 10

th

,

2006 it

was possible that the water softener system ran and discharged its brine into the system.

See Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 195, In. 10 through pg. 195, In. 21. Mr. Waters
BREIF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMLJiliRY JUDGMENT
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acknowledged that on December 13, 2006 Printcraft received a letter which specifically
identified water softener brine as expressly prohibited by Idaho Code, yet the water
softener brine continued to be discharged into the system until the disconnection on
December 15, 2006. See Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 199, In. 5 through pg. 201, In.
5 and Exhibit 18 ("0. [Mark Fuller] Was there any change made to the discharge of water
softener brine into the Sunnyside system in response to this letter? A. [Travis Waters] No.

Q. You continued to discharge into the system. A. Yes.").
There is no issue of material fact which would prevent Summary Judgment.
Printcraft clearly violated the terms of the September 20, 2006 letter by discharging water
softener brine, ink, and other chemicals into the system up until the day of disconnection.
The breaches of the agreement were confirmed by Printcraft's President, Travis Waters;
Printcraft's General Manager, Terry Luzier; and an officer of Sunnyside Utilities', Doyle
Beck. Furthermore, despite a specific demand for compliance on December 13, 2006,
Printcraft continued to refuse to comply and cease discharging "processed waste" into the
system. Sunnyside Utilities is entitled to Summary Judgment on its cause of action for
Breach of Contract.
IV.

DAMAGES
Sunnyside Utilities has suffered damages in the amount of $2,648.64 as a result of

Printcraft's breach of the contract, because Sunnyside Utilities was forced to sever the
sewer connection to the building occupied by Printcraft on December 15
On December 15

th

,

th

,

2006.

2006, Sunnyside Utilities severed the sewer connection to the

building Printcraft occupied. See Amended Complaint, para. 53. The Court in this case
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previously decided:
Printcraft has not offered any evidence rebutting Sunnyside Utilities' evidence that
Printcraft violated IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03 by discharging water softener brine,
hazardous wastes, processed water and excessive flows of wastewater into the
system. Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no issue of material fact that
Printcraft discharged substances into the sewer system in violation of state law.
Sunnyside Utilities was justified in severing Printcraft's sewer connection in
light of this illegality.

See Memorandum Decision and Order, pg. 9, entered August 31,2007. (Emphasis
Added). Because Sunnyside Utilities was justified in severing Printcraft's sewer
connection as a result of Printcraft's illegal discharges, and Printcraft's breaches of the
contract, Sunnyside Utilities is entitled to recover the costs it incurred in severing the
sewer connection.
Sunnyside Utilities incurred costs in the amount of $1 ,228.64 for a backhoe and
operator to perform the disconnection. See Affidavit of Doyle Beck, para. 6, dated March
10,2008. Sunnyside Utilities also incurred costs in the amount of $1 ,420.00 for
inspection and supervision of the disconnection. Id. Para. 7. As a result Sunnyside
Utilities is entitled to damages in the amount of $2,648.64 which were incurred as a
direct and proximate result of Printcraft's breach of the contract.
CONCLUSION

On September 20,2006 Sunnyside Utilities offered to provide Printcraft with sewer
services upon very specific terms and conditions. One of those conditions was that
Sunnyside Utilities would only accept human waste and would not accept any "processed
waste" from Printcraft. On September 25, 2006, Printcraft agreed to the terms of the
September 20, 2006 letter, specifically agreeing to follow the definition of "processed

BREIF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR smJ[~qRY JUDGMENT RS:
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waste" set forth in Sunnyside Utilities' letter. During the months following, Printcraft
continued discharging water softener brine, ink and other "processed wastes" in violation
of the agreement and in violation of state law, despite warnings from Sunnyside Utilities
and a specific demand that such discharges cease from Sunnyside Utilities' attorney.
On December 15

th

,

2006, Sunnyside Utilities was forced to sever the sewer

connection to the building occupied by Printcraft. In order to complete the severance of
the sewer connection, Sunnyside Utilities incurred damages in the amount of $2,648.64.
There are no issues of fact as to the terms of the agreement, that the agreement
was breached, or the amount of Sunnyside Utilities' damages. As a result, Sunnyside
Utilities is entitled to Summary Judgment on its cause of action for Breach of Contract
and is entitled to damages in the amount of $2,648.64.
DATED this

i
~day
of March, 2008.
I \\'"

-Daniel R. Beck
Fuller & Carr
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ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho)
corporation,
)
Plaintiff,

v.
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
SUNNYSIDE
PARK
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-06-7097
AFFIDAVIT OF DOYLE BECK IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: SUNNYSIDE
UTILITIES' BREACH OF CONTRACT
CAUSE OF ACTION

STATE OF IDAHO
) ss.
County of Bonneville)

Doyle Beck,

being first duly sworn upon his oath states and

alleges as follows:
AFFIDAVIT OF DOYLE BECK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUlV1MARY JUDGMENT
RE: SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES' BREACH OF CONTRP.CT CAuSE OF ACTION - 1

Affiant

1.

I

a

resident

of

Bonneville

County,

State

of

and executes this Affidavit upon his personal knowledge.

2.
3.

si

is

Affiant is an officer of Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc.
On

10,

December

ficant

quantities

2006

Affiant

personally

of processed waste

observed

being discharged

from

the building occupied by Printcraft.
4.

Affiant

processed

confirmed

wastes

were

on

coming

December
from

10,

2006

Printcraft's

that

the

building

by

removing the clean out cover in front of Printcraft's building and
watching the processed wastes

flow

down

the

sewer

lines

toward

Sunnyside Utilities septic tanks.
5.

Affiant

discharges
checking

were
the

determining

also

not

coming

manhole
that

confirmed on

no

December

10,

from upstream in the

upstream
processed

from
wastes

2006

the

sewer lines by

Printcraft's
were

that

flowing

building

and

through

the

sewer lines upstream from Printcraft's building.
6.

an

On December 15, 2006 affiant rented a backhoe and hired

operator

to

perform

the

disconnection

for

a

total

cost

of

members

of

$1,228.64.
7.

On

December

15,

2006

affiant

and

other

Sunnyside Utilities supervised the disconnection and performed an
inspection

of

the

disconnection

to

verify

that

it

had

been

properly disconnected for a total cost of $1,420.00.
8.

Further this Affiant sayeth naught.

AFFIDAVIT OF DOYLE BECK IN SuPPORT OF MOTION FOR SuM~~RY JUDGMENT
RE: SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES' BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION - 2

G::;

DATED this

Ie) ~day

of March,

2008.

11LuLL/

Doyle BE\4::k

'"

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me

this

j)

'f-t.-...,

day of tvlarch,

2008.

61tJ~71.3
I

I
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AFFIDAVIT OF DOYLE BECK IN
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Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
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ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES,

INC.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
INC. ,

PRINTCRAFT
PRESS,
Idaho corporation,

an )

Case No. CV-06-7097

)

)
)

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL BECK IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE:SUNNYSIDE
UTILITIES' BREACH OF CONTRACT
CAUSE OF ACTION

)

v.

)
)
)
)
)

SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an
Idaho
corporation,
SUNNYSIDE
PARK OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
an
Idaho
corporation,
and )
SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRIAL
AND )
PROFESSIONAL
PARK,
LLC,
an )
Idaho
imited
liability )
)
corporation,
)

Defendants.

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO
)3S.

County of Bonneville)

Daniel Beck, being first duly sworn upon his oath states and
alleges as follows:
1.

Affiant

is

a

resident

of

Bonneville

County,

State

of

daho and executes this Affidavit upon his personal knowledge.
AFFIDAVI OF DANIEL BECK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: SUNNYS DE UTILITIES' BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF llDTION - 1.

2.

Affiant

an attorney licensed in the State of Idaho

lS

and represents Sunnyside Park utilities,
Attached

3.

copies of
(with

hereto

Plaintiff's

Fuller

letter

as

Exhibit

Responses
dated

Inc.,
A

are

to Requests

September

in t

20,

smatter.

true

and

correct

for l\dmission No.
2006),

No.

6

(with

7

Erickson letter dated September 26, 2006), and No. 21.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B are true and correct copies

of excerpts of the Deposition of Travis Waters, pgs. 109-110, 190193,

195,

199-201

and Exhibit

18

(letter

of Mark

Fuller,

dated

December 13, 2006.
5.

Attached

hereto

as

Exhibit

C

are

true

and

copies of excerpts of the Deposition of Terry Luzier,

s.

correct
39-40,

69-71, and 74.
6.

Further this Affiant sayeth naught.

DATED this

I~*~

day of March, 2008.

~1
oanel
SUBSCRIBED AND

S~'JORN

8L.

Beck

to before me this

day of JVIarch,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the
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described pleading or document on the attorneys

belO\Y on this

day of
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~~
__~_~
________________ ,

listed

2008:

AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL BECK IN
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Attorneys Served:
Jeffrey D. Brunson, Esq.
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
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Racine Law

Mitchell W. Brown (ISB#: 4202)
Lane Y. Erickson (I8B#: 5979)
RACINE, OLSON, NYE,
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Telephone: (208)232-6101
Fa,"'(: (208)232-6109

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
Case No. CY-06-7097
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC. an Idaho
corporatio~

PLAINTIFF PRINTCRAFT PRESS~
RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION

Plaintiff,
VS.

SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC. an Idaho
cOIporation,

Defendant.

COMES NOW the PlaintiffPRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC. an Idaho cOIporation (hereafter
"Printcraft"), by and through its counsel of record, Lane V. Erickson, and pursuant to Idallo' S
Rules of Civil Procedure hereby Responds to Defendant's First Set of Requests for Admission.

To the extent that the definitions and instrnctions contained jn Defendant's First Set of
Discovery to Plaintiffs contlict with, vary from, or add to the requirements of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs do hereby object to the same and state that their answers herein are
made without regard to such definitions and instructions.
PLAINTIFF PRINTCRAFT PRESS' RESPONSES TO
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION

Page I
("<

.~;~

f)

U..:...d

EXHIBIT JL

I4J 006

Racine Law

U1/:lZnUU7 16:17 FAX 1 208 232 7352

between Travis Waters as President of Plaintiff and Doyle Beck as representative of Defendant,
Travis Waters again informed Mr. Beck that Defendant's inspectors were welcome to inspect the
.....

.

sewer service to Plaintiffs property whenever Defendant desired.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.4: Deny.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.5:
.

~.

Admit that during the inspection of the sewer

...- . .

...

.

.

-

.

service by Defendant's representative, Kirk Woolf, on or about October 5, 2006, Plaintiff's
President, Travis Waters, again invited Defendant's :inspectors to visit and inspect Plaintiff's
property and the sewer service connections whenever Defendant des:ired.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.5: Deny_
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.6: Admit that Exhibit "A" attached hereto as a true
and correct copy of the letter dated September 20, 2006, sent by Defendant's counsel to Plaintiff's
counseL
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.6; Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO_ 7: Admit that attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a tme

and correct copy of the letter dated September 26, 2006, sent by Plaintiff's counsel to Defendant's
counseL
RESPONSE TO REOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.7: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.8: Admit that attached hereto as Exhibit «C" is a true
and correct copy of the letter dated December II, 2006, sent by Defendant's counsel to Plaintiffs
counsel, setting forth three options available to Printcraft Press to allow sanitary sewer service to
continue.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO_ 8: Plaintiff admits that Exhibit "e" is
a true and correct copy of the letter dated December 11, 2006, sent by Defendant's counsel to
PLAINTIFF PRTNTCRAFT PRESS' RESPONSES TO

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
Page 3
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 20: Admit that since December 18, 2006, Plaintiff has
refused to pennit Defendant to perform any inspections on Plaintiff's business located at 3834
....

.

,~

South Professional Way, Idaho Falls, Idaho_
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 20: Admit
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO_ 11: Admit that prior to September 26,2006, Plaintiff
. .

..

~

put cooling water, reverse osmosis water and water softener brine into the sanitary sewer service
connected to Plaintiff's business premises.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 21: Admit.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 22:

Admit that the sewer service connected to

Plaintiff's business premises is designed only to accept of blackwater and blackwaste as defined by
Article I of the Rules and Regulations attached as Exhibit '·B" to Plaintiffs Verified Complaint.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 22: Plaintiff was not involved in the
construction of the sewer system in question and therefore does not have the requisite lmowledge to
either admit or deny Request

fOT

Admission No. 22 and therefore denies the same.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 23:

Admit

that Printcraft Press

discharged

substances into Sunnyside's sewer system beyond what the sewer was intended to receive from
the partiCUlar parcel that Printcraft Press is located upon.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 23: Plaintiff was not involved in the

construction of the sewer system in question and therefore does not have the requisjte knowledge to
either admit or deny Request for Admission No. 23 and therefore denies the same.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24:

Admit that Printcraft Press discharged an

excessive volume of flow into Sunnyside's sewer system.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24: Deny_
PLAlNTIFF PRINTeRAFT PRESS' RESPONSES TO
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTS FOR ADM1SSION
Page 6

FULLER & CARR
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Mark R. Fuller
Steven E. Carr"
Daniel R. Beck-Associate
•Also Licensed in Utah

Telephone
410 Memorial Drive. Suite 201
P.O. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0935

(208) 524-5400
Facsimile

(208) 524-7167

VIA FACSIMILE: 232-6109
September 20,2006

Lane V. Erickson, Esq.
RACINE OLSEN NYE BUDGE & BAILEY
201 East Center Street
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391

RE:

Sanitary Sewer Facility and Process Waste Disposal
Your File No. 33712

Dear Mr. Erickson:
Our office represents Sunnyside Park Utilities, LLC, and we have been asked to respond to your letter of
September 18, 2006.
As stated in the September 6,2006 letter, the sewer system is only designed to accommodate human
waste and is not designed to handle "processed waste." By putting its processed waste into the system,
Printcraft Press causes a violation of IDAPA 58.01.03.004.04 which states: "Unless authorized by the
Director, no person shaff provide for or connect additional black waste or wastewater sources to any
system if the resulting flow or volume would exceed the design flow of the system."
You are correct that Sunnyside is in discussions with District 7 Health regarding the existing sewer
system. In large part, as a result of excessive flows from Printcraft Press, District 7 Health believes that
Sunnyside Park Utilities has been exceeding the maximum permitted volume, and sanctions are being
threatened. Sunnyside Park Utilities cannot allow the actions of Printcraft Press to cause Sunnyside Park
Utilities to violate the law. Sunnyside Park Utilities is not equipped to neutralize chemicals injected by
Printcraft Press, nor is the system capable of handling large amounts of water. Printcraft Press is
violating Idaho Administrative Code 58.01.03.004.03 (system limitations). 58.01.03.004.04 (increased
flows). and 58.01.03012.02 (system operation). See attached copies.
Printcraft Press was advised when the water was shut off on two weekends to allow repair to the sewer
system. After the shut off, Mr. Waters promised to cease using the wastewater for humidification, but he
continued to do so. After the second shut off, Mr. Waters again promised that he would cease injecting
excess wastewater causing Sunnyside's system limitation problem. The problem continues, in violation of
Idaho law.
Sunnyside Park Utilities will continue to accept sewer water, but will not accept process wastewater.
Sunnyside Park Utilities will not partiCipate in violation of Idaho law. Therefore, Printcraft Press must
cease any flows of process water into the system by 5:00 p.m. September 22,2006. If Printcraft does not
cease injecting excess wastewater and process wastewater, absent a court order, Sunnyside Utilities will
be forced to physically disconnect all flows from Printcraft Press, and will seek to recover a/l damages

,... .' (")
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September 20, 2006

Page 2

which result from Printcraft Press's actions. These issues are not negotiable. Our discussions with
District 7 will not be complicated by the continued violations of Printcraft Press.
A meeting to discuss these issues is advisable at the earliest convenient time so that we can resolve
these serious issues. We have requested and Sunnyside is locating copies of all documents, contracts,
agreements and the like having to do with the utility services that Sunnyside Park Utilities, LLC has been
providing to Printcraft Press.
Very truly yours,

:;;li/;:1L
Mark R. Fuller
Attorney at Law
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September 26, 2006

Via Facsimile 524-7167
Mark Fuller
410 Memorial Dr., Ste 201
P.O. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, lD 83405-0935
Re:

The Sanitary Sewer Facility and Process Waste Disposal with Sunnyside Park
Utilities, LLC
Our File No. 33712

Dear Mark:

In following up to our meeting, Travis Waters has informed me that he had an additional
conversation with Doyle Beck yesterday evening about 7:00 p.m. Travis agreed with Doyle that
Printcraft Press will no longer be putting the RO water into the sewer system. Additionally, Travis
agreed to make arrangements to collect and dispose of what you classify as "processed waste."
It should be noted that in my review of the IDAP A regulations, I do not see any definition
of''processed waste." However, in an effort to assist Doyle inbis negotiations with the DEQ, Travis
has agreed to operate as outlined above. I would appreciate your keeping me informed as to Doyle's
negotiations with the DEQ. Should you have any questions or concerns, do not hesitate to contact
me.

LVElltz
r"" '-.

U I ....

,~
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Transcript of the Testimony of:
Travis Waters
Date: Aprll 25, 2007
Volume: I

Case: PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC. v. SUNNYSIDE

UTILITIES, INC.

Printed On: March 13, 2008

T&T Reporting
Phone:208j529-5491
Fax:208j529-5496
Email:tntreport@ida.net
Internet: www.tandtreport.com

Deposition of:

Travis Waters

April 25, 2007

Page 106
1

2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9

10
11
12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

was provided by you. Is this a copy of the canceled
check that you were referring to?
A. No.
Q. Do you know what this is?
A. I don't. It looks like a statement out
oTQuickbooks or something.
MR. ERICKSON: For the record, Mark, I think
we actually provided you a copy of the check along
with these documents is my recollection. I'm
certainly willing to go back and take a look again at
what we produced. My recollection was seeing it and
providing it in connection with these documents.
MR. FULLER: We'll check again. I think
this is the only one we've been able to locate. It
actually has what I think is the check number written
up here in the comer.
MR. ERICKSON: What you'll find unusual is
it wasn't printed by a computer. It says Sunnyside
Utilities, Incorporated in handwriting. That's
probably what you'll need to look for. I'll go back
and double-check on that as well.
Q. BY MR. FULLER: All I'm trying to
establish is that Printcraft Press itself paid
nothing for the cost of connection; isn't that
correct?

Page 108
A. They were the owner ofthe building.
Q. Did CTR Development know what kind of
3
sewer service Printcraft Press would need when it
4
subleased the property to Printcraft?
5
A. Yes.
6
Q. Can you explain for me what was
7
discussed between Printcraft and CTR Development
8
about the needs of Printcraft at the time that
9
sublease was agreed to?
l O A . That they'd need four bathrooms, a drain
11
for the Roland 305, a water heater, a break room with
12
a sink in it, and a wash-up area for the flexo area.
13
Q. Was there any discussion about the kind
14
of chemicals that would be discharged by Printcraft
15
with its processed waste?
16
A. There was no need for a discussion,
17
because there was nothing of any alarm.
18
Q. It wasn't discussed?
19
A. Huh-uh.
20
Q. Who would be the participants in this
21
conversation on behalf of Printcraft?
22
A. Travis Waters.
23
Q. Who would be the participant in that
24
conversation on behalf of CTR Development?
25
A. Lawry Wilde.
1
2
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A. Correct. I have a copy of that check.
I'm sure I could find it if you want.
Q. If you wouldn't mind, that would be
great.
MR. ERICKSON: I'll double-check, too, Mark.
I kept a complete copy of everything that I sent to
you.
MR. FULLER: Let's stop for just a minute.
(A break was taken from 12:02 p.m. to
12:03 p.m.)
Q. BY MR. FULLER: We've gone off the
record for just a minute, Mr. Waters. You provided
me with a copy of check number 5896, which is now
page 3 of Exhibit *-009; is that correct?
A. Correct.
MR. FULLER: By stipulation of counsel,
we've agreed to just attach that as an additional
page of Exhibit *-009; is that correct, Counsel?
MR. ERICKSON: That is correct.
Q. BY MR. FULLER: Just to finalize this,
am I correct that the connection fees were paid by
CTR Development, LLC, and that Printcraft Press paid
no portion of the connection fee?
A. That's correct.
Q. Why did CTR Development pay the fee?
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Q. Do you recall a specific conversation
regarding the needs?
A. No. There was hours and hours and hours
of conversations and details concerning the building.
Q. Did CTR Development make any promises to
Printcraft regarding the type of sewer services that
would be available?
A. No. There was an assumption that there
was sewer and water.
Q. On what was that assumption based?
A. That that subdivision had sewer and
water.
Q. Anything else?
A. No.
Q. Was there any investigation made by
Printcraft Press regarding the services provided by
Sunnyside Park Utilities before construction of the
building began?
A. No.
Q. Was there any investigation made by
Printcraft Press regarding the services provided by
Sunnyside Park Utilities before Printcraft began
occupancy?
A. No.
Q. Did Sunnyside promise anything to
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Printcraft before Printcraft began occupancy?
A. No.
Q. Did Sunnyside promise anything to CTR?
A. Yes.
Q. What?
A. Sewer and water service.
Q. To whom were those promises made at CTR
Development?
A. I'd say Travis Waters and Lawry Wilde.
Q. By whom were those promises made by
Sunnyside?
A. I would say it's through a document
that's tiled at Bonneville County that says that
Sunnyside will provide sewer and water.
Q. Which document are you referring to?
A. I think it's the development agreement,
the plat has that on there. I think there's multiple
documents, actually, that have the commitment between
Sunnyside Utilities, Sunnyside Industrial Park and
Bonneville County and District Seven.
Q. My question was, what promises were made
by Sunnyside Utilities to CTR. You had indicated
that CTR was promised sewer and water and that those
promises were made to Travis and Lawry.
My next question was, who at Sunnyside
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Q. Those are the closing documents you're
referring to?
A. Right. And you prepared some of those
documents and then filed them with the county. Then
the title company requested a copy of those filed
docwnents and provided them to us.
Q. Did you keep a copy of your closing
documents, your closing file?
A. Yes. I'm sure I've got that.
Q. Do you have those?
A. No.
Q. Would you have those available to bring
back with you after lunch?
A. No.
Q. They are available to produce to your
attorney?
A. Yes.
Q. Who was the closing title office?
A. I don't recall.
MR. FULLER: I think that's a good place for
us to stop at lunch. Why don't we start back up
again at 1: 15.
(A break was taken from 12:11 p.m. to
1:33 p.m.)
Q. BY MR. FULLER: We're back on the record
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made those promises? Can you identify any verbal
statements, or are you relying only upon the written
documents you've referred to?
A. I don't recall any verbal.
Q. We're just talking about the written
docwnents?
A. Correct.
Q. Was there any direct correspondence,
letters, between Sunnyside Utilities and CTR
promising specific services?
A. I don't know, not that I know of.
Q. Okay. So we're talking about the
development agreement, the plat. What other
documents did CTR rely upon regarding sewer and water
services?
A. The CCNRs, the development agreement,
the plat, anything that we would have gotten at
closing.
Q. Did Sunnyside participate in preparing
any of those closing documents?
A. Yeah. It's got your name on a lot of
those documents.
Q. This is the documents by which the
property was acquired from Miskin, right?
A. Correct.
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after a lunch break. You understand, Mr. Waters,
that you're still under oath?
A. Yes.
Q. I want to ask you for just a minute
about a document we had already discussed this
morning. I'm handing you what's been marked
Exhibit *-007. Is this the document that you
actually dropped off to Mr. Beck? You indicated
there was also a fourth page to it?
A. I dropped off full size blueprints in a
roll, not an 8 112-by-II representation of that.
Q. How large would they have been?
A. 24-by-36.
Q. This size?
A. I dropped those off as well.
Q. You're saying they were bigger than
this?
A. Yeah. There should have been a set that
was bigger than that that had the site plan with it
from Mountain River Engineering and a full, just like
I gave to the county that would reside on the
premises during construction.
Q. Can you tum to the second page of
Exhibit *-007 for me? There's some handwriting on
the lower left; is that your handwriting?
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s ink and letting that half a pint of food grade ink
go down the drain, we deposit it in the 55 gallon
dntm and then wash the residue out in the sink.
Q. It was never your intention to cease
washing the trays directly in the sink and allowing
that to drain into the sewage system?
A. Repeat that.
(The record was read.)
THE WITNESS: No.
Q. BY MR. FULLER: You continued to do so
until the system was disconnected?
A. Yes.
Q. What actual changes did you make after
the meeting and the letter in September of 2006?
A. I diverted the reverse osmosis water,
collected the water from the prepress area. I think
that's pretty much it.
Q. Did you make any change to the water
softener?
A. No.
Q. At what point did you divert the air
compressor water out of the sewage system?
A. It's still in the sewage system.
Q. Did you ever divert that away from the
system until it was disconnected?
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(Exhibit *-0\6 marked.)
Q. BY MR. FULLER: Did you have any
communication with Mr. Beck or any other
representative of Sunnyside Park Utilities between
September of2006 and December of2006-A. i believe-Q. -- with regard to these issues?
A. Somewhere in there is when Kirk Wolf and
I met.
Q. In October, I think you had a meeting
with Mr. Wolf. Describe for me how that meeting
went.
A. I don't remember how the contact was
made, ifit was you contacting Lane saying that
Sunnyside Utilities wanted to do an inspection. I
don't recall how that was. Anyway, Kirk Wolf came to
the facility. We did a walk-through. I answered any
questions. I explained what we did. I felt like he
was not quite up to speed with some of the things
that Doyle had talked about, so we discussed some
things at length to bring him up to where he could
return and report to Doyle.
He said, that sink is going to be a
concern. I showed him everything else, showed him
how we plumbed it, showed him where it came outside.
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A. No. There again, [ felt Mr. Beck wa<;
concerned about volume, and that's not a lot of
volume, a few gal/ons a week.
Q. It was not your understanding that water
softener brine was a concern to Sunnyside Utilities?
A. Well, it's in the letters, but I felt
like he was concerned about volume, not quality.
Q. You made no change with regard to the
water softener brine?
A. No. [showed that to Mr. Wolf during
the inspection.
Q. Can I get you to look at Exhibit *-013,
the second page? The next to the last full
paragraph, the last sentence states, we expect the
areas where you have been injecting processed waste
will be pennanently altered to prohibit the
accidental disposal of your employees of any
processed waste into our sewer facility. What steps
did you take to comply with that directive?
A. They were pennanently -- those
corrections that I made were pennanent. They were
hard plumbed, as you can see by your pictures.
Q. Was there any accidental disposal, to
your knowledge, after you made those changes?
A. No.
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As he was leaving, he kind of gave me a -- I don't
know. I should have taken it more serious. It was
more of a warning about Doyle Beck and how I probably
didn't want to cross him. I got the impression it
was kind of a potentate mentality, so I kind of blew
it off. I didn't take it too serious.
Q. You considered it a warning by Mr. Wolf?
A. A little bit, that I didn't know who I
was messing with, make sure he's appeased.
Q. Anything else?
A. I think that's it.
Q. Did you acknowledge that Sunnyside had a
right to come in and inspect the premises to verifY
that you had made the changes that you had stated?
A. I wouldn't say they had a right. I
acknowledged that I'm trying to do what they asked me
to do and have been very open and friendly to finding
a solution all along. I just felt like I told them I
would do it, and I wanted to show them I had done it.
Q. They had previously been grant ed an
inspection back in September when we had the meeting
in that building, we walked through the premises, and
you showed us the set-ups at that time; do you recall
that inspection?
A. Yeah. I remember walking through the
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building so that everybody knew what we were talking
about.
Q. Do you recall extending an invitation to
return for further inspections if they wished?
A. I'm sure that I wouldn't have said you
can't call me and come back and look at it. Why
would I say that?
Q. Do you recall saying words to the
affect, we've got nothing to hide, you're welcome any
time?
A. Sure.
Q. Do you recall saying the same things to
Mr. Wolfwhen he came through with that inspection on
October 30th?
A. I think all along I've let it be known,
contact me, ['II show you what we're doing, I have
nothing to hide.
Q. I'm now handing you what's been marked
as Exhibit *-016. Can you indicate for me what led
to -- I'd like to hear your understanding of what
happened that preceded the issuance of this letter
during the early portions of December 2006. Let me
ask it this way: Why did you bury the water meter?
A. [didn't bury the water meter.
Q. Why was it buried?
~~-~~.-~-~

.....-...
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to that.
Q. Were you in the building and observed
Mr. Beck attempting to uncover the water meter to
veritY the quantity of water that flowed from the
building?
A. On December 10th?
Q. Uh-huh.
A. IfI'm not there, how could [ have done
that?
Q. You were not present that day at all?
A. Correct. He's made reference to my
personal vehicle being there, but I'm not sure -- he
doesn't get specific on what my personal vehicle is,
but I think he's mistaken.
Q. Do you have records that would indicate
what was going on on December 10th in that building?
A. I could probably piece some things
together. ['m sure we had some mechanics working on
that press on that day.
Q. Would that cause a flow of water to come
from the building?
A. Sure. Mechanics use break rooms and
toilets just like anyone else.
Q. It wouldn't be anything other than human
waste, toilet water?

~~~
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A. Because my kids were doing some
landscaping in the front and had -- didn't clear the
dirt away from the lid to the water meter. It had
two or three or four inches of dirt. They were
bringing that area up to grade. It wasn't an
intentional act. My kids are not very vindictive.
Q. How old are you children that were doing
this landscaping?
A. 14 and 12.
Q. Were you present at the Printcraft Press
facility on the afternoon of December lOth, 2006?
A. No.
Q. Do you know what operations were going
on on December lOth, 2006 in the Printcraft Press
building that would have caused water to flow into
the Sunnyside sewer system?
A. There may have been somebody using the
toilet. There may have been somebody washing their
hands. There may have been somebody doing dishes.
There may have been -- the water softener may have
ran. There's any number of things.
Q. Wac; the reverse osmosis system still
connected to the sewer system on December 10th of
2006?
A. No, it was not. Mr. Wolf saw that prior
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A. They could have been washing dishes,
getting a drink, any number ofthings.
Q. You can see on the second page ofthis
document it contains several options in order to
resolve the continuing dispute between Printcraft
Press and Sunnyside Utilities. Can you explain for
me why neither of these first two options were
acceptable to Printcraft?
A. Number one, I had a pretty good feel of
what my flows were and didn't feel like I needed to
spend $10,000 to confirm what I already knew because
Mr. Beck didn't believe me. That's a lot of money.
Number two, at this point I felt like
Sunnyside Utilities was being unrealistic. They were
looking for an excuse. They were not wanting to work
with me anymore. They weren't satisfied with the
changes that I had made, and I felt this was just
another way for them to get more aggressive. I
just -- I didn't see this being a solution to give
them permission to send me a $1,000 bill whenever
they felt like it, after some of the experiences I
had, that didn't make very good sense.
Q. What was your response to this letter?
A. Do you want me to answer number three?
Q. If you'd like. The third really isn't
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an option, it's a disconnect. What was your response
with regard to the third option?
A. I definitely didn't want that to happen.
I didn't want to take that option.
Q. What did you do to respond to this
letter?
A. If! remember right, I called Lane, and
we talked about it, and I think he responded with a
letter.
(Exhibit *-017 marked.)
Q. BY MR. FULLER: This is a letter dated
December 12, 2006 from Mr. Erickson. I'm just
looking at the first paragraph, the last sentence.
My clients state that they have conformed in every
way with my letter dated September 26, 2006, wherein
we agreed that Printcraft Press would no longer put
the RO water in the sewer system and that Travis
Waters would make arrangements to collect and dispose
of what you classifY as processed water.
Is that an accurate statement by your
attorney?
A. Yeah, I think it's accurate. I think
the whole processed waste, processed water thing has
been bantered back and forth. I think we're
switching back to water. It's been waste, and water.

Page 200
that plastic tub next to the canister and that to get
water softener brine into the sewer, you'd have to
tip that over into a drain or bucket it out. So I
thought -- part of it was I found it -- I could see
that's a high concentration of salt, maybe that's a
concem.
I later found out that it's actually
water softener brine cycling through and coming out
of that tube. There was some ignorance on my part
not really understanding what was considered water
softener brine. Between what I felt water softener
brine was and then not comprehending why the State of
Idaho would disallow water softener brine, because
it's in every residential house going into septic
tanks, I didn't even think that was what they were
talking about.
Q. What did you do with regard to water
softener brine after receipt of this letter?
A. Started researching what this was all
about.
Q. Was there any change made to the
discharge of water softener brine into the Sunnyside
system in response to this letter?
A. No.
Q. You continued to discharge into the
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We felt like we were complying, and we brought
Mr. Wolf in and didn't hear back from Mr. Beck or
Wolf, so we assumed everything was fine.
(Exhibit *-018 marked.)
Q. BY MR. FULLER: I'm handing you what's
been marked as Exhibit *-018. 111is, again, discusses
7
the flow of water coming from the Printcraft Press
and states in the second paragraph -- do you recall
8
9
seeing this letter?
l O A . Yes.
11
Q. In the second paragraph it states,
12
because of the nature of the flow, my client believes
13
the most likely source is the water softener system
14
installed by Printcraft Press. The discharge of
15
water softener brine into the central system operated
16
by my client is expressly prohibited by the Idaho
17
Administrative Code, IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03.
18
Is this the first time you became aware
19
that depositing water softener brine in the central
20
system operated by Sunnyside was prohibited by the
21
Idaho Administrative Code?
22
A. I wouldn't even say that I realized it
23
at this point. I was confused on what water softener
24
brine was. My understanding prior to this that water
25
softener brine was the water and salt mixture inside
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system?
A. Yes.
Q. Until the day the system was
disconnected?
A. That's correct, out of ignorance.
Q. At this point, by the time you received
this letter, you weren't ignorant?
A. What I considered or what I thought was
water softener brine was the stuff in with the salt,
not the water coming out of the tube.
Q. Did you consult with any professionals,
any water softener companies?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Who did you consult with?
A. Culligan Water.
Q. Was the result ofthat inquiry that
report we've already reviewed?
A. Yeah. And they pointed me to some
research that I did on the intemet.
Q. What steps did you take after the septic
system was disconnected to contact the media?
A. The media found Printcraft. I don't
recall what the steps were. We had mUltiple
organizations coming in, news media coming in, I met
with Paul Menser for an interview. I declined to

I
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December 13, 2006
By

Lane V. Erickson, Esq.
RACINE OLSEN NYE BUDGE & BAILEY
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello,lD 83204-1391
Facsimile Number: 232-6109
RE:

My Client: Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc.
Your Client Travis Waters dba Printcraft Press
Your File No.: 33712

Dear Lane:
This responds to your letter of December 12, 2006. For your information, the Notice Cif Intent to Reimpose Sanitary Restrictions issued by District Seven Health Department has no bearing or effect upon
Printcraft Press. My client rejects the assertion of Printcraft Press that "there was no RO wateror process
water being used or coming from the Printcraft Press building" on the afternoon of Sunday, December 10,
2006. My client observed the flow personally by removing the cleanout cover in front of the Printcraft
Press building. Anticipating that your clients would deny that the flow was coming from their building, he
next examined the downstream manhole and verified that the same flow was passing that location. He
then removed the upstream manhole cover and found that no flow whatsoever was passing that location.
Your client's assertion that no water was flowing from their location that day is simply wrong.
Because of the nature of the flow, my client believes the most likely source is the water softener system
installed by Printcraft Press. The discharge of water softener brine into the central system operated by my
client is expressly prohibited by the Idaho Administrative Code, IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03-System
Limitations.
Cooling water, backwash or back flush water, hot tub or spa water, air conditioning water,
water softener brine, groundwater, oil, or roof drainage cannot be discharged into any
system unless that discharge is approved by the director.
In addition, the next section, IDAPA 58.01 .03.004.04 prohibits excessive flow being placed in the system:

)

Unless authorized by the director, no person shall provide for or connect additional black
waste or wastewater sources to any system if the resulting flow or volume would exceed
the design flow of the system.
-
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In order to determine the quantity of water flowing into the Printcraft Press facility, my client has examined
the water meter records from September 1, 2006. The average water used by Printcraft Press in
September was 893 gallons per day. The average use for October 1000.323 gallons per day. Because
Mr. Waters covered the water meter, itwas not possible to obtain a reading solely for November.
However, the water usage from November 1 through December 12, 2006, averaged 664 gallons per day.
These readings are for every calendar day, so business days are likely much higher. Other than the small
amount of water consumed by drinking on the premises, it is expected that all of the water flowing in the .
Printcraft Press building also flows out, on a monthly basis. As an example, during the month of October,
2006, Printcraft Press produced outflow equal·to fifty percent (50%) of the total water which can be
discharged by the entire subdivision into the central septic system as designed. The excessive discharge
simply must cease.
Your letter indicates an intention to proceed with a temporary restraining order in the event my client fulfills
its promise to disconnect the Printcraft Press building. My client has requested a "dig line" search which
should be completed between now and noon Friday, December 15, 2006. This process will locate other
adjacent utilities to prevent damage to those utilities by the backhoe needed to disconnect the Printcraft
Press building from the septic service. Disconnection will occur upon completion of the dig line search.
The Sewer Rules and Regulations previously provided to you, adopted by Sunnyside Park Utilities, Article
IV, Penalties, provide as follows:
(
Section 1: Written Notice.' Any person found to be violating any provision of these rules
and regulations or JDAPA 58.01.03, may be served by the company with written notice,
stating the nature of the violation and providing a reasonable time for the satisfactory
correction thereof. The offender shall, within the period of time stated in such notice,
permanently cease all violations.
Section 2: Liability for Violation. Any person violating any of the provisions of these rules
and regulations or IDAPA 58.01.03, shall become liable to the company for all expense,
loss, fines, charges, or damage occasioned the company by reason of such violation.
Section 3: Refusal of Service. The company reserves the right to refuse to provide
service to persistent violators of these rules and regulations.
Notice of the violations of Printcraft Press was submitted September 6, 2006,in a letter directed to Travis
Waters. Your letter of September 18, 2006, acknowledged receipt of that notice. Nearly ninety (90) days
has passed, which is clearly a reasonable time to allow Printcraft Press to satisfactorily correct the
violations and permanently cease all violations. The failure of Printcraft Press to address these issues,
and its continued actions constitute persistent violations of these rules and regulations and the company
exercised its right to refuse to provide service. Sunnyside cannot allow Printcraft Press to continue to
violate both the law and the applicable rules and regulations.
You indicate an intention to seek a "temporary restraining order" to prevent disconnection of the sewer
service. Pursuant to IRCP 65(b) this letter will inform you that our office demands notice of any motion for
a temporary restraining order so that we may be heard in opposition to such a petition. Pursuant to IRCP
65(c), we intend to demand a bond in the sum of not less than $450,000, which will be Sunnyside's
antiCipated damage in the event of continued violations by Printcraft Press. Any further violations could
. result in enforcement action by the Department of Environmental Quality, possibly mandating annexation
of the entire subdivision into the City of Ida~o Falls, at a cost of $450;000 to Sunnyside Park. The actions

•
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by my client will not cause great or irreparable injury to Printcraft Press, as your client needs only agree to
compliance and payment of reasonable monitoring costs in order to avoid further action. Your client's
refusal to accept any of the options expressed in my earlier correspondence leaves my client with no
alternatives but to proceed.
.
Please contact my office if you have any further questions. Our office will acknowledge service of any
Complaint, Summons, or Notice of Hearing issued with regard to this matter.
Very truly yours,
FULLER & CARR

Mark R. Fuller
Attorney at Law

c: client
Chuck Holmer, Counsel for" Luke Boyle
MRF:kss
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the septic system?
A The system must have not been changed
at that point. It must have been changed after that
date.
Q Okay. After you went down there and
turned the system off, you told Doyle, "I've shut it
off"?
A Correct.
Q What did Doyle say?
A I do not remember what his reply was to
that.
Q Okay.
A That was five -- well, that was six or
seven months ago now.
Q Okay. You remember what you said to
him but you don't recall his statement to you?
A I remember telling him that I had
turned it off
Q And did he say -- did he give you any
instructions, that you recall, as to whether or
not -- what to do with that soft water brine?
A I do not remember, no.
Q But your testimony is that certainly by
the end -- would you agree that by the end of
September both the water softener brine discharge
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I think was December 15th-A Yes.
Q -- on that day Terry Luzier was general
manager and production manager?
A Correct.
"\.I What were your responsibilities as
production manager regarding chemical and other
discharge into the sewer system?
A As far as I know, there were no raw
chemicals being discharged into the system. There
was, I guess you would call it, wastewater from our
prepress department that was going into the septic
system, that was being discharged from our building.
The chemicals that are used in that are diluted and
not harmful to the system.
Q Okay. Only the discharge from the
prepress room was going into the septic system?
A Along with our day-to-day use and the
flexo cleaning of the flexo equipment.
Q So there was discharge from the flexo
department, too?
A Yes.
Q Was their discharge from the Iithopress department going into the sewer system?
A No.
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and the reverse osmosis discharge had been rerouted
so that it was impossible for them to flow into the
septic system.
Is that accurate?
A I would say, yes, that by the end of
September it had been rerouted.
Q We were talking about your anticipated
testimony regarding the physical inspections by Wolf
and Beck.
Did you have anything else that you
anticipated testifYing about that inspection?
A No.
Q Was there more than one inspection?
A Yes. I believe there was another
inspection after that. I believe it was the end of
September or the first part of October they came
back through, and we showed them the corrections
that we had done.
Q Okay. I want to go back to your -- you
testified that when you -- throughout the time
period leading up to the disconnection of the
service, you were the production manager; is that
correct?
A Correct.
Q On the day of the disconnection, which

May 17, 2007
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Q Okay. How do you know that?
A Because our employees did not put
anything down the system.
Q Okay. So your testimony is that there
were no litho-press chemicals going into the system
in December of2006?
A That's correct.
Q Okay. As production manager, were you
over both the litho-press and the flexo-press rooms.
A That's correct.
Q And the prepress room?
A Yes.
Q And the bindery?
A Yes.
Q It all stopped with you, all of those
departments were under your jurisdiction?
A Yes.
Q As production manager, who was your
immediate supervisor?
A Travis Waters.
Q Okay. As general manager, who was your
immediate supervisor?
A Travis Waters.
Q Okay. I am -- I want to talk a minute
just about 2006.
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paragraph 2, is a chemical called Performa plate
developer.
Do you know what that chemical is?
A That chemical is used in our plate
processor. When a metal plate is made, it's sent
through the plate processor. This helps develop -to clean the plate up so that it could be used on
the press.
Q Okay. Do you know how Printcraft
disposes of this chemical?
A It goes into the system.
Q Okay. And prior to the disconnection
of the system by Sunnyside, this was flowing into
the septic system?
A Correct.
Q Okay. And the Photo fix was also
flowing into the septic system?
A Correct.
Q Okay. Do you know if there are any
records kept regarding disposal of this material?
A Not to my knowledge.
Q Okay. With regard to all three of
these chemicals that we talked about, were you ever
involved in infonning Sunnyside that these chemicals
were being discharged into the septic system?
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Q Okay. So does it go down into the
septic system?
A No.
Q Do you know if there are any records
retained as to how the Speedy Dry is disposed of?
A No.
Q And then there is a chemical on the
next page, the top one here, referred to as Aqua
Prime.
Are you familiar with that chemical?
A Yes, I am.
Q What is that used for?
A That is a printing ink that is used in
our flexo department -- or could be used in our
flexo department. Let me clarifY that. That
chemical or that product has never been used. It
was sent to Printcraft as a sample to try, and it
has never been used.
Q Okay. Is it still on site?
A To my knowledge, I could not answer yes
or no.
Q Okay. It was just a sample. Do you
how Printcraft disposed of it?
A I don't know if it has been disposed
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A When they came for a tour, we showed
them how it was being pumped out of the building,
how it pumps into the drain system.
Q Okay. Until they came to inspect, did
you ever send them any kind of notice either oral or
in writing, "These are the chemicals we're
discharging"?
A No.
Q The next chemical referred thereunder,
I think it's identified as paragraph -- let's go
down to 3b, stuff called Speedy Dry.
A Correct.
Q Are you familiar with what that
chemical is used for?
A Yes.
Q What is that used for?
A That chemical is mixed with the
printing inks to help it dry harder.
Q Okay. Do you know how that chemical is
disposed of by Printcraft?
A That is put into the sanitary landfill
through our garbage system.
Q So does this -- this is not a liquid
chemical?
A No.
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A I don't know if anybody -- 1 don't
know.
Q Where would this chemical -- this is
just an MSDS?
A Right.
Q I would indicate, we received an MSDS
sheet on this chemical.
A Right. You received it, but 1 don't
know if we even still have that product on the
shelf. Ifit isn't, I would not know who disposed
ofit.
Q Where would it likely be located?
A In the flexo department.
Q Okay. And, at the time, those involved
in the flexo room were Travis Waters and -- I am
sorry. Travis Peterson and Mike Bennek?
A No. They are in the litho-press room.
Q So it would be Rick Boyck or Sandan?
A No. They are in the prepress
department.
Q Which employees, then, would know where
the Aqua Prime might be located?
A That might be Todd Landon.
Q Has Printcraft ever discharged ink
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directly into Sunnyside's sewer?
A They have discharged the flexo inks,
which are water-based inks.
Q Okay.
A They don't dump the ink down directly.
It's into the system through the cleaning process
when they need to clean the equipment.
Q Could you explain that for me in a
little more detail.
A On the flexo printing press, you have
fountains or containers that they pour the ink into.
It's about as thin as water, maybe a little bit
thicker than water.
When the printing process is done, they
are done printing that project, they take the excess
ink and pour it back into the gallon containers as
much as they possibly can.
If it's contaminated inks, which can
happen occasionally, they dump it into a 55-gallon
drum. The remaining ink that is on that piece of
equipment that goes in the press is then cleaned
with water.
Q Where is it cleaned?
A In a sink.
Q Where does the flow from the sink
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Q What is the red substance on the bottom
of the sink?
A That would be ink.
Q And your testimony, the source of this
ink is from cleaning the equipment?
A Yes. That's correct.
Q What steps are taken to prevent flexo
ink from entering the sewer system?
A No steps.
Q Okay.
A The only steps that are taken from it
entering is the excess that cannot be put into the
gallon jugs is put into a 55-gallon drum that is
right next to the sink.
Q Okay. After you received
correspondence from Mr. Beck with regard to the
chemicals that were going into the sink, did you
take -- into the system, did you take any steps with
regard to ink?
A Yes, we did. We were dumping as much
of the excess as we could into the 55-gallon drum
prior to rinsing the rollers and the equipment that
is used to hold the ink.
Q But you were already doing that before
you got the letter from Mr. Beck?
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discharge into?
A Into the system.
Q Okay. Until the system was
disconnected on December 15th of 2006, those flexo
inks were flowing into Sunnyside's septic system?
A That's correct.
Q Okay. Do you know how much ink is
disposed of into that septic system?
A I could not give you a number, no.
Q Okay. I am showing you what was marked
as Exhibit 3, page 2, Picture D. Right here.
A Correct.
Q What is this picture of?
A That is a picture of one of the sinks
in the flexo department.
Q How many sinks are there?
A Two-Q Okay.
A -- that are joined together.
Q Okay. What do you mean they are
"joined together"?
A It's one sink. One counter, basically,
with two sinks in it.
Q Do both flow into the septic system?
A Yes.
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A

No, we were not.

Q You were just allowing -- you were just
washing it all down the drain?
A That's correct.
Q Okay. I am turning back to Exhibit 13.
Attached to that exhibit is the third page. It's a
letter from Mike Lund, Benton Engineering.
Have you read that letter before?
A This is the first time that I have seen
it.
Q Why don't you take a minute and review
it.
A (Witness complies.)
Q You have not seen that letter before
today?
A No.
Q But you had seen this, letter Exhibit
13?
A Yes.
Q Can read for me the first line of
Exhibit 13.
A "Enclosed is a letter dated August 28,
'06, in response to our inquiry from our engineer."
Q There is the letter that's referred to.
A Okay.
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Q When you saw this, letter Exhibit 13
from Mr. Beck, you were not given a copy of the
attached letter from Mr. Lund?
A No, I was not.
Q Okay. Do you know why not?
A I do not.
Q From whom did you receive your copy of
Exhibit 13 that you did review, addressed to
Mr. Waters.
A If I remember right, it was from
Mr. Waters.
Q Okay. Did you ask him why the
attachment referred to on the first line of the
letter was not provided to you?
A No, I did not ask.
Q But your testimony is that, even after
you had seen Exhibit 13, there were no steps taken
to prevent ink from running into the septic system?
A We had taken steps to minimize the
amount of ink going into the system, yes.
Q But there was still ink flowing into
the system on a daily basis until it was
disconnected by Sunnyside on December 15?
A Yes.
Q Okay. I am going to refer to some
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Q What accessibility -- the conference
room is upstairs in the building?
A And open to all the employees.
Q Are there are meetings held in that
conference room?
A Yes.
Q Prior to the request for this MSDS
sheet from Sunnyside, which you said came in August
of 2006, were these MSDS sheets available to
Printcraft employees?
A Yes.
Q How were they made available before
August?
A They were in a three-ring binder.
Q Okay. As I recall your testimony -well, let me back up.
Am I correct that before August the
only MSDS sheets that you had were the ones that
were voluntarily provided by the suppliers?
A Correct.
Q Were those located in the binder at
that time?
A Yes.
Q And after the request was received from
Sunnyside, an effort was made to gather all of the
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additional MSDS sheets, which have also been
provided to us by Printcraft Press. They have
already been marked as Exhibit 10 to these
depositions.
The first 1 would like you to look at
for me is a material called, if! am reading right,
On-The-Run-Plate Cleaner.
Do you see right here?
A Uh-huh.
Q Mr. Waters has testified that
Printcraft was discharging this substance into the
sewer system.
Do you know how much of this substance
Printcraft uses per day?
A I do not.
Q Do you know what they do with this?
A I do not.
Q Do you know how this MSDS sheet is made
available to Printcraft's employees.
A It's in the folder.
Q Okay. The folder is in a file drawer?
A It's in a -- it's in a binder. When I
call it a folder, it's actually a binder -- a
three-ring binder. I believe it's in the conference
room at this time.
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MSDS sheets on all of the chemicals; correct?
A Correct.
Q And remind me, who did that?
A It was a combination of people that did
that. I requested some, and Jonathan Hope requested
some.
Q Okay. What is Jonathan Hope's
responsibilities or title?
A He is estimator and purchasing.
Q Okay. Did you and he work together to
be certain that you would acquire all of them?
A I believe we had, yes.
Q Explain that process for me of
verifying that you had them all.
A I basically delegated it to Jonathan to
check to see what chemicals we were using through
our purchasing system and requested the MSDS sheets
on all of them.
Q Okay. Did you do anything to verify
that they were all acquired?
A I did not, personally, no.
Q Okay. Do you know who did?
A I believe Travis Waters checked into
that.
Q Okay. And then all of those MSDS
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DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho
corporation.
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

Case No.: CV-06-7097

vs.
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
FOURTH MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants/Counterclaimants.

The plaintiff, Printeraft Press, Inc. (Printeraft) submits the following
memorandum in opposition to defendant's fourth motion for summary judgment.
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INTRODUCTION
This is the fourth motion for summary judgment that the defendants (Sunnyside)
have filed in this case. There are numerous issues of fact that prevent summary
judgment. In ruling on Smillyside's second motion for summary judgment this Comi
found:
Woolf and Beck knew the nature of Printcraft's business and the types of
substances it would discharge into the system as a result of the blueprints
Smillyside Utilities had received previously. Despite its prior acceptance of
Printcraft's discharges, SUill1yside Utilities asked Printcraft to either eliminate
various discharges or change the points of discharge. Printcraft complied with
the requests and Sunnyside Utilities, through Woolf, approved of the alterations
in early October 2006.
Mem. Dec. and Order, August 31, 2007, pp. 5-6 (emphasis added). Sunnyside has moved
for summary judgment on the very issue previously decided by this Court. As already
determined by this Court, Printcraft complied with Sunnyside's requests to eliminate
various discharges.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
oflaw."

IDAHO

R. CIv. P. 56(c); G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 516-

17, 808 P.2d 851, 853-54 (1991). The moving party bears the burden of establishing the
lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Tingly v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P .2d
960 (1994).
When assessing the motion for summary judgment, Idaho courts liberally
construe all disputed facts in favor ofthe non-moving pmiy, and draw all reasonable
inferences and conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party opposing the

C,~
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motion. Cookv. State.

Dep'tolTran~l).,

133 Idaho 288, 294, 985 P.2d 1150,1156 (1999).

If reasonable people could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences
from the evidence, the motion must be denied. Id. However, the plaintiffs case must be
"anchored in something speculation and a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to
create a genuine issue." G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 516-17, 808
P.2d 851,853-54 (l991)(intemal citation omitted). If the evidence reveals no disputed
issues of material fact, the trial court should grant the motion for summary judgment.

Cook, 133 Idaho at 294,985 P.2d at 1156.
FACTS

The facts have previously been submitted in opposition to Smmyside's other
motions for summary judgment. Printcraft fully incorporates those facts here. The
following facts are particularly relevant to the present motion:
1. In September 2005, before the construction or occupancy of the building that
Printcraft occupies, Travis Waters met with Doyle Beck and Kirk Woolf to discuss
construction of the building. In those meetings at the request of Sunnyside, Printcraft
provided several versions of the blueprints and drawings for the building that Printcraft
would occupy. Affidavit of Travis Waters, filed August 2, 2007 (Waters August Aff.)

~

20.
2. In January 2006, Printcraft moved from its previous building to its current
location in Sunnyside Industrial Park and began operating its printing business. Waters
August Aff.

~

31.

3. In June 2006, Sunnyside's septic system failed. Waters August Aff.

~

32.

4. Despite their previous acceptance of all of Smmyside's waste without
limitation, on September 6,2006, Smmyside sent a letter to Printcraft advising Printcraft

C.:~:
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for the very first time that SUlmyside's system was "designed only to accept human
waste". Waters August Aff.

,r 37, Ex. R.

5. The letter attached cOlTespondence from Sunnyside's engineer suggesting
that, "Ink is not considered human waste and could very easily be deposited into a
separate seepage pit on site without even a permit by District Seven Health and would
thereby not overload the septic system." Waters August Aff.

~

37, Ex. R.

6. At the time Printcraft received the September 6, 2006 letter, it was completely
unaware of any of prior cOlTespondence, issues, or demands that had existed and had
been made by the District Seven Health Department to SUlmyside. Waters August Aff.

~

37.
7.

On September 18, 2006, counsel for Printcraft, Lane Erickson, sent a letter

responding to the September 6, 2006 letter suggesting a meeting to discuss the issues
raised. Brunson Aff. Ex. A.
8. The letter also requested all documents dealing with the utility services
Sunnyside had been providing Printcraft.
9. On September 20,2006, counsel for SUlmyside, Mark Fuller, responded. The
letter threatens to disconnect Printcraft and recommends a meeting to resolve the issues.
Daniel Beck Aff. Ex. A.
10. On September 25,2006, Printcraft and Sunnyside met on Printcraft's
premises. Mark Fuller was present at the meeting. During the meeting, Printcraft took
Sunnyside and Mark Fuller around the premises and showed them each process,
operation, and station located within the facility. Several suggestions were made by
Sunnyside with regard to either eliminating the discharges or changing the location of
those discharges. Waters August Aff.

~

40.
(' Ui
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11. Early in October 2006, after Printcraft made all of the suggested changes, Kirk
Woolf on behalf of Sunnyside met with Printcraft at its facility. They went through the
building and inspected the changes and alterations made by Printcraft pursuant to the
recommendations from the earlier meeting. At this meeting, after inspecting the changes,
Woolf approved the changes which had been made. The only concern Woolf raised was
with regard to the rinsing of trays which held inks used in the Flexo printing press area.
Printcraft explained to Woolf that inks used were aqueous in nature and not hannful. Mr.
Woolf approved the alterations and changes. Printcraft operated its printing business as
inspected and approved by Sunnyside. Waters August Aff. ,-r 4l.
12. Despite operating under the changes approved by SUilllYside, on December
11, 2006, SUill1yside sent another letter setting additional conditions and requirements.
Waters August Aff. ,-r 45, Ex. X.
13. On December 12, 2006, Printcraft responded and reminded Sunnyside that
Woolf had inspected the facility and approved the actions taken by Printcraft. Waters
August Aff.,-r 46, Ex. Y.
14. On December 15,2006, Sunnyside disconnected Printcraft from the system.
15. In a letter dated December 13, 2006 and stamped received December 15,
2006, Sunnyside responded to Printcraft's December 12, 2006 letter and for the first time
raised an issue with the soft water brine being allegedly discharged into the system. The
letter additionally states, "Your client's refusal to accept any o.fthe options expressed ill

my earlier correspondence leaves my client with

110

alternatives but to proceed." Daniel

Beck Aff. Ex. B (Waters Dep. Ex. 18).
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ARGUMENT

I.

A CONTRACT \VAS NOT FORMED BETWEEN SUNNYSIDE AND
PRINTCRAFT.
There was no mutual intent to contract. F0D11ation of a valid contract requires

there be a meeting of the minds as evidenced by a manifestation of mutual intent to
contract. Heritage Excavation, Inc. v. Briscoe, 141 Idaho 40,43, 105 P.3d 700, 703 eCt.
App.2005). This manifestation takes the form of an offer and acceptance. !d. An offer
is a manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another
person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it. Id.
An offer standing alone is not sufficient to form a contract. Id.
The Idaho jury instructions are instructive on the definition and elements of a
contract. The relevant jury instructions provide as follows:
A contract is an agreement between two or more paliies to do or not do
something that is supported by consideration. There are four elements to
complete a contract. Every contract must have these four elements. The
four elements are:
1.
Competent paIiies;
2.
A lawful purpose;
3.
Valid consideration; and
4.
Mutual agreement by all parties to all essential terms.
IDJI2d 6.01.1.
A promise is not enforceable as a contract unless something of value was
given or was agreed to be given in exchange for it. In law, the giving of
value or agreement to give value is called "consideration." Consideration is
the benefit given or agreed to be given by one party in exchange for the other
party's performance or promise to perfOlm.
Id. 6.04.1
"It is elementary that a promise to do, or doing of, what one is already bound

by contract to do, is not a valid consideration." Indep. Sch. Dist. v. MUtry, 39 Idaho
282, 289 (1924).
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The elements of a contract cannot be established here. SUlmyside argues that on
September 20, 2006, I through Mark Fuller, Sunnyside offered to accept Printcraft's
human waste only if Printcraft agreed not to discharge any process wastewater into
Sunnyside's sewer system. The language of the letter belies this argument. The
threatening nature of the September 20th letter is the complete opposite of a
"manifestation of a willingness to enter a bargain." There simply was no "offer" by
Sunnyside that Printcraft could accept. Additionally, there was no consideration for such
a purported offer since Sunnyside was already bound to provide sewer services to
Printcraft as an occupant in the subdivision. See Mem. Dec. and Order at I 1 ("Printcraft
is clearly an intended beneficiary of the Agreement.") Finally, there was no acceptance.
Sunnyside undisputedly stated, "[Printcraft's] refusal to accept any of the options
expressed in my earlier correspondence leaves my client with no alternative but to
proceed." Daniel Beck Aff. Ex. B. As a matter oflaw, there was no contract formed. At
a minimum, there are genuine issues of material fact.
Further, in the September 6th letter, Doyle Beck suggested to Printcraft that they
bury the inks into the ground without a permit. See Waters Aff. Ex. R (Benton
Engineering letter attached to exhibit). District Seven Health representative Kellye Eager
testified regarding this suggestion as follows:
Q. It states, ink is not considered human waste and could very easily be deposited
into a separate seepage pit on-site without even a permit from District Seven
Health and would thereby not overload the septic system.
Do you agree with that statement?
A. I disagree.

Q. vVhy?

I

Sunnyside omits the two letters preceding the September 20th letter
Beck and the September 18th letter from Lane Erickson.

the September 6th letter from Doyle
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A. We're not supposed to separate out wastes. It should have been going into the
original system. If there is another pit, it would have had to have been permitted
through us.

Q. They can't just dig a hole and bury it?
A. Correct.

Eager Dep. 158:20-159:24, Ex.30. Sunnyside was attempting to have Printcraft separate
wastes without a pernlit. Such an attempt was unlawful and could not have been the
basis for a contract pursuant to Idaho law. Thus, the alleged contract was not based on a
lawful purpose and there was no contract as a matter of law. At a minimum, there are
genuine issues of fact.

II.

EVEN IF THERE IS A CONTRACT, THE TERMS ARE AMBIGUOUS.
Even if one assumes there is a contract, the terms of the contract are ambiguous.

The alleged contract is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations. Sunnyside
argues that "Printcraft was only entitled to discharge human waste into the sewer system
and any discharge of 'processed waste' violated the tenns of the contract." At the outset
this statement is problematic because "processed waste" is not defined in any of the
correspondence. SUlTIlyside seeks to box Printcraft in based on its attorney's September
26, 2006 letter providing that Travis agreed to make arrangements to collect and dispose
of what Sunnyside classified as "processed waste." However, no reference is made to the
September 20,2006 letter (as argued by Sunnyside) but rather to a meeting involving
Printcraft and Sunnyside at Printcraft's facility. Review ofthe September 20, 2006 letter
does not establish what constitutes "processed waste."
If any contract exists, the only way it could have been formed was during the
meeting that occurred at Printcraft's facility and follow up meeting that occurred between
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Waters and Doyle Beck. At Printcraft's 30(b )(6) deposition Waters was explicitly asked
about processed waste. He testified as follows:

Q.... The next para!6Taph says, in light of all ofthe above, we will not accept
processed waste in our sewer facility. Can I ask how you responded when you
received that directive 2 from Mr. Beck?
A. I tried to get clarification on processed waste and couldn't find it.
Q. Tell me what steps you took to obtain that clarification.
A. Somewhere in all of this, IDAPA code was mentioned. I referred to the
IDAPA code in the glossary portion, definitions portion, sorry. Under the
definitions, there is not anything called processed waste. I think it's something
that Mr. Beck created.
Q. Did you consider the chemicals that you were disposing in the Sunnyside
sewage system to be human waste?
A. I considered it to be wastewater with human waste in it.
Waters Dep. 184:6-185:4. Waters continued by discussing what occurred at the
September 25th meeting when he was asked about the September 26th letter:
Q. Travis agreed with Doyle that Printcraft Press will no longer be putting the RO
water into the sewer system. Do you recall making that commitment?
A. Yes.

Q. Additionally, Travis agreed to make arrangements to collect and dispose of
what you classify as processed waste. Did I read that correctly?
A. Dh-huh.
Q. Did you make such agreement?
A. Yes.

Q. Did you understand that your counsel was confirming that you would collect
and dispose of what Sunnyside Utilities classified as processed waste?
A. Yes.

Q. What did you understand that term to mean on September 26th?
f""'

,

:~o!

\j":... {
2

Interestingly, Sunnyside's own counsel does not refer to that as an "offer" but rather as a directive.
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A. Those things that had been brought to our attention by Mr. Beck.
Q. Can you identify those for me?
A. The water coming from the film processor, the plate processor, excess inks
from our flexo area, the RO system. There was some discussion about the washup sinks, but I didn't agree to divert that or catch that. That's what I recall.
Waters Dep. 185:6-189:6.
Unlike the September 20th letter, Water's deposition is very clear on what Waters
understood and what he was agreeable to doing. At a minimum, Waters' testimony
generates an issue of fact at to what the tenns of the alleged contract were.
If there is an issue as to what was said at the September 25th meeting it has not
been adequately raised by Sunnyside.

3

Sunnyside's reliance on the September 26th letter

to somehow bind Printcraft to the September 20th letter is misleading and inappropriate.
The September 26th letter expressly references the meeting that took place between the
parties and their counsel and the follow meeting between Waters and Doyle Beck. The
only testimony before the Court as to what happened during that meeting and what was
agreed to if anything is contained in the deposition of Travis Waters.
A complete review of the entire series of correspondence reveals that the terms of
the alleged contract i.e. the demands of Sunnyside, were unclear and were constantly
changing. The December 11 th letter gives three new options to Printcraft. Waters August
Aff.

,r 45, Ex. X.

The December l3th letter, which was not received until December 15th,

raises soft water brine as an issue for the first time. Sunnyside's strategy of refusing to
define "processed waste" so that Sunnyside could continually add to its definition should
f~

1;

,.""

lJ . . . .

-.J

) Significantly, Mark Fuller was present at the meeting and has now interposed himself into the middle of
the dispute as a witness. Rule 3.7 of the Idaho Rules o I' Professional Conduct provides: "A lawyer shall
not act as an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness .. ," The rule goes
on to list three exceptions none of which apply here. Sunnyside is on notice that Printcraft will object to
Mr. Fuller serving as trial counsel and that Printcraft intends on deposing Mr. Fuller to ascetiain his
recollection of what occurred at the September 25th meeting,
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not be given approval by this Court. Thus, summary judgment is not appropriate as the
alleged contract is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations.

III. EVEN IF THERE IS A CONTRACT, IT WAS NOT MATERIALLY
BREACHED BY PRINTCRAFT.
Even if there is a contract, there was no material breach by Printcraft. A material
breach of contract is a breach so substantial that it defeats the object of the parties in
entering the contract. Alountain Rest. Corp. v. Parkcenter Mall Assoc., 122 Idaho 261,
265,833 P.2d 119, 123 (Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). There is no material breach
of contract where substantial perfomlance has been rendered. ld. Substantial
perfomlance is performance which despite deviance or omission provides the important
and essential benefits of the contract to the promissee. ld. Whether a breach of contract
is material is a question offact. !d. (emphasis added).
A breach of contract may be total or partial. Enter., Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho
734,740,536 P.2d 729, 735 (1975) (citing Restatement Contracts § 312 (date)). A total
breach of contract is non-perfomlance of a duty that is so material and important as to
justify the injured party in regarding the whole transaction as at an end. Id. (citing 4
Corbin on Contracts § 946 (1951 )).
Not only was there no breach here, there was no material breach. This Court
previously found:
Woolf and Beck knew the nature of Print craft's business and the types of
substances it would discharge into the system as a result of the blueprints
SUlmyside Utilities had received previously. Despite its prior acceptance of
Printcraft's discharges, Sunnyside Utilities asked Printcraft to either eliminate
various discharges or change the points of discharge. Printcraft complied with
the requests and SUllnyside Utilities, through Woolf, approved o.fthe alteratiol1s
ill ear(v October 2006.
,...

U

.~

/l.

-.I. ..)
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Mem. Dec. and Order, August 31, 2007, pp. 5-6 (emphasis added). There are no new
facts justifying this COUli to deviate from Judge St. Clair's previous ruling in this regard.
As explained in the previously submitted Waters August Affidavit, after the
September 25th meetings Waters met with Sunnyside to allow them to inspect what had
been done. 4 Sunnyside thoroughly re-inspected everything and approved of it.
Sunnyside cites Judge St. Clair's previous finding that "Printcraft discharged
water softener brine, hazardous wastes, processed water and excessive flows of
wastewater into the system in violation oflDAPA 58.01.03.004.03." While Printcraft
strongly disagrees with Judge

st. Clair's previous finding,S it is immaterial to the present

motion for summary judgment. In reaching this ruling the Court was looking at whether
Printcraft could maintain its own breach of contract claim. Here, the question is whether
Sunnyside is entitled to prevail on its breach of contract claim as a matter of law. There
are numerous factual issues preventing summary judgment in favor of Sunnyside and
those issues were correctly relied on by Judge St. Clair in determining: "Printcraft
complied with the requests and Sunnyside Utilities, through Woolf, approved of the
alterations in early October 2006." Based on this language there is no room for a finding
that Printcraft breached the contract as a matter of law.
Sunnyside argues that by discharging soft water brine, air compressor water,
diluted chemicals from the prepress area, discharges from the flexo department, and inks
being washed offtrays a breach occurred as a matter oflaw. Printcraft unequivocally
4

5

Significantly. this process was expressly contemplated by Sunnyside in its September 6 th letter where it
states: "[W]e will conduct an on site inspection of your facility. We expect the areas where you have
been injecting processed waste will be permanently altered to prohibit the accidental disposal by your
employees of any processed waste into our sewer facility."
With all due respect to Judge st. Clair, his ruling completely ignores whether discharging soft water brine
constitutes a material breach of contract which in turn justified the disconnection. Of course, this is a
fact question to be determined by the trier of fact. Further, Judge St. Clair misapplied IDAP A in
reaching his ruling. Printcraft anticipates filing a motion to reconsider after additional expert discovery
is completed.
~
~
~
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testified that Sunnyside represented that they were concerned about volume and that they
approved ofthe changes that were made. See Waters Aff. "40, 41; Waters Dep. 184: 11199:3. At the meeting and subsequent inspection, Printcraft dealt with SUill1yside's
specific concerns and Sunnyside agreed to the changes that were made. At a minimum,
there are genuine issues of fact.
Printcraft argues that Doyle Beck personally witnessed "processed waste" flowing
through the sewer system. Not only does Doyle Beck fail to define processed waste, he
completely fails to identify what was allegedly flowing in the sewer, what it looked like,
how much there was, or how he knew it was processed waste. 6 Even ifhis testimony is
admissible, it does not generate an issue that Printcraft needs to respond to.
Notwithstanding, Waters testified that the flows could have been human waste, toilet
water, washing dishes, or getting a drink. Waters Dep. 194:18-197:2. The December
12th letter sent by Printcraft through counsel clearly refutes Doyle Beck's allegations
since a new printing press was being installed and there was no RO water or process
water coming from Printcraft. Waters Aff. Ex. Y.
Sunnyside argues that Waters acknowledged that "despite the warnings from Mr.
Woolf about the sink and the necessity to comply with the agreement 'I kind of blew it
off. I didn't take it too serious. '" Sunnyside complete misstates Waters' testimony.
Waters actually testified:
As he was leaving, he kind of gave me a I don't know. I should have taken it
more serious. It was more a warning about Doyle Beck and how I probably didn't
want to cross him. I got the impression it was kind of a potentate mentality, so I
kind of blew it off. I didn't take it too serious.
Q. You considered it a warning by Mr. Wolf?
A. A little bit, that I didn't know who I was messing with, make sure he's
appeased.

C,r.:;

A

v.~

(, Printcraft has moved to strike Doyle Beck's affidavit pursuant to Rule 56( e) filed contemporaneously.
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Q. Anything else?
A. I think that's it.
Waters Dep. 193: 1-11. The warning Waters should have taken more serious was that
Doyle Beck was vindictive and it would be a mistake to cross him. It had nothing to do
with the sink or statements Woolf made regarding complying the agreement. In fact,
there is absolutely no evidence that Woolf said anything about complying with any
agreement. Waters testimony regarding the sink is clear:
Q. What were you going to do with regard to the sink in which the ink is
deposited in the photographs?
A. Leave it hooked up. There's not I shouldn't say that. We put a 55 gallon
drum in there to collect an extra quart of ink a month.

Q. You did agree to divert that away from the sewage system?
A. No. I agreed to collect any contaminated ink and put it into 55 gallon drum
and then wash the minor amount that's in the pans out in the sink.
Q. The sink was never disconnected from the sewer system?
A. I never committed to do it. I never agreed to do it.

Q. And never did it?
A. And never did it. And discussed it with Kirk Wolf as we walked through.

Waters Dep. 188: 13-189:6. Printcraft's practice after the October inspection was
consistent with what they said they would do to help Sunnyside out.
Sunnyside also attempts to make much of the alleged disposal of the soft water
brine. Sunnyside first claims that Printcraft acknowledged receipt of the December 13th
letter on December 13th. However, unlike the September 20th letter, the December 13th
letter does not indicate it was sent via fax and is stamped received December 15th.
Daniel Beck Affidavit Ex. B (Ex. 18 to Waters Dep.). The only inference that can be
(-., r- '-,

lJ J ...
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drawn is that Printcraft's attorney did not even get the letter until the day Sunnyside
disconnected Printcraft. 7 The December 13th letter is the first time soft water brine is
mentioned anywhere. This is likely because the soft water issue was so inconsequential
to the real issue that Sunnyside was having (volume) that it was not brought to
Printcraft's attention. Waters was repeatedly asked about soft water brine during
Printcraft's deposition. He testified as follows:
Q. When was that last modification made?
A. Within the last coup Ie of months.
Q. After the service was disconnected?
A. Correct.

Q. The water softener now drains outside to the landscaping on the south side of
the building?
A. Correct.

Q. Why did you wait until after the service was disconnected before you ceased
discharging water softener brine into the system?
A. I understood Mr. Beck's issue to be volume coming out of my RO system, not
water softener brine. I solved the water coming from my RO system, which I
thought would satisfy Mr. Beck and Mr. Wolf, and that's why I showed the system
fixed that way to Mr. Wolf, and Mr. Wolf approved it as he saw it.

Waters Dep. 67: 1 17.
A. I showed that system and the corrections that were made to Mr. Wolf, and it
satisfied him, which I took to mean Mr. Beck and Mr. Wolf were fine with the
adjustments I made.
Q. My question is, did the water softener brine from Printcraft continue to
discharge directly into the Sunnyside septic system until the day Sunnyside
disconnected the building?
A. Yes, with Kirk Wolf's approval.
Waters Dep. 71:12-20.
7

Even if the letter was received before the 15th there is no indication when Waters got the letter.
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Q. If you understood that water softener brine discharge was a concem prior to
disconnection, why did you take no steps to modify the discharge of water
softener brine into the septic system?
A. I didn't understand. That's why I didn't. It's a simple 10 minute fix. I would

have done it in a heartbeat if I knew it was an issue.
Waters Dep. 72:3-9. The reason Waters did not understand it was a concem is because it
was not communicated to Waters as a concern by Sunnyside. Waters further testifies that
once he did receive the December 13th letter he was still confused as to what soft water
brine was and what the concern was. See Waters Dep. 199:5-201:19.
Even if there was a contract, something as trivial as soft water brine, which is
discharged by residences and businesses across the state, is not a material breach of the
alleged contract. At a minimum, there are genuine issues of a material fact.

IV. DAMAGE IS A FACT QUESTION TO BE DETERMINED BY THE JURY.
Even ifthere was a contract and it was materially breached, damages is a fact
question for the jury to decide. A jury must decide the amount of money that will fairly
and reasonably compensate a plaintiff. Where damages are shown to have resulted,
fixing the amount is for the trier of fact. Smith v. Daniels, 93 Idaho 716, 718,471 P.2d
571,573 (1970): Conley v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 74 Idaho 416, 423, 263 P.2d 705,
709 (1953). The amount of damages here is a question that should be decided by the jury
and not as a matter oflaw.
Additionally, the affidavit submitted by Doyle Beck is not admissible on several
grounds. First, it fails to identify who performed the work. Second, it fails to attach any
invoices demonstrating what was in fact paid. Third, it fails to establish why a backhoe
was needed. Fourth, it fails to include how much time was spent utilizing the backhoe.
Fifth, it attempts recovery for time spent inspecting the work done without identifying
,- ,.-
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who paliicipated in the inspection, what their qualifications were, how much time it took
them, the hourly value of their time, or how the $1,420 amount was otherwise calculated.
Even if the affidavit were admissible, it would be up to a jury to determine if the amount
is reasonable.

CONCLUSION
Based on the toregoing, Printcraft respectfully requests that Sunnyside's motion
for summary judgment be denied.
DATED: April 1, 2008.

Of Beard st. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorneys for Printcraft Press, Inc.
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j eff@beardstclair.com
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DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho
corporation.
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

Case No.: CV-06-7097

vs.
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND
PURSUANT TO RULE 15(A)

Defendants/Counterclaimants.

The plaintiff, Printcraft Press, Inc. (Printcraft), through counsel of record, Beard
St. Clair Gaffney PA, respectfully moves this Comi for an order granting its motion to
amend pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
This motion is supported by the Memorandum in SuppOli of Plaintiff's Motion to
Amend (Rule 15( a). Oral argument is requested.
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Attorneys for the Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho
corporation.
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

Case No.: CV-06-7097

vs.
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND
(RULE 15(a))

Defendants/Counterclaimants.

The plaintiff, Printcraft Press, Inc. (Printcraft), through counsel of record Beard
St. Clair Gaffney PA, respectfully submits the following Memorandum in support of its
Motion to Amend pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. An
affidavit of counsel is submitted with this memorandum.
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INTRODUCTION
Printcraft's water has been shut off in breach of its contract with the defendant,
SUlU1yside Utilities, Inc. (Sunnyside). Sunnyside agreed to provide Printcraft with water
and Sunnyside's unreasonable and unilateral conduct in shutting offPrintcraft's water
constitutes a breach of the parties' agreement for water. Printcraft should be allowed to
amend its complaint against Sunnyside to include a breach of contract claim for
Sunnyside's conduct.
Further, Doyle Beck and Kirk Woolf should be personally liable for the fraud they
committed in failing to disclose to Printcraft the sewer limitations.

LEGAL STANDARD
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15, a party is required to seek leave from the
Court to amend in the circumstances present in this case. It is within this Court's sound
discretion whether to grant such an amendment. See Carl H Christensen Family Trust v.
Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871, 993 P.2d 1197,1202 (1999). Rule 15 also states that

"leave shall be freely given when justice so requires."

IDAHO

R. CIY. P. IS (2007). Idaho

has adopted the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the comparable federal rule.
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith
or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies
by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by
virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.-the leave
sought should, as the rules require, be freely granted.
See id. (citation omitted). "In the interest of justice, district courts should favor liberal

grants of leave to amend a complaint." Jd.; see also Wick5trom v. N. Idaho College, III
Idaho 450, 453, 725 P.2d 155, 158 (1986).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. In April 2002, Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. and Sunnyside Park Owners
Associations, Inc. entered into the Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement (the
Agreement).
2. In the Agreement, Sunnyside covenanted to provide a water supply system for the
purpose of supplying water to the businesses and occupants of the Sunnyside Industrial
and Professional Park.
3. In August 2007, Judge Richard T.

st. Clair ruled that Printcraft is an intended

beneficiary of the Agreement.
4. In November 2007, Sunnyside unilaterally cut-offPrintcraft's water supply in
breach of its obligations under the Agreement.
5. In September 2005, before the construction or occupancy of the building that
Printcraft occupies, Travis Waters met with Doyle Beck and Kirk Woolf to discuss
construction of the building. In those meetings at the request of Sunnyside, Printcraft
provided several versions of the blueprints and drawings for the building that Printcraft
would occupy. Affidavit of Travis Waters, filed August 2,2007 (Waters August Aff.)

~

20.
6. Beck and Woolf failed to disclose to Waters or Printcraft the severe limitations of
the Sunnyside sewer system and the restrictions that had been imposed by District Seven
Health.

ARGUMENT
I. Printcraft's claim for bre~ch of contract is a viable claim in Idaho and does
c y J - -;,
not prejudi~e Sunnyside. )

Printcraft has a legitimate legal basis for adding a breach of contract claim against
SUilllyside. The Court has previously held that Printcraft is an intended beneficiary of the
Memorandum in Support

ofPI~i~i&s Motion to Amend (Rule lS(a))

Page 3

Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement (the Agreement). (Mem. Dec. Order 11,
August 31,2007.) The Agreement is intended to benefit "the present and future owners
or occupants of all and each of the properties, buildings, and other improvements which
are now or may hereafter be served by the water supply systems." (Counsel Aff. Ex. D,
Def. Resp. PI. Req. Prod. 42.) In the event that a party breaches the provisions of an
Agreement, the third party beneficiaries are entitled to sue for breach of contract. Just's

v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 466,583 P.2d 997, 1001 (1978). This appears to
be a long standing rule in Idaho and Printcraft is entitled to allege a claim for breach of
contract against Sunnyside.
In this case, SUill1yside cut-offPrintcraft's water supply in violation of its
obligations under the Agreement. Section 2 of the agreement clearly shows that
Sunnyside covenanted to supply "at all times and under adequate pressure for the use of
the properties duly connected to its water supply system a sufficient quantity of water to
meet the reasonable needs of each ofthe properties duly com1ected to said water supply
systems." (Counsel Aff. Ex. D, Def. Resp. PI. Req. Prod. 42.) Sunnyside breached its
obligation to Printcraft to supply water and has damaged Printcraft. Whether Sunnyside
has a defense to Printcraft's claim for breach of contract is a substantive question not
appropriately considered on a motion to amend. See Dt(ffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement

Ass 'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1013, 895 P.2d 1195, 1206 (1995). A court may consider
whether the allegations sought to be added to the complaint state a valid claim in
determining whether to grant leave to amend the complaint. Black Canyon Racquetball

Club, Inc., v. Idaho First Nat'l BankN.A., 119 Idaho 171,175,804 P.2d 900,904 (1991).
A court, however, may not consider the sufficiency of evidence suppOliing the claim
sought to be added in detem1ining leave to amend because that is more properly

G'" -',
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determined at the summary judgment stage. Thomas v. Medical Ctr. Physicians, P.A.,
138 Idaho 200,210,61 P.3d 557,567 (2002). Since Idaho recognizes that an intended
beneficiary can allege a breach of contract claim, Printcraft has satisfied its burden to
justify an amendment to its complaint.
Allowing Printcraft to amend its complaint to include a breach of contract claim is
in the interests of justice. Printcraft's claim has recently arisen and is intrinsically related
to the claims that are presently before the Court in this suit. Adding a breach of contract
claim would allow the Court to fully and completely adjudicate all of the present disputes
between the parties. Leave is to be liberally granted to parties seeking to amend their
claims. Wickstrom v. N. Idaho College, 111 Idaho 450, 453, 725 P.2d 155, 158 (1986).
This case is no different and the Court should appropriately apply the law and exercise its
discretion in granting Printcraft's motion to amend. Amending the complaint does not
prejudice Sunnyside since discovery is ongoing, the case is developing, and the issues
involved in the breach of contract claim are known to the parties. Sunnyside cannot point
to any real prejudice beyond the usual inconvenience of civil litigation.
Printcraft's motion to amend for breach of contract should be granted.
II. Printcraft should be allowed to add Doyle Beck and Kirk Woolf as parties
and allege counts of fraud against them.

Printcraft also seeks to amend its complaint to include counts of fraud against
Doyle Beck (Beck) and Kirk (Woolf). These two individuals, who are principals in
Sunnyside, committed the intentional tort of fraud against Printcraft. Both Beck and
Woolf intentionally failed to convey key facts and information to Printcraft. As a
consequence, Printcraft should be allowed to add them both as parties and allege claims
of fraud.
f""

1'......
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In Idaho, both federal and state courts generally adhere to the rule that corporate
officers and directors are not individually liable for the conduct of their corporation. See

Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400,848 P.2d 984 (Ct. App. 1992); L.B. Indus., Inc. v.
Smith, 631 F.Supp. 922, 925 (D. Idaho 1986); L.B. Indus., Inc. v. Smith, 817 F.2d 69, 71
(9th Cir. 1987).1 Nevertheless, this general rule is subject to an impOliant exception
courts have recognized.
According to the Eliopulos court, "If a director or officer commits or participates
in the commission of a tort, whether or not it is also by or for a corporation, the director is
personally liable to third persons injured thereby, and it does not matter what liability
attaches to the corporation for the tort." Eliopulos, 123 Idaho at 404-05 (citation
omitted). 2 This position is consistent with the L.B. Industries court, which held, "If an
officer or agent of a corporation directs or participates actively in the commission of a
tOliious act or an act from which a tort necessarily follows or may reasonably be expected
to follow, he is personally liable to a third person for injmies proximately resulting
therefrom." L.B. Industries, Inc., 631 F. Supp., at 925 (citations omitted).
Crucial to a determination of whether individual officer liability exists is whether
the officer has overseen, approved of, acquiesced to, or directly participated in the
tortiolls conduct giving rise to a particular cause of action. It is insufficient to impose
individual liability on a corporate officer merely on the basis that the officer knew of or
I The latter two cases cit~d are the Distlict Court's and the Tenth Circuit's opinions in the same matter.' In
the District Court's L.B. Industries v. Smith opinion, the court, relying on two Idaho state cases, stated
"Idaho has adopted the general rule that corporate officers and directors are not individually liable for the
conduct oftlle corporation." In the Tenth Circuit's review of the District Court's ruling, the Tenth Circuit
corrected the District Court, indicating that although Idaho courts had recognized that corporate officers are
generally not individually liable for the contracts of the corporation, they had not yet addressed individual
officer liability for fraud. Despite the distinction the Tenth Circuit identified, it nevertheless appears that
corporate officers are generally not liable, absent an applicable exception, for tortious conduct of their
corporation, especially in light of the court's decision in EliojJulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400 (Idaho Ct. App.
1992).
1 This case is found at 848 P .2d 984, but Lcxis apparently cannot provide pinpoint citations for the Pacific
r: r> .1
RepOlier Second in this case.
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was aware of the corporation's tortious conduct. See id. at 926. Instead, "Specific
direction or sanction of, or active participation or cooperation in, a positively wrongful
act of commission or omission which operates to the injury or prejudice of the
complaining party is necessary to generate individual liability and damages of an officer
or agent of a corporation for the tort of the corporation." ld. (citations omitted). This
inquiry, however, is a fact issue and one that does not need to be passed on by the Court
at the amendment stage of litigation. It is sufficient for purposes of amending the
complaint to show that there is a basis in the law to allege claims of fraud against
corporate officers.
Rule 9(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the circumstances
giving rise to a claim for fraud be stated with particularity. IDAHO R. elY. P. 9(b).
Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred
generally. ld. The elements of fraud are:
1. A representation of fact;

2. Its falsity;
3. Its materiality;
4. The speaker's knowledge of its falsity;

5. The speaker's intent that the representation will be acted upon in a reasonably
contemplated manner;
6. The listener's ignorance of its falsity;
7. The listener's reliance on the t111th of the representation;

8. The listener's right to rely on the truth of the representations; and,
9. The listener's consequent and proximate injury.

C:3
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McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 777, 820 P.2d 360, 372 (1991) (McDevitt, J.,

dissenting). The Idaho Supreme COUli later commented:
It cannot be controverted that actionable fraud or misrepresentation by a vendor
may be by concealment or failure to disclose a ... material fact, where under the
circumstances there was an obligation to disclose it during the transaction. If
deception is accomplished, the form of the deceit is immaterial. And the legal
question is not affected by the absence of an intent to deceive, for the element of
intent, whether good or bad, is only important as it may affect the moral character
of the representation.

Staff of the Idaho Real Estate Comm 'n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 635-36, 22 P.3d 105,

110-11 (2001). In this case, the elements of fraud are suppOlied by the evidence and the
Court has previously found issues of fact on Printcraft's fraud claims against Sunnyside.
Printcraft now seeks to allege fraud against Beck and Woolf individually. All of
the elements of fraud are suggested and satisfied in the evidence. Beck and Woolf acted
as officers of Sunnyside when dealing with Printcraft. Beck and \Voolfboth had an
obligation to disclose the information they had regarding the blueprints and schematics
for the industrial park. Both Beck and Woolf were aware of the industrial nature and
orientation of the business engaged in by Printcraft. (Waters Aff. 'Il'll18-27.)3 Beck and
Woolf had an obligation to disclose the relevant information contained in the blueprints
and plans for the industrial park to Printcraft because that knowledge "is so vital that if
the mistake were mutual the contract would be voidable, and the party knowing the fact
also knows that the other does not know it." Sowards v. Rathburn, 134 Idaho 702, 707, 8
P.3d 1245, 1250 (2000). Beck and Woolf knew that their representations, and the
concurrent omissions, would be relied upon by Printcraft. Beck and Woolf intended for
Printeraft to rely upon their statements to Printeraft. Printeraft did not know of the
limitations of the septic system. (Id.)

3

This affidavit was previously submitted to the COUli.

G;:; G
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As this court previously noted, the issue of reliance is a question of fact. King v.
Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 42 P.3d 698 (2002). Thus, whether Printcraft reasonably relied on
the intentional omissions by Beck and Woolf is an issue that the jury will ultimately have
to decide. This court also previously found that the issue of causation and damages is a
fact question.
Since this court previously found issues of material fact on Printcraft's fraud
claims, the fact that Beck and Woolf, as Sunnyside officers, failed to disclose the
pertinent infonnation to Printcraft make them liable for that fraudulent conduct.
CONCLUSION
As a result of the foregoing, Printcraft respectfully request that the Court exercise
its discretion and allow it to amend its claims against Sunnyside and Woolf and Beck
individually.

r,A"""
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
Case No.

CV~06-7097

PRINTCRAPT PRESS, INC. an Idaho
corporation,

AFFIDAVIT OF LAWRY WILDE

Plaintiff,
vs.
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC. an
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
corporation,

(CTR MANAGEMENT, LLC.) 1N
OPPOSITION TO
THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Bonneville

)

: S8

LAWRY WILDE, after first being duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am over the age of 18 and, am competent to testify and the information

contained in this affidavit is made upon my own knowledge;
AFFIDAVIT OF LAWRY WILDE (em DEVELOPMENT, LLC)
IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho )
corporation,
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.

)
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
SUNNYSIDE
PARK
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
corporation,
Defendants.

Case No. CV-06-7097

REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE PARK
OWNERS ASSOCIATION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW, the Defendant, Sunnyside Park Owners Association, an Idaho
corporation ("SPOA"), through its counsel of record, Mark R. Fuller of Fuller & Carr, and
submits this Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to Motion for Summary
Judgment.

REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE PARK OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
TO PLAINTIfF'S lv1EMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION FOF
SUMt1}\RY ,JUDGlV1ENT - 1

REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATED TO SPOA'S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1. Plaintiff has repeatedly relied upon the statements given by Doyle Beck, during the
May 30,2007, Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., as though
such statements were admissions by Defendant SPOA. Defendant SPOA asserts
that Doyle Beck provided testimony in response to a 30(b )(6) subpoena to
Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., and Doyle Beck was not testifying on behalf of
Defendant SPOA during such deposition. See Plaintiff's Amended Notice of
Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Defendant pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6). SPOA
was not a party to this case until July 5, 2007.
ARGUMENT

I. BREACH OF THIRD PARTY UTILITY AGREEMENT
A. Defendant SPOA has no obligations to provide sewer services to
Printcraft llnder the Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement.
Printcraft has not disputed that SPOA has no obligations to provide sewer services
under the Third Party Beneficiary Contract. Printcraft has provided no case law which
would allow Printcraft to recover under a breach of contract theory for SPOA's failure to
provide sewer services when SPOA did not undertake any such obligations under the
Third Party Beneficiary Contract. "A breach of contract occurs when there is a failure to
perform a contractual duty." Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 32280, pg. 6 (Idaho
5-24-2007). (A copy of this decision is attached for the convenience of the court). In Paz,
the Court held: "The plaintiffs failed to exercise the purchase option per the contract's

REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE PARK OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
TO PLAINTIFF'S MEfVIORANDUl'1 IN RESPONSE TO ]\10TION FOR
SUMtvlARY JUDGIV:ENT - 2

terms. Therefore, Paz had no contractual obligation to sell the property to the plaintiffs
and did not breach the contract by failing to do so." Id., pg. 8. (Emphasis added).
Because SPOA had no obligation to provide sewer service to the Plaintiff, SPOA did not
breach the contract by failing to do so. SPOA is entitled to Summary Judgment on
Printcraft's Cause of Action for Breach of the Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement.
8. Printcraft is not entitled to enforce the alleged oral agreement against
SPOA

Printcraft is not entitled to enforce any alleged oral agreement for sewer services,
because there is no issue of material fact that Printcraft's discharges were in violation of
state and federal rules and regulations. See Order RE: Pending Motions, entered July 3,
2007. Defendant SPOA re-alleges and incorporates Defendant Sunnyside Utilities'
argument regarding any oral agreement for sewer services from SPOA alleged by
Printcraft. SPOA is entitled to Summary Judgment regarding Printcraft's attempt to
recover under breach of any alleged oral agreement for Printcraft to receive sewer
services.
II. CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD

Printcraft's two causes of action for Constructive Fraud must fail because Printcraft
has produced no evidence of a relationship of trust and confidence between SPOA and
Printcraft. Under Mitchell v. Barendregt, the Court held that "[b]ecause no legally
enforceable relationship of trust and confidence existed between Mitchell and Berendregt,
no action for constructive fraud can arise from their dealings." 120 Idaho 837, 844, 820

P.2d 707 (Ida. App. 1991) (Emphasis Added). Printcraft's allegation of a two constructive

REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE PARK mVNERS ASSOCIATION,
TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUlvJ IN RESPONSE TO j\jOTION FOR
SUMtJIARY JUDGMENT - 3
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fraud claims without any evidence of a relationship of trust and confidence between
SPOA and Printcraft was frivolous.
III. FAILURE TO DISCLOSE ANDIOR MISREPRESENTATION AND CONSTRUCTIVE
FRAUD
A. Duty to Disclose

Defendant SPOA had no duty to disclose any information regarding Sunnyside
Park Utilities, Inc.'s sewer system to Printcraft Press because there was no relationship
whatsoever between SPOA and Printcraft prior to Printcraft's occupancy of the building.
Printcraft claims the following actions by SPOA created a duty for SPOA to disclose
information to Printcraft:
(1) SPOA's failure to record the Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement;
(2) SPOA's alleged creation and recordation of a plat map and CC&Rs for the
subdivision:
(3) SPOA's receipt of the April 15, 2002 letter from District Seven Health Department; and
(4) SPOA's alleged involvement in meetings with Printcraft prior to construction of the
building Printcraft now occupies. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. 25-27.
SPOA re-alleges and incorporates by reference the arguments and case law set
forth in Sunnyside Utilities' reply brief regarding the duty to disclose as if set forth fully
herein.
None of the facts asserted by Printcraft created a duty for SPOA to disclose
information to Printcraft. Printcraft has not disputed that neither Printcraft, nor any of the

REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE PARK OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
TO PLAINTIFF'S j\jEMORANDUlVl IN RESPONSE TO lVIOTION FOR
SUl1j\1ARY JUDGMENT - 4

prior owners or occupants of Block 1, Lot 5 are members of SPOA. See Affidavit of Kirk
Woolf, para. 3. Printcraft has not disputed that neither Printcraft, nor any of the prior
owners or occupants of Block 1, Lot 5 ever paid any type of consideration to SPOA. Id.
para. 4. There has been no evidence produced by Printcraft of a relationship of
confidence and trust between SPOA and Printcraft. There is no evidence of even a direct
contractual relationship between SPOA and Printcraft prior to Printcraft's occupancy of
the building pursuant to the oral month-to-month lease between Printcraft and CTR
Management.
There is no evidence that SPOA created or recorded the plat map for the property
or created or recorded the CC&R's for the subdivision. The plat map was created and
recorded in 1999 on behalf of Defendant SIPP. See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint,
para. 12. The CC&Rs referenced by Printcraft specifically state that they were created by
SIPP and the only signature on the CC&Rs is specifically on behalf of SIPP. See CC&Rs
attached as Exhibit "H" to the Affidavit of Travis Waters. Even if the Court were to find that
SPOA was involved with the plat map and the CC&Rs, those documents do not justify
creation of an affirmative duty because they do not create any relationship between
SPOA and Printcraft. See SIPP's reply brief regarding the plat and the CC&Rs.
SPOA re-alleges and incorporates by reference the arguments set forth by
Sunnyside Utilities regarding receipt of the April 15, 2002 letter and SPOA's alleged
attendance at meetings with Printcraft prior to the construction of the building Printcraft
now occupies pursuant to an oral month-to-month lease.

REPLY OF SUNNYS DE PARK OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5

Because there was no relationship between SPOA and Printcraft prior to
Printcraft's decision to occupy J&LB Properties' building, SPOA had no duty to disclose
any information regarding Sunnyside Utilities' sewer facilities.
B. Materiality, Reliance, and Damages

SPOA re-alleges and re-asserts the argument of Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., set
forth in its Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum regarding materiality, reliance, and damages
as if set forth fully herein.

CONCLUSION
Printcraft Press is not entitled to enforce or collect damages for breach of contract
against SPOA because (1) SPOA had no obligation to provide sewer services under the
Third Party Beneficiary Agreement and cannot be in breach of that agreement for failing
to provide sewer services; and (2) Printcraft is not entitled to enforce any agreement for
sewer services because of Printcraft's violation's of state and federal rules and
regulations. Therefore, SPOA is entitled to Summary Judgment on Printcraft's cause of
action for Breach of Contract.
Printcraft Press is not entitled to recovery for its causes of action for non-disclosure
and/or misrepresentation or constructive fraud because there was no relationship
between Printcraft and SPOA. Printcraft has not proven that any non-disclosures were
material to its decision to occupy J&LB Properties' building, that Printcraft was justified in
relying on any alleged non-disclosure, and Printcraft has not suffered any damages as a
direct and proximate result of any alleged non-disclosure.

REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE PARK OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
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SPOA requests Summary Judgment against Printcraft on all of Printcraft's causes
of action.
DATED this

q

day of

--¥--if-'=-"':-_-'

2007.

Mark R. Fuller
Fuller & Carr
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ensued whereby Pastor orally agreed that the Church would put $5,000
down on the property, with the balance of the purchase price to bear 9.5
percent interest and be paid in monthly installments of $550. The
Church paid $2,500 on April 27, 2000, and Paz proceeded to purchase the
subject property on May 18, 2000.
The parties did not execute a written agreement regarding the subject
property until June 22, 2000, when they signed a contract furnished by
Paz. The written contract differed from the parties' prior oral
agreement in that it did not provide for a down payment. Additionally,
the contract stated it was a lease with an option to purchase; however,
Pastor, who could not read or write English, signed with the belief that
it was a simple sale contract in accordance with the terms of their oral
agreement. The contract provided that should the Church wish to exercise
its option to purchase the subject property, it must do so between May
18, 2001 and May 28, 2001 by: (1) paying an additional $550; (2)
entering into a long term purchase agreement with Paz; and (3) utilizing
Alliance Title of Caldwell as the closing agency. The plaintiffs began
making what they believed to be monthly purchase payments of $550 on
July 1, 2000. Paz contends the payments were rent payments under the
terms of the lease. The plaintiffs subsequently presented Paz with a
second payment of $2,500 on July 5, 2000. Then, in Mayor June of 2001,
the plaintiffs allege Paz informed Pastor that state regulations
prohibited him from selling the subject property until two years had
lapsed from when he sold the commercial property to the City of
Caldwell.
In the spring of 2003, the Church came up with sufficient funding to
payoff the remaining balance of the purchase price and Pastor
approached Paz to acquire title to the
Page 3
subject property. At that time, Paz informed him that the Church had not
exercised its option to purchase the property pursuant to the terms of
the contract. Paz did, however, indicate that he would be willing to
sell the subject property to the Church for $70,000. He further stated
that he would credit against the new asking price the $5,000 payment
made by the plaintiffs, $1,294 the plaintiffs paid to keep the building
insured, $1,837.49 they paid in property taxes, and $108.81 they paid
for irrigation assessments, bringing the requested purchase price down
to $61,759.70.[fnl]
The plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, claiming they had a
contractual right to purchase the subject property for $52,500. Paz
denied the plaintiffs' claim, and filed a counterclaim seeking a quiet
title jUdgment. Paz then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing
that the contract executed by the parties constituted a lease agreement
with an option to purchase and that the plaintiffs had failed to
exercise the option. Although the district court found that the contract
unambiguously constituted a lease agreement with an option to purchase,
it initially denied Paz' motion on the ground that a material factual
dispute might exist concerning the statement allegedly made by Paz in
Mayor June of 2001, regarding his ability to sell the property. On
reconsideration, the district court found that Paz' alleged statement
was immaterial and granted his motion for summary judgment, holding that
the plaintiffs never exercised their contractual option to purchase. The
district court subsequently quieted title to the property in Paz' name.
The plaintiffs appeal.
II.
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The following issues will be addressed in this opinion: (1) whether
the district court erred in finding that the parties' written contract
was a lease with an option to purchase and subsequently granting Paz'
motion for summary judgment, and (2) whether either party is entitled to
attorney fees or costs on appeal.
A.

When reviewing a summary judgment order, this Court applies the same
standard as the district court. Foster v. Traul,
Idaho 890, 892,
(2005). Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file,
Page 4
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." loR.C.P. 56(c). "If there is no genuine
issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over which this
Court exercises free review." Infanger v. Ci ty of Salmon,
Idaho 45,
, 44 P.le!
, 1102 (2002). This Court will construe all disputed
facts liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable
inferences will be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Hayward v.
Jack's Pharmacy Inc., 141 Idaho 622, 625, 115P.3d713, 116 (2005). If
the facts are such that reasonable persons could reach differing
results, summary judgment is improper. Id.
B.
At dispute in this case is whether the plaintiffs have an ownership
right in the subject property pursuant to the parties' written contract.
Paz argues, and the district court found, that the parties' contract
constituted a lease agreement with an option to purchase and that the
plaintiffs failed to exercise the option. The plaintiffs maintain that
the contract constituted a contract for sale of the subject property,
which Paz breached by failing to transfer title when presented with the
purchase price. In the alternative, they argue that even if the Court
finds the contract to be a lease agreement with an option to purchase,
they exercised the option by paying Paz $2,500 on July 5, 2000.
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel
precludes summary judgment in this case.
i.

As an initial matter, this Court must determine the legal effect of
the parties' written contract. "The interpretation of a contract begins
wi th the language of the contract i tsel f." Independence Lead Mines Co.
v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 26, 1311>.30409, 413 (2006). If the
language of the contract is unambiguous, then its meaning and legal
effect must be determined from its words. Shawver v. Huckleberry
Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 361, 931'.30685, 692 (2004). "A contract
is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to conflicting
interpretations." Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 185,
743, 746 (2003). Determining whether a contract is ambiguous is a
question of law over which this Court exercises free review.
Id.

5

The express terms of the parties' contract unambiguously provided that
it was a lease agreement with an option to purchase. Paragraph five of
the contract, which delineated the pricing terms, stated that the total
purchase price of the subject property was to be $52,500 with nothing
; (,0
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down, and that the "[bJalance of the purchase price to be paid as
follows: LEASE WITH AN OPTION TO PURCHASE AT $52,500." Paragraph eight
provided additional terms and conditions, it stated in relevant part:
THE TENANTS ARE TO HAVE POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY AND LEASE AT $550.00 A MONTH. LEASE
PAYMENTS ARE TO BE PAID AT THE BEGINNING OF EACH
MONTH. THE TENANT IS TO EXERCISE THE PURCHASE
OPTION BETWEEN MAY 18TH 2001 AND MAY 28TH 2001 BY
PAYING $550.00 AND ENTERING INTO THE LONG TERM
PURCHASE AGREEMENTS.
THE CLOSING AGENCY IS TO BE ALLIANCE TITLE OF
CALDWELL, ID.
THE TENANTS ARE TO PAY FOR ALL MAINTENANCE,
UPKEEP, UTILITIES AND PROVIDE THEIR OWN
INSURANCE.
The language of the contract indicates it is not
to sell, as suggested by the plaintiffs. Rather,
plaintiffs an option to purchase the property at
the specified price of $52,500. A reading of the
language establishes that the parties executed a
option to purchase.

an absolute agreement
the language grants the
a specified time for
contract's plain
lease agreement with an

The plaintiffs contend that Pastor believed he was signing a simple
sale contract in accordance with the parties' prior oral agreement and
intended to purchase, not lease, the subject property. Pastor's
subjective belief is inconsistent with the plain language of the
contract. The parties do not dispute that Pastor did not review the
terms of the contract at the time of signing due to his inability to
read English. Pastor's erroneous belief that he was signing a sale
contract will not excuse his failure to read the contract's terms prior
to signing, nor will it allow him to avoid the contract's terms on the
ground that he did not understand them. [fn2] Constantine v.
McDonald, 25 Idaho 342, 344, 137 P. 531, 531 (1913) (a person who cannot
read the language in which a contract is written has a duty to procure
someone to read and explain it to him before signing).
6

Further, the plaintiffs' contention that the parties' written contract
was merely a reproduction of the parties' previous oral agreement and
should be enforced as such is misplaced. Paragraph 22 of the contract
contained a merger clause, the purpose of which is to establish that the
writing constituted the parties' entire agreement and superseded all
prior informal understandings. Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 142,
106
(2005). Any informal oral agreement the parties may have
reached regarding the subject property was superseded by the written
agreement and cannot now be relied upon to alter or change its plain
language.
Last, the plaintiffs argue that the document's heading
"Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement"
indicates that the agreement was a contract for sale. When interpreting
contractual provisions, the agreement must be viewed as a whole to
determine the parties' intent. Lickley v. Max Herbold r Inc.,
133 Idaho
, 211, 984P.2d697, 699 (1999). If, after viewing the contract in
its entirety, it appears that preprinted portions of the form conflict
with written portions, "the written parts control the printed parts, and
,. 1"' ....~
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the parts which are purely original control those which are copied from
a form, and if the two are absolutely repugnant, the latter must be so
far disregarded." I.C. § 29-109. In this case, the written contractual
provisions establish it was a lease agreement with an option to
purchase.
In sum,
the plain
option to
contracts

though Pastor may have thought he was signing a sale contract,
language established that it was a lease agreement with an
purchase. "Courts do not possess the roving power to rewrite
in order to make them more equitable." Shawver,
at693. The district court did not err in holding that the
parties' written contract was a lease agreement with an option to
purchase.
ii.

Similarly, the district court did not err in finding that Paz did not
breach the contract. "A breach of contract occurs when there is a
failure to perform a contractual duty." Shawver, 140 Idaho 361,
93
at692. The plaintiffs contend that Paz had a contractual
obligation to convey the subject property when Pastor approached him in
2003 with the balance of the purchase price. This argument is
inconsistent with the contract's terms, which established that the
Church was merely a lessee upon signing. Paz did not have an obligation
to sell the property pursuant to the contract until the
Page 7
plaintiffs exercised the option in the manner prescribed in the parties'
contract. See Sutheimer v. Stoltenberg, 127 Idaho 81, 86, 8961".2<1989,
(Ct .App. 1995) (optionors have no duty to convey title unless and
until the option is exercised, "until then, no bilateral sale contract
exist[sl"). By failing to exercise the option within the specified time
period the plaintiffs allowed the option to expire, thereby relieving
Paz of any potential contractual duty to sell the property.
The plaintiffs argue that even if this Court interprets the contract
to embody a lease with an option to purchase, they exercised the option
by making a $2,500 payment on July 5, 2000. The plaintiffs' position
that the $2,500 dollars they put down exercised the option to
purchase the property - is likewise contrary to the terms of the
contract. Assuming that a portion of the $2,500 payment could be
attributed to the $550 that was to be paid between May 18, 2001 and May
28, 2001, it is still undisputed that the plaintiffs did not execute any
long-term purchase agreements as required by the contract, nor did they
close the purchase through Alliance Title per the contract's terms.
Last, the plaintiffs allege that in Mayor June of 2001, Paz informed
Pastor that state regulations prohibited him from selling the subject
property until two years had lapsed from the time he sold his commercial
property to the City of Caldwell. The plaintiffs do not state what they
allege the legal effect of Paz' statement was. Paz' statement did not
become a part of, alter, or modify the contract as there was no meeting
of the minds between the parties that such would be the case. See Barry
v. Pacific West Canst., Inc., 140 I<laho 827, 831, 103P.3d440, 444
(2004). The plaintiffs do not allege mistake in their pleadings, nor do
they seek any relief in the form of reformation. Furthermore there is no
indication (1) that the plaintiffs tried to exercise their option at the
time provided in the agreement or at any time within the next year, or
(2) that Paz ever withdrew the option, or took any action precluding the
plaintiffs from exercising the option during the time prescribed.
Therefore, the district court correctly held that Paz' alleged statement
, ,...., r,
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was immaterial and did not preclude summary judgment.
iii.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argue for the first time that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment because it did not consider the
doctrine of quasi-estoppel.
Page 8
An issue raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered by
this Court. McPheters v. Maile,
Idaho 391, 397, 64P.3d317, 323
(2003) .

c.
Paz seeks attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121, alleging that the
action was brought frivolously. Paz is not entitled to an award because
the plaintiffs did not act frivolously or unreasonably in this matter.
Paz additionally seeks attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3),
which provides that the prevailing party shall recover attorney fees in
a civil action to recover on a contract relating to the purchase or sale
of goods or services and in any commercial transaction.[fn3] Paz does
not seek attorney fees on the basis that the case involved a commercial
transaction. Rather, Paz characterizes the case as a contract action.
However, the contract branch of Idaho Code § 12-120(3) pertains only to
contracts for the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or
services. By its own terms, it does not apply to contracts for the
rental or purchase of real property. Because Paz merely cites to Idaho
Code § 12-120(3) and does not provide any argument justifying an award
under that section, his request is denied. Craig Johnson Const., LLC v.
Floyd Town Architects,

P.A.,

142 Idaho 797,

803,

134P.3d

,654

(2006) .
III.

The district court is affirmed. The parties' written contract
unambiguously constituted a lease agreement with an option to purchase.
The plaintiffs failed to exercise the purchase option per the contract's
terms. Therefore, Paz had no contractual obligation to sell the property
to the plaintiffs and did not breach the contract by failing to do so.
Costs, but not attorney fees, are awarded to Paz.
Justices TROUT and BURDICK CONCUR.
[fnl] Plaintiffs did not seek to recover the taxes and assessments they
paid, which appear to be the responsibility of Paz under the contract,
nor do they seek to recover for certain improvements they made to the
building.

[fn2] Plaintiffs did not allege that Paz fraudulently induced Pastor to
sign the contract by affirmatively misrepresenting its contents.

[fn3] Of interest is the fact that Paz was awarded attorney fees below.
In its written decision on the matter, the district court recited that
"[t]he parties are in agreement that the defendant is the prevailing
party and entitled to recover reasonable attorneys based on I.C. §
12-120(3) and under the terms of the agreement between the parties."
There is nothing in the record to indicate whether the award under
"1"\'-"
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§ 12-120(3) was based on the contract provision or the commercial
transaction provision. On appeal, however, Paz does not assert a right
to fees under either the agreement between the parties or under the
commercial transaction provision.

Page 9

Justice EISMANN, concurring in the result in part and dissenting in
part.
I concur in the result in Parts II.A and B. I do so not because I
disagree with the reasoning, but because the issues addressed were not
properly raised on appeal. I agree that Respondent did not properly
request attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) because he did not
contend that this was a commercial transaction. However, because I
believe he is entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code
§
I respectfully dissent as to that portion of Part II.C.
Attorney fees on appeal are awardable under Idaho Code § 12-121 if the
appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.
Gustaves v. Gustaves, 138 Idaho 64, 57 P.3d 775 (2002). The appeal in
this case certainly qualifies.
We have consistently held that issues on appeal must be raised in the
opening brief. Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 982 P.ld 940 (1999).
"In order to be considered by this Court, the appellant is required to
identify legal issues and provide authorities supporting the arguments
in the opening brief. A reviewing court looks to the initial brief on
appeal for the issues presented on appeal." Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins.
Co.,
Idaho
,50S, 95 P.3d 917, 990 (2004)
(citations omitted).
This Court will not address an issue raised only in the reply brief.
Hogg v. Wolske,
Idaho
, 130 P.3d 10S7 (2006); Suitts v. Nix,

State v.

, ll1P.3dll0 (2005); Hernandez v. State, 1271da110685,
(1995); State v. Killinger, 126 Idaho 137, 890P.2d323 (1995);
Raudebaugh,
Idaho 758, 763, 864P.2d596, 601 (1993).

In their opening brief, the Appellants did not list any issues on
appeal. They did not dispute that the contract they signed was a lease
with an option to purchase. In fact, that is what they repeatedly stated
it was.[ful] They presented argument on only two issues:
Page 10
(1) the district court should have considered the doctrine of
quasi-estoppel and (2) the district court should have found that the
Appellants exercised their option to purchase the property. The first
issue was not raised in the trial court, and therefore the majority
rightfully did not address it on appeal. Interestingly, that is the only
issue on which the Appellants provided any authority in their briefing.
With respect to the second issue, the Appellants entire argument in
their opening brief was as follows:
Further under the facts, the court should have
found with respect to the lease/option which
respondent had appellant Pastor sign, that the
appellants had exercised the option to purchase,
the respondent having received $5,000 on the
transaction for which he never gave any credit in
writing, or orally informed the appellants that
that was consideration for his having leased the
Darigold property to appellants with the option
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(Opening brief, pp. 17 18)

In arguing that the district court should have found that they had
exercised the option to purchase, the Appellants did not even address
the contractual requirements for doing so. The contract states, "The
tenant is to exercise the purchase option between May 18th 2001 and May
28th 2001 by paying $550.00 and entering into the long term purchase
agreements." The Appellants totally ignored the additional requirement
that they enter into a long-term purchase agreement. The agreement also
states, "The closing agency is to be Alliance Title of Caldwell, Id."
The Appellants also ignore the fact that there was no closing.
Page 11
In their reply brief, the Appellants responded to Respondent's
argument that they had not exercised their option to purchase. In doing
so, they simply reiterated that they had paid the $550. They did not
address the other requirement that they also execute a long-term
purchase agreement, nor did they mention the lack of any closing. Their
entire argument was as follows:
Was the option exercised? It is Appellants'
contention that it was. By the terms of the
option to exercise it, the payment of $550.00
was to have been made between May 18, 2001 and
May 28, 2001. Actually, the $550.009 had already
been paid. The payment was acknowledged when the
agreement was executed. Reference is made to
paragraph 6
"EARNEST MONEY". As much as the
receipt of July 5, 2000 acknowledges the payment
of $2,500.00 on the building, why was such
payment required of Appellants if it did not
apply to the purchase of the building and,
certainly, many times over exceeded the $550.00
payment to exercise the option in 2001.
It was only in their reply brief that the
Appellants made a half-hearted effort to argue that
the agreement may be ambiguous, and they did so
only in response to the Respondent's argument that
it was unambiguous. The Appellants admit, "This
Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement form was
converted into a lease option by a realtor employed
by Mr. Paz." (Reply brief, p. 4) They then argued
that the document's heading, without reading its
contents, could cause one to believe it was a
purchase contract. "The agreement of June 22, 2000
upon examination without study gives the impression
that it was a 'Commercial/Investment Real Estate
Purchase and Sale Agreement', as it is identified
and not a lease." (Reply brief, p. 5; emphasis
added) Even then, the Appellants admitted it was a
lease. They continued, "Mr. Paz could have
explained to Mr. Pastor that it was not a purchase
and sale agreement as it appeared, but a lease with
an option to purchase." (Reply brief, p. 5)
The only issue properly raised by Appellants on appeal was whether
they had exercised their option to purchase. In arguing that issue, they
do not even address the contractual requirements for doing so. In my
opinion, this appeal was brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably,

. '"'
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and without foundation.
Chief Justice SCHROEDER CONCURS.
[fnl] For example, they stated:
Respondent did not tell appellant Pastor that
the aqreement was a lease/option and not an
agreement selling the property with a down
payment and monthly installments as stated
before. (Opening brief, p. 5)
An examination of the agreement shows
appellants were to have exercised the option by
making an additional payment of $550 between May
18, 2001 and May 28, 200l. (Opening brief, p. 7)
The discovery by the appellants that the
agreement signed by appellant Pastor was not an
agreement for sale and purchase, but a
lease/option, did not occur until appellants had
arranged to pay the balance of the purchase price
owed respondent. (Opening brief, p. 12)
It appears the reason respondent, instead of
having prepared an agreement for purchase and
sale, had the agreement of lease and option
prepared because he wanted to defer the income
taxes he would have to pay by reason of his sale
of property to the City of Caldwell.
Under the provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code relating to the exchange of properties, and
the income tax advantages for respondent, he knew
he could not immediately sell the property to the
church, which he thought was for one year, and
which he provided in the lease/option agreement
he had appellant Pastor sign. (Opening brief, p.
13 )

In this case respondent to the disadvantage of
appellants by making the agreement between the
parties a lease/option was inconsistent with the
position he had taken that he was purchasing the
Darigold property and selling it to appellant
church. (Opening brief, p. 16)
In this case, the respondent reaped an
unconscionable advantage and appellants suffered
an unconscionable disadvantage by respondent's
changing his position from selling to the
appellant church the Darigold property and having
appellant Pastor sign a lease with an option to
purchase. (Opening brief, p. 17)
Page 1
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MARK R. FULLER (ISB No. 2698)
FULLER & CARR
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE, SUITE 201
P.O. Box 50935
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405-0935
TELEPHONE: (208) 524-5400
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL PARK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho )
)
corporation,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho )
corporation,
SUNNYSIDE
PARK )
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an )
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE )
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL )
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability )
)
corporation,
)
)
Defendants.

Case No. CV-06-7097
REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL
AND PROFESSIONAL PARK TO
PRINTCRAFT'S MEMORANDUM
IN RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

COMES NOW, the Defendant, Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park, an
Idaho limited liability corporation ("SIPP"), through its counsel of record, Mark R. Fuller of
Fuller & Carr, and submits this Reply to Printcraft Press, Inc.'s ("Printcraft") Memorandum
in Response to Motion for Summary Judgment.

REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE INDllSTRIJl,L AND PROFESSIOl'JJl.L P!-iRK
TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDU]\1 IN RESPONSE TO ~10TION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1

REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATED TO SIPP'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1. Plaintiff has repeatedly relied upon the statements given by Doyle Beck, during the
May 30,2007 Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., as though
such statements were admissions of Defendant SIPP. Defendant SIPP asserts
that Doyle Beck provided testimony in response to a 30(b)(6) subpoena directed
solely to Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., and Doyle Beck was not testifying on behalf
of Defendant SIPP during such deposition. See Plaintiff's Amended Notice of
Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Defendant pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6). SIPP
was not a party to this case until July 5,2007.
ARGUMENT

I. BREACH OF THIRD PARTY UTILITY AGREEMENT
A. Defendant SIPP is not a party to the Third Party Utility Agreement

Despite filing a claim for breach of the Third Party Utility Agreement against SIPP,
Printcraft now acknowledges that "the Defendant SIPP is not a party to the written Third
Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement and therefore has no liability thereunder." See
Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. 18, fn. 1. Printcraft's filing of a claim for Breach of the Third
Party Beneficiary Agreement against SIPP was patently frivolous.
B. Printcraft is not entitled to enforce the alleged oral agreement against

SIPP
Printcraft is not entitled to enforce any alleged oral agreement, because there is no
issue of material fact that Printcraft's discharges were in violation of state and federal

REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL PARK
TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
Sm1MARY JUDGMENT - 2
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rules and regulations. See Order entered July 5, 2007. Defendant SIPP re-alleges and
incorporates Defendant Sunnyside Utilities' argument regarding the oral agreement now
alleged by Printcraft. SIPP is entitled to Summary Judgment regarding Printcraft's attempt
to recover under breach of any alleged oral agreement for Printcraft to receive sewer
services.
II. CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD

Printcraft's two causes of action for Constructive Fraud must fail because Printcraft
has produced no evidence of a relationship of trust and confidence between SIPP and
Printcraft. Under Mitchell v. 8arendregt, the Court held that "[b]ecause no legally
enforceable relationship of trust and confidence existed between Mitchell and Berendregt,
no action for constructive fraud can arise from their dealings." 120 Idaho 837,844,820

P.2d 707 (Ida. App. 1991) (Emphasis Added). Printcraft's allegation of a two constructive
fraud claims without any evidence of a relationship of trust and confidence between SIPP
and Printcraft was frivolous.
III. FAILURE TO DISCLOSE ANDIOR MISREPRESENTATION
A. Duty to Disclose

Defendant SIPP had no duty to disclose any information regarding Sunnyside Park
Utilities, Inc.'s sewer system to Printcraft Press because there was no relationship
whatsoever between SIPP and Printcraft. Printcraft claims the following actions by SIPP
created a duty for SIPP to disclose information related to Sunnyside Utilities' sewer
facilities to Printcraft:

REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL PARK
TO PLAINTIFF'S MEt10RANDUM IN RESPONSE TO l'10TION FOR
SUlvjMARY ,JUDGMENT - 3

(1) SIPP named the subdivision "Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park" (this
includes placement of a sign by the entrance to the subdivision, creation and recordation
of a plat map, and creation and recordation of CC&Rs for the subdivision);
(2) the receipt by SIPP of the April 15, 2002 letter from District Seven Health Department;
and
(3) SIPP allegedly was involved in meetings with Printcraft prior to the construction of the
building Printcraft now occupies. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. 25-27.
SIPP re-asserts and incorporates by reference the arguments and case law set
forth in Sunnyside Utilities' reply brief regarding the duty to disclose as if set forth fully
herein.
Printcraft claims that by naming the subdivision "Sunnyside Industrial and
Professional Park," SIPP had the duty to inform Printcraft that Sunnyside Utilities' sewer
system was not capable of treating Printcraft's discharges of hazardous chemicals, inks,
water softener brine, and other discharges from Printcraft's printing processes. Printcraft's
claim is without merit.
Printcraft asserts that Travis Waters read the sign for the subdivision near the
entrance to the subdivision which stated: "Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park"
and that as a result Printcraft believed that the subdivision would be an ideal location for
Printcraft's "commercial printing business." See Affidavit of Travis Waters, para. 16 and
19. Printcraft asserts that "This sign, all by itself, led Plaintiff to believe that 'industrial'
businesses using 'industrial' processes were and could be occupants of the subdivision."
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See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. 25. Printcraft has not presented any evidence that

"industrial" businesses using "industrial" processes are not and cannot be occupants of
the subdivision. There simply is no such restriction. However, just because an "industrial"
business can occupy the subdivision does not entitle the "industrial" business to
discharge any substances into Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system. An "industrial"
business can operate in the subdivision without discharging "processed" wastes into
Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system. Corporate Express is an example, in that Corporate
Express, which occupies four lots in the subdivision, is an "industrial" business with its
own sewer system. See Deposition of Sunnyside Utilities, pg. 216, I. 4-14. Miskin
Scraper Works, which occupies the largest parcel in the subdivision, is another example,
in that Miskin Scraper works is an "industrial" business connected to the City of Idaho
Falls sewer system. See Deposition of Sunnyside Utilities, pg. 240, I. 13-16. Printcraft was
not mislead by the sign because the sign accurately states that "Industrial and
Professional" businesses can operate within the subdivision in compliance with state and
federal law.
Printcraft claims that it is entitled to rely on descriptions of uses in the CC&Rs for
the subdivision. However, Printcraft failed to note that the property governed by the
CC&Rs does not include Lot 5 of Block 1 of the subdivision, the parcel occupied by
Printcraft. See Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, attached as Exhibit "H" to the
Affidavit of Travis Waters. The legal description of the property governed by the CC&Rs
is:
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Lots 6-10, Block 1; Lots 4-5, Block 2; Lots 1-7, Block 3, and Lots 1-8, Block 4,
Sunnyside Professional and Industrial Park, Division 1, Bonneville County, Idaho,
according to the plat thereof, recorded August 4, 1999, as Bonneville County
Instrument Number 1003568; all located in the northwest % of Section 36, T2N, R
37 EMB. (the "Development Area.").
Id. Creation and recordation of CC&Rs for property in the same general vicinity as

Printcraft does not give rise to any duty to disclose to occupants of a parcel not governed
by the CC&Rs.
The creation and recordation of the plat map does not create a duty to disclose
either. Printcraft claims that the plat map and the CC&Rs, by indicating that the
subdivision can be used for commercial and industrial purposes, "create the very
ambiguity contemplated by Krebs, that requires additional disclosure by the Defendants in
order to avoid misleading occupants of the subdivision about what is and what is not
allowed as a sewer discharge." See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. 26. Nothing on the plat
map indicates that Printcraft is automatically entitled to discharge any sewage in
whatever manner Printcraft chooses. See Plat map. Contrary to Printcraft's assertion,
there was no need to inform Printcraft about "what is and what is not allowed as a sewer
discharge" when Printcraft had no right to discharge any sewage.
Printcraft, like all other tenants in the subdivision, had four options to make
arrangements for discharge of its sewer prior to Printcraft's occupancy of the building:
OPTION 1: Contract for sewer services from Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., an

independent utility company;
OPTION 2: Contract for sewer services from the owner of the property;
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OPTION 3: Install an on-site, individual system (like Corporate Express); or
OPTION 4: Contract for sewer services from the City of Idaho Falls (like Miskin
Scraper Works).
Printcraft did not exercise option 1. See Deposition of Printcraft Press, pg. 109, In.
25 through pg. 110, In. 2. (Q: "Did Sunnyside promise anything to Printcraft before
Printcraft began occupancy? A: No."). Printcraft did not exercise option 2. See Affidavit of
Luke Boyle, para. 5. ('The understanding between J&LB, CTR, and the Plaintiff was that
the lessees of the premises would be responsible to pay for and obtain a sewer
connection from the subdivision ... ") 1 There is no evidence that Printcraft exercised
options 3 or 4. If Prinlcraft had exercised any of these options, prior to its occupancy of
the building this litigation likely could have been avoided.
Printcraft was entitled to and continues to occupy Lot 5 of Block 1 in the
subdivision and operate an Industrial or Commercial business. Nothing on the plat map,
the CC&Rs or the sign is misleading regarding Printcraft's illegal dumping of hazardous
chemicals, inks, water softener brine, large volumes of water, etc. down J&LP Properties'
drain lines and Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system.
Because Printcraft has failed to provide any evidence which would support
imposition of a duty to disclose on SIPP, Printcraft's causes of action for nondisclosure
and constructive fraud must fail against SIPP. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 US 317,
321, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). There is simply nothing which would justify
obtained a sewer connection
to eTR Management or
ide Utili ties.

prior to occupancy. However, eTR Devel
intcraft Press, obtained sewer services
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imposition of an affirmative duty to disclose on SIPP. SIPP is entitled to Summary

Judgment on Printcraft's causes of action for fraud because of Printcraft's failure to
produce any evidence which would establish a duty for SIPP to disclose information
regarding Sunnyside Park Utilities' sewer facilities to Printcraft.
B. Materiality, Reliance, and Damages

SIPP re-alleges and re-asserts the argument of Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., set
forth in its Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum regarding materiality, reliance, and damages
as if set forth fully herein.
CONCLUSION
Printcraft Press is not entitled to enforce or collect damages for a breach of
contract against SIPP because (1) SIPP was not a party to the Third Party Beneficiary
Agreement; and (2) Printcraft is not entitled to enforce any oral agreement against SIPP
because of Printcraft's violations of state and federal rules and regulations. SIPP is
entitled to Summary Judgment on Printcraft's cause of action for Breach of Contract.
Printcraft Press is not entitled to recovery for its causes of action for non-disclosure
and/or misrepresentation or constructive fraud because there was no relationship
between Printcraft and SIPP and no unusual circumstances have been proven by
Printcraft. Printcraft has not proven that any non-disclosures were material to Printcraft's
decision to occupy J&LB Properties' building, or that Printcraft was justified in relying on
any alleged non-disclosure. Furthermore, Printcraft has not suffered any damages as a
direct and proximate result of any alleged non-disclosure.
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SIPP requests Summary Judgment against Printcraft on all of Printcraft's causes
of action.
DATED this

1

day of _--,¥:..;:.c'
7 f = - - ' - - - ' 2007.

Mark R. Fuller
Fuller & Carr
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9
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PROFESSIONAL PARK TO PLAINTIFF'S
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MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Document Served:

Attorney Served:
Lane Erickson, Esq.
Mitchell Brown, Esq.
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MARK R. FULLER (ISB No. 2698)
FULLER & CARR
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE, SUITE 201
P.O. Box 50935
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405-0935
TELEPHONE: (208) 524-5400
AnORNEY FOR DEFENDANT SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho )
corporation,
)

)
Plaintiff,

)
)
v.
)
)
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho )
corporation,
SUNNYSIDE
PARK )
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an)
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE)
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL)
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability )
corporation,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)

Case No. CV-06-7097

REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE PARK
UTILITIES TO PLAINTIFF'S
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COMES NOW, the Defendant, Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., an Idaho corporation
("Sunnyside Utilities"), through its counsel of record, Mark R. Fuller of Fuller & Carr, and
submits this Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to Motion for Summary
Judgment.
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ARGUMENT
I. BREACH OF CONTRACT
A. Third Party Beneficiary

Printcraft is not entitled to enforce the Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement
because Printcraft persistently violated Sunnyside Utilities' Rules and Regulations and
Printcraft violated applicable state and federal rules and regulations. See Order RE:
Pending Motions entered July 5,2007. These facts are not disputed by Printcraft.
Furthermore, Printcraft is merely an incidental third party beneficiary to the Third
Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement and therefore has no rights to enforce the agreement.
Printcraft argues that because of the title of the Third Party Beneficiary Utility
Agreement "there has to be a third party somewhere." See Plaintiffs Memorandum, pg.

22. Sunnyside Utilities admits that there are a virtually unlimited number of third party
beneficiaries (some are intended beneficiaries and all others are merely incidental
beneficiaries) under the agreement. However, case law limits the third party beneficiaries
that can enforce the agreement to the "intended" third party beneficiaries. See Stewart v.
Arrington Construction Company, 92 Idaho 526, 446 P.2d 895 (1968).
Printcraft states: "[u]nder the Defendants argument no one in the Sunnyside
Professional and Industrial Park would be an intended beneficiary despite the title of the
Third Party Beneficiary Agreement or the language contained therein." See Plaintiffs
Memorandum, pg. 22. First, there is no requirement that an agreement titled 'Third Party
Beneficiary Utility Agreement" must have intended third party beneficiaries as opposed to
merely incidental third party beneficiaries. In addition, there is a clearly defined and
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limited class of intended third party beneficiaries to the agreement. The "present owners
and occupants" of the subdivision at the time the agreement was entered into in March
of 2002, are the intended third party beneficiaries of the agreement. See Third Party
Agreement, attached as Exhibit "G" to Travis Waters Affidavit. The "future owners and
occupants" of any of the subdivisions to be served by the company's sewer systems
are merely incidental beneficiaries of the agreement because such owners constitute a
vague and unlimited class of beneficiaries. Printcraft did not occupy the building until
nearly four years after the agreement was entered into by SPOA and Sunnyside Utilities.
Printcraft as a "future" occupant is only an incidental third party beneficiary to the "Third
Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement", with no rights to enforce the agreement.
Sunnyside Utilities is entitled to Summary Judgment because Printcraft has no
right, as an incidental beneficiary, to enforce the agreement, Printcraft was in persistent
violation of the agreement, and Printcraft violated applicable state and federal rules and
regulations.
B. Printcraft's violations of state and federal rules and regulations precludes
Printcraft from enforcing any contract for sewer services
Printcraft's violation of applicable state and federal rules and regulations precludes
any attempt by Printcraft to recover for breach of an oral contract. Printcraft was in
continuing violation of state and federal rules and regulations for sewer service up until
the day that Sunnyside Utilities disconnected Printcraft from the sewer system. See Order
entered July 5, 2007, and prior briefing.
Apparently, Printcraft is now claiming that in October, 2006, the Defendants
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entered into an oral agreement with Printcraft, wherein the Defendants agreed to waive
compliance with the state and federal rules and regulations and to allow Printcraft to
continue illegally discharging multiple substances into Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system.
See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pgs. 20-21. ("In October 2006, the Defendants, by and
through its officer and/or member Kirk Woolf inspected and approved the changes that
were made by the Plaintiff. .. Thereafter, Plaintiff operated its printing business as
inspected and approved by the Defendants for two months without incident.") Defendants
strongly dispute that such an agreement was ever made. No other oral contract has been
asserted by the Plaintiff. Even if, for purposes of this motion, the Court assumes that such
an agreement was reached between the parties, such agreement is unenforceable by
Printcraft because of its illegality. Printcraft's version of the contract, if believed by a jury,
would preclude a recovery under a breach of contract claim by any of the parties to the
agreement, including Printcraft.
In Idaho, Courts have held that when faced with an illegal agreement, the Court
will leave the parties as its finds them, and neither party will be entitled to enforce the
agreement against the other. Barry v. Pacific West Const., 140 Idaho 827, 832, 103 P.3d
440 (2004). "When the Court 'leaves the parties where it finds them,' it denies recovery to
either party." Id.
There is no dispute that Printcraft's discharges were in violation of state and
federal rules and regulations. See Order, entered July 5, 2007. The direct result of the

Court's earlier Order is: (1) that Printcraft breached any possible contract by violating
state and federal rules and regulations; or (2) that any possible contract for sewer
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service was illegal and unenforceable. Printcraft is not entitled to enforce either an
illegal contract or a contract which Printcraft has already breached. This Court can and
should rule as a matter of law that Printcraft is not entitled to a recovery for any breach
of any sewer services contract.
C. Amendment of the Complaint
Plaintiff's argument that the Court would not have allowed amendment of the
Complaint if Printcraft did not have a valid cause of action for Breach of Contract is
baseless. The Court made the correct decision to allow the amendment of the Complaint
even if the Court believed that Printcraft would be unable to support the allegations made
in Printcraft's Amended Complaint. The Court's decision to allow the amendment has no
bearing on whether or not the Court should grant a Motion for Summary Judgment to the
Defendants.
A court "may not consider the sufficiency of evidence supporting the claim sought
to be added in determining leave to amend because that is more properly determined at
the summary judgment stage." Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, 138 Idaho 200,61
P.3d 557 (2002) (Emphasis Added). Printcraft's Amended Complaint does state a valid
claim for breach of a third party beneficiary contract. See Amended Complaint. However,
stating a valid claim is not the equivalent of proving a valid claim. If the Court had
considered evidence beyond the mere allegations in the proposed amended complaint, in
determining whether or not to grant the Motion to Amend, the Court would have exceeded
the scope of its discretion. The proper time for the Court to consider the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting Printcraft's allegations is the Summary Judgment stage. The Court
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should now decide whether or not the evidence put forth by Printcraft is sufficient to
sustain the causes of action that Printcraft alleged in the Amended Complaint.
II. CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD
Printcraft's two causes of action for Constructive Fraud must fail because Printcraft
has produced no evidence of a relationship of trust and confidence between Sunnyside
utilities and Printcraft. Under Mitchell v. Barendregt, the Court held that "[b]ecause no
legally enforceable relationship of trust and confidence existed between Mitchell and
Berendregt, no action for constructive fraud can arise from their dealings." 120 Idaho
837, 844, 820 P.2d 707 (Ida. App. 1991) (Emphasis Added). Printcraft's allegation of a
two constructive fraud claims without any evidence of a relationship of trust and
confidence between Sunnyside Utilities and Printcraft was frivolous.
III. FAILURE TO DISCLOSE AND/OR MISREPRESENTATION AND CONSTRUCTIVE
FRAUD
A. Duty to Disclose
Printcraft is not entitled to recovery under its various fraud theories because
Sunnyside Utilities had no duty to disclose to Printcraft. Printcraft claims that Sunnyside
Utilities' duty to disclose arises from the following circumstances:
(1) Sunnyside Utilities' failure to record the Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement;
(2) the receipt by Sunnyside Utilities of the April 15, 2002 letter from District Seven Health
Department; and
(3) participation by Sunnyside Utilities in meetings with Printcraft prior to the construction
of the building Printcraft now occupies (pursuant to an oral month-to-month sub-lease
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agreement between Printcraft and CTR Management). See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pgs.
25-27.
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated: "Only when a defendant owes a duty to the
plaintiff does tort liability exist." Summers v. Cambridge Joint School Oist No. 432, 139
Idaho 953,955, 88 P.3d 772 (2004). The Utah Supreme Court held that "[a] person who
possesses important, even vital, information of interest to another has no legal duty to
communicate the information where no relationship between the parties exists."
Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283, 287 (Utah 2006) (Emphasis
Added). Idaho's case law is consistent with the Utah Supreme Court holding. The Idaho
Supreme Court has stated that "one also owes no affirmative duty to act to assist or
protect another absent unusual circumstances, which justify imposing such an affirmative
responsibility." Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 389, 34 P.3d 1069 (Idaho 2001).
Printcraft has not produced evidence that any type of relationship of confidence
and trust existed between Printcraft and Sunnyside Utilities. See Plaintiff's Memorandum
and Supporting Documents. The only direct contractual relationship even alleged to exist
between Printcraft Press and Sunnyside Utilities is an oral contract that was allegedly
made in September or October of 2006, ten months after Printcraft began occupancy of
J&LB Properties' building in January, 2006. Id. There was simply no relationship between
the parties which would justify imposition of a legal duty to disclose prior to Printcraft's
occupancy of the building.
Printcraft alleges that "By the terms of the Agreement Defendants SPU and SPOA
were required to disclose the existence of the Agreement and the Rules and Regulations
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by recording them." See Plaintiffs Memorandum, pg. 25. Nothing in the Third Party
Beneficiary Agreement creates a duty to disclose any information to Printcraft. The
language and terms of the Third Party Beneficiary Agreement do not require recordation
for the benefit of the owners or occupants of Block 1, Lot 5 of the subdivision, the parcel
occupied by Printcraft. Printcraft has mistakenly asserted that the Third Party Beneficiary
Utility Agreement contained terms requiring it to be recorded so that any owner or
occupant of Block 1, Lot 5 of the subdivision would be given notice of the existence of
that document. See Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, para. 22. However, the
provisions of the Agreement that require the Third Party Beneficiary Agreement to be
recorded are not intended to bind owners and occupiers of the parcels within the
subdivision, rather they are intended to bind purchasers (1) of the sewer system, (2) of
the Utility Company or (3) of the lot the sewer facilities are located on, and to put such

purchasers on notice that the sewer system, the Utility Company, and the lot the sewer
is located on are encumbered by obligations to serve any buildings connected to the
sewer facilities. See Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement, Section 1O(a). The
Agreement is intended to run with the land identified in Schedule A of the Agreement.

See §1 O(a) of the Agreement. ("The covenants, reservations, restrictions or conditions
herein set forth are and shall be deemed to be covenants, reservations, restrictions, or
conditions imposed and running with the land and properties of the Company as listed

on Schedule A attached hereto"). The only parcels referred to in Schedule A of the
Agreement are the parcels of property containing the sewer and water facilities. See Third
Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement, Schedule A. Schedule A does not include Block 1,
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Lot 5, the parcel occupied by Printcraft, and owned by J&LB Properties. If a duty to
disclose did arise from the failure to record the Agreement, the duty would only be toward
potential purchasers (1) of the sewer system; (2) of the Utility Company or (3) of the lot
the sewer facilities are located on.
The April 15, 2002 letter from District Seven Health Department does not give rise
to a duty to disclose. Printcraft asserts: "The prohibition in this letter constitutes,
'information that has been acquired which a party knows will make a representation
untrue or misleading.'" See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. 26. See also Watts v. Krebs, 131
Idaho 616, 620, 962 P.2d 387, 391 (1998). Printcraft fails to identify what prior
representation by Sunnyside Utilities or either of the other defendants, was made untrue
or misleading as a result of this letter, even assuming that the letter has the prohibitive
effect Printcraft claims. Under this part of the Krebs rule recited by Printcraft, before a
duty will arise to disclose information there must have been a previous affirmative
representation. It is undisputed that Sunnyside Utilities never promised to provide sewer
services to Printcraft prior to Printcraft's occupancy of the building. See Deposition of
Printcraft Press, pg. 109, In. 25 through pg. 110, In. 2. There simply was no previous
representation by Sunnyside Utilities which was made untrue or misleading by Sunnyside
Utilities' alleged receipt of the April 15, 2002 letter. Without any prior representations to
Printcraft, Sunnyside Utilities' receipt of the April 15, 2002 letter is irrelevant. There is no
duty to correct a statement which was never made.
Meetings between Sunnyside Utilities and Printcraft also did not give rise to a duty.
At the time of the meetings there was no relationship between Sunnyside Utilities and
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Printcraft, nor has any relationship between the parties been alleged. Printcraft never
purchased any property from Sunnyside Utilities. See Affidavit of Doyle Beck, para. 3.
Printcraft never paid a connection fee for sewer services. Id., para. 4. Printcraft was never
promised any sewer services during those meetings. See Deposition of Printcraft Press,
pg. 109, In. 25 through pg. 110, In. 2. There is simply no reason why Sunnyside Utilities
would have a legal obligation to provide any information regarding Sunnyside Utilities'
sewer facilities to Printcraft during the course of the alleged meetings. "A person who
possesses important, even vital, information of interest to another has no legal duty to
communicate the information where no relationship between the parties exists." Yazd v.
Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283, 287 (Utah 2006)

Because Printcraft has failed to establish that Sunnyside Utilities had a duty to
disclose any information to Printcraft regarding the sewer system, Sunnyside Utilities is
entitled to Summary Judgment regarding Printcraft's causes of action for fraud.
B. Any alleged non-disclosure by the Defendant was not material.

Printcraft's allegations are not sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to
whether or not any alleged non-disclosures by Sunnyside Utilities were material to
Printcraft's decision to occupy J&LB Properties' building. Printcraft attempts to raise
triable issues of fact by stating, that Printcraft would not have occupied the building if it
knew the limitations of the sewer system. However, the issues of fact raised by Printcraft
are not triable issues of fact which preclude Summary Judgment. It is undisputed that
Sunnyside Utilities did not promise sewer services to Printcraft prior to Printcraft's
occupancy of the building. See Printcraft Deposition, pg. 109, In. 25 through pg. 110, In.
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2. It is undisputed that Printcraft was not promised sewer services by J&LB Properties,
the owner of the building. See Lease Agreement between CTR Management and J&LB
Properties. See also Affidavit of Luke Boyle, para. 5. Printcraft chose to occupy the
building without obtaining the right to sewer services from anyone. For Printcraft to claim
that it would not have occupied the building if Printcraft had known that the sewer
services Printcraft was not entitled to receive were not capable of meeting Printcraft's
needs is not sufficient to avoid Summary Judgment. There remain no triable issues of fact
as to whether any non-disclosure was material to Printcraft's decision to enter into an oral
month-to-month lease with CTR Management, and therefore Sunnyside Utilities is entitled
to Summary Judgment on Printcraft's causes of action for fraud.

c. Printcraft did not have the right to rely on any alleged non-disclosure.
Printcraft's use of the Watts v. Krebs case to attempt to establish Printcraft's
justifiable reliance on alleged non-disclosures by Sunnyside Utilities is misplaced. In
Watts v. Krebs, the Court explicitly found the existence of "a relationship of trust and
confidence between the cotenants, which in turn gives rise to a duty to disclose." 131
Idaho 616,620-621,692 P.2d 387 (1998). Only as a result of the relationship of trust
and confidence between the parties, the Court held that "Watts had a right to rely on

Krebs' duty to disclose all material facts within his knowledge that may have been
important to her decision to partition the property." Id. Printcraft has not provided any
evidence or even argued that a relationship of trust and confidence existed between the
parties, and there is no evidence in the record from which the Court could find a
relationship of trust and confidence. Sunnyside Utilities did not even promise to provide

REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILIITES TO PLAIN!IFF'S
IvJHlORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO tJ]OTION FOR SUlVlMARY JUDGIvJENi - 11
~-

....)

~,;

t"~

-- ",'

Printcraft with any sewer services. See Deposition of Printcraft Press, pg. 109, In. 25
through pg. 110, In. 2. Printcraft simply had no right to rely on a nondisclosure of
information by Sunnyside Utilities in making its decision to enter into an oral month-tomonth sublease with CTR Management, LLC. Therefore Sunnyside Utilities is entitled to
Summary Judgment on Printcraft's causes of action for fraud.
D. Printcraft has not suffered any damages

Printcraft has not suffered any damages as a result of any alleged fraud by
Sunnyside Utilities. Printcraft received the "benefit of the bargain" as it received sewer
services up until Printcraft breached any agreement for sewer services and Printcraft is
not entitled to "out-af-pocket" damages because it never paid a connection fee to receive
sewer services. See Order RE: Pending Motions entered July 3, 2007 and Affidavit of
Doyle Beck, para. 4. Printcraft simply has not established that it suffered any damages as
a direct and proximate result of any alleged non-disclosures by Sunnyside Utilities.
CONCLUSION
Sunnyside Utilities is entitled to Summary Judgment on Printcraft's cause of action
for breach of contract because of Printcraft's violation of state and federal rules and
regulations. Furthermore, Printcraft is not entitled to enforce the agreement because
Printcraft is merely an incidental beneficiary of the agreement.
Sunnyside Utilities is entitled to Summary Judgment on Printcraft's causes of
action for fraud because Sunnyside Utilities had no duty to disclose. Furthermore, any
non-disclosures by Sunnyside Utilities were not material and Printcraft was not justified in
relying on any non-disclosures because Printcraft was not promised any sewer services
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by Sunnyside Utilities. Furthermore, none of the damages that have allegedly been
suffered by Printcraft were the direct and proximate result of the alleged failures to
disclose by Sunnyside Utilities.
DATED this

q

day Of_.I.4.a""",,~~,---_, 2007.

Mark R. Fuller
Fuller & Carr
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the following
described pleading or document on the attorney listed below on this

q

day of

~lJ: ,2007:
REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES
TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Document Served:

Attorney Served:
Lane Erickson, Esq.
Patrick N. George, Esq.
RACINE, OLSEN, NYE
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED
PO BOX 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Fax: (208)232-6109

---"'---

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

Mark R. Fuller
FULLER & CARR
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an
Idaho corporation,
Plaintiff,
MINUTE ENTRY
Case No.
CV-06-7097

vs.
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an
Idaho corporation,
Defendant.

On the 16th day of August, 2007, Plaintiff's motion for
continuance under 56(f), Defendant's motion for summary judgment
and Plaintiff's motion to strike affidavits hearing came before
the Honorable Richard T. St. Clair, District Judge, in open court
at Idaho Falls, Idaho.
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick,
Deputy Court Clerk, were present.
Mr. Mitch Brown appeared by telephonic connection on behalf
of the Plaintiff.
Mr. Mark Fuller appeared on behalf of the Defendant.
Mr. Brown presented Defendant's motion for continuance under
56(f).

Mr. Fuller argued in opposition to the motion.

presented rebuttal argument.

Mr. Brown

Mr. Fuller presented additional

argument.
The Court denied the motion for continuance.
Mr. Brown presented argument in support of the motion to

strike affidavits.
motion.

Mr.

Fuller argued in opposition to the

Mr. Brown presented rebuttal argument.

The Court denied the motion in part.

The Court will read

the documents and consider any new information.
Mr. Fuller presented Defendant's motion for summary

judgment.
motion.

Mr. Brown presented argument in opposition to the
Mr. Fuller presented rebuttal argument.

The Court will take the matter under advisement and issue an
opinion as soon as possible.
Mr. Fuller will prepare a proposed order for the Court's

signature.
Court was thus adjourned.
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day of August, 2007,

I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to
be delivered to the following:
RONALD LONGMORE

Deputy Court Clerk
Mitchell W. Brown
Lane V. Erickson
PO Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391
Mark R. Fuller
PO Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID

83405

r"n
.JJ..J

MARK R. FULLER (ISB No. 2698)
FULLER & CARR
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE, SUITE 201
P.O. Box 50935
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405-0935
TELEPHONE: (208) 524-5400
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho )
)
corporation,
)
Plaintiff,
)

Case No. CV-06-7097

)
)
v.
)
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho )

ORDER RE: MOTIONS ARGUED
AUGUST 16, 2007

corporation,
SUNNYSIDE
PARK
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
corporation,
Defendants.

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

The above-entitled matter came before the Court pursuant to Defendants' Motions
for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's causes of action for Breach of Contract,
Constructive Fraud and Misrepresentation and/or Nondisclosure and pursuant to
Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavits. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Continue Hearing on the
Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court reviewed such Motions and heard oral

argument on the Motions and after consideration enters the following Findings of Fact
and Orders:
ORDER RE: MOTIONS ARGUED AUGUST 16, 2007 - 1

1. The Court, having interrogated counsel, determined that Plaintiff sought to
continue the hearing for the purpose of obtaining the depositions of Sunnyside
Industrial and Professional Park and Sunnyside Park Owners' Association. The
Court finds that the Deposition of Sunnyside Park Utilities has already occurred,
with deposition testimony being given by Doyle Beck, and that such testimony, for
purposes may be imputed to all three defendants for purposes of the pending
motions. As a result, there is no need to continue the hearing to conduct additional
depositions of the other defendants.
2. Therefore, the Court DENIES the Motion to Continue the Hearing on the Motions
for Summary Judgment.
3. The Court finds that many of the statements in the affidavits of Lane Erickson and
Travis Waters are not based upon personal knowledge and are more properly
characterized as argument than evidence. Such was acknowledged by counsel for
Printcraft.
4. Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Strike in part and DENIES the Motion
to Strike in part. The Court hereby orders that all statements not based upon
personal knowledge in the Affidavits of Lane Erickson and Travis Waters are
stricken from the record. Statements which are expressly based on the affiants'
personal knowledge and the documents attached to the Affidavits are not stricken
from the record and will be considered by the Court in ruling on the pending
Motions for Summary Judgment.
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5. The Court has taken all of the Motions for Summary Judgment under advisement.

DATEDthiS~YOf ~~7

4~~
Honorable Richard St. Clair
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the following
described Order on the attorneys listed below on this

day of

aucrf<4.b

2007:
Document Served:

ORDER RE: MOTIONS ARGUED
AUGUST 16, 2007

Attorney Served:
Mitchell W. Brown, Esq.
Patrick N. George, Esq.
RACINE, OLSEN, NYE
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED
PO BOX 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Fax: (208)232-6109
(Attorney for Plaintiff)
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_ _ Hand Delivery
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Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
Fuller & Carr, Law Offices
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
P.O. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0935
(Attorney for Defendant)
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